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INTRODUCTION
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, [rather] their actions are
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.
Granovetter (1985, p. 487)
This thesis aims to shed light on how the social environment affects economic decision-
making.Humans are social beings and the surrounding social environment has tremen-
dous influence on individuals (e.g., Salganik et al., 2006). Hence, human decision-
making does not take place in a social vacuum, but is surrounded and influenced by
social context, such as social information about and (social) interaction with others
(e.g., Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Granovetter, 1985; Larrick, 2016).
In economics, standard economic theory remains silent on social determinants of
human decision-making in economically relevant situations. In contrast, the rising
field of behavioral economics enriches economic analysis by incorporating findings
from other academic fields, such as (social) psychology, evolutionary biology, anthro-
pology, and sociology. The power and strength of this approach is that it incorporates,
among others, social determinants of economic decisions and could therefore con-
tribute to the understanding of human decision-making. A significant contribution to
the development of behavioral economics comes from data gathered from experimen-
tal research (Villeval, 2007), since some experiments are not designed to test standard
economic theories, but to capture, for instance, social aspects of economic decisions
(Schmidt, 2009). In general, the experimental approach in economics iswell-established
(e.g., Harrison and List, 2004; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Levitt and List, 2009) and de-
veloped efficient tools to measure the impact of certain factors on economic decisions
by isolating them in a controlled environment.
This thesis comprises four independent research articles that examine how the so-
cial environment affects human decision-making by investigating different dimensions
of it. In particular, I will address (i) whether social cues such as age influence coop-
erative behavior of individual decision makers, (ii) if and how changing the decision
environment from individual to group decision-making affects the psychic benefits
of holding a decision right, and (iii) whether social reference points in the form of
peer income trigger relative income concerns, and thus affect honesty. According to
the underlying research questions, this thesis consists of two parts. In the first part,
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Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I focus on whether belonging to different generations (i.e., be-
ing young, old) affects behavior in social dilemma situations. While previous findings
highlight high levels of cooperation among complete strangers, one information about
a “stranger” is relatively easy to observe, the age. In terms of standard economic theory,
this information should not lead to a different behavior. However, from an evolutionary
point of view the intergenerational transmission of cooperative norms is fundamental
for establishing large-scale cooperation (Henrich et al., 2015). Hence, age seems to play
a crucial role in this context. Along this line, I examine two potential mechanisms of
norm transmission from older to younger generations, namely an (i) institutionalized
channel via punishment (Chapter 2), and an (ii) institution-free channel via social and
cultural learning (Chapter 3).
The second part of this thesis consists of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 discusses
a topic which is at the heart of economic decision-making, namely the value decision
makers assign to having the right to decide about outcomes. Standard economic theory
would predict that simply the outcomes at stake matter, but recent behavioral findings
show that having the right to decide creates a value itself, i.e., non-material benefits
of having a decision right (e.g., Bartling et al., 2014). In particular, we are interested
in how this value is affected by the decision-making environment. Therefore, we in-
vestigate whether non-material values of having a decision right change if individuals
decide on their own or within a group. In Chapter 5, we discuss the impact of the social
environment onmoral and ethical decision-making. Given that humans are embedded
in a social structure and are surrounded by others, it is inevitable to get information
about them or to observe certain characteristics. This information allows them to com-
pare themselves with others, i.e., to engage in social comparison. In this study, we
investigate whether social information, i.e., information about the income of a peer,
affects honesty in a situation where dishonesty could be used for monetary gains.
Before I summarize all chapters of this thesis, I want to discuss the methodological
approaches used in this thesis. I used either laboratory experiments or artefactual field
experiments (Harrison and List, 2004) as foundations of my research projects. While
both chapters in the second part of the thesis are standard laboratory experiments
involving a standard subject pool (university students), the research questions in the
first part forced me to enrich this toolbox. In Chapter 2 I conducted a laboratory exper-
iment where we invited students and non-students to the lab (i.e., a combination of a
standard and non-standard subject pool), while in Chapter 3 I ran the experiment in
the field with subjects drawn from the general population and recruited on the spot.
In what follows, I give a summary of each research project.
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Summary of the research projects
Chapter 2 with the title “Cooperation and Third-Party Punishment Within and
Across Generations: An Experimental Study with Juniors and Seniors” is joint work
with Bettina Rockenbach and Matthias Sutter.1 In this paper, we examine whether or
not the institution of third-party punishment could help to transmit innergenerational
cooperative norms from older to younger generations. Therefore, we invited two gener-
ations to our lab, i.e., students in their 20ies and people drawn from the population 50
years and older. Our vehicle of research to test this potential mechanism is a repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with costly third-party punishment. First, both players si-
multaniously decide whether they want to cooperate with each other or not. After the
decisions of the players, the observer learns the decisions of both players and could
punish them at a cost.
We report findings from four treamtentswherewevary the interactionbetweenboth
generations in a systematic way and the generation composition is common knowledge
in all sessions, i.e., two homogeneous treatments where players and observers belong
to the same generation and two heterogeneous treatments where players belong to the
same generation and the observer belongs to the other generation.
We find that members of the older generation achieve significantly higher cooper-
ation rates than members of the younger generation. Moreover, members of the older
generation punish norm violations more often than members of the younger gener-
ation. Interestingly, the generation of the third-party observer has no impact on the
aggregated cooperation rates in both generations.
Chapter 3 called “The Secret of Success: Older Generations Teach Cooperation to
Younger Generations” is joint work with Stefania Bortolotti, Wilhelm Hoffmann, Angelo
Romano and Matthias Sutter.2 This study aims to test hypotheses on intergenerational
transmission of cooperative normsderived froman evolutionary theory on social learn-
ing, namely prestige-biased learning. This theory postulates that younger generations
learn from prestigious and experiencedmembers of the society. In particular, followers
condition their behavior towardprestigiousmembers of the society, and the prestigious
members enforce cooperation with high levels of generosity toward their followers. It
1All authors contributed equally to this project. Financial support from theUniversity of Innsbruck is
gratefully acknowledged. I presented this paper at the CASWorkshop “Moral Behavior” inMunich (July
2015), the ESA European meeting in Heidelberg (September 2015), and the Symposium “Self-Control
and Motivation”-Follow-up in Cologne (December 2015).
2All authors contributed equally to this project. Financial support from C-SEB (Center for Social and
Economic Behavior, University of Cologne) is gratefully acknowledged. I presented this paper at the
“Bonn-Innsbruck-Munich”- workshop at the MPI Bonn (November 2017). I want to thank Simon Alber-
tini, Alexandra Baier, Helena Fornwagner, Martina Rief, Lukas Schilling, Michael Seidl, and Katharina
Vieth for great research assistance.
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is worth mentioning that within this framework high levels of cooperation among
strangers could be achievedwithout coercive force and punishment institutions. In our
study, we use the age of participants as a proxy for prestige and experience.
Therefore, we conducted an artefactual field experiment in Austria where we re-
cruited subjects 18 years or older drawn from the Austrian general population. In order
to be able to test the predictions derived from the theory, we divided the subject pool
into three age cohorts, i.e., Juniors (18-39 years), Middle (40-59 years), and Seniors (60
years or older). All subjects participated in two experimental games, a Dictator game
and a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Our main innovation to test the hypotheses from the
prestige-biased learning theory is that participants could condition their decisions in
both economic games on the age cohort of the partner.
We find that, indeed, decision-makers use social cues of experience in social
dilemma situations. Participants cooperate more with older generations than with
younger generations. This pattern is particularly strong in the youngest generation. In
addition, we show that age is positively correlated with generosity and that the oldest
generation shows higher levels of unconditional cooperation when they are matched
with the youngest cohort. These findings suggest that more experienced generations
try to transmit cooperative norms to younger generations within their group.
Chapter 4 titled “The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights – Team vs. Individual
Decision-making” is joint work with Justin Buffat and Matthias Sutter.3 In this paper, we
ask the question how individuals and teams value decision rights. Decision makers
value decision rights because they carry two values which reflect on the one hand the
power to influence the outcome, i.e., the instrumental value, and on the other hand the
psychic benefits of having the right to decide, i.e., the intrinsic value. While a positive
instrumental value is expected, recent experimental evidence at the individual level
report a positive intrinsic value too (e.g., Bartling et al., 2014). This means that decision
makers also value control, power, liberty, and/or autonomy per se. Especially from an
organizational point of view, decisions about delegating or keeping decision rights
are at the heart of managerial decision-making and potential psychic benefits would
constitute a source of inefficiency. Yet, decisions in organizations are often taken in
teams (a group of individuals), hence we test whether teams are less affected by the
psychic component of having the right to decide than individuals.
3All authors contributed equally to this project. Financial support by the University of Cologne is
gratefully acknowledged. I also want to thank the student assistants Ann-Christin Heilig and Sabine
Herzog for coding the chat history, and Holger Herz for providing the original instructions. I presented
this paper at the “Innsbruck Workshop 2016” at the MPI in Munich, the “Seminar in Applied Microe-
conomics” at the University of Cologne (May 2016), and the “FAIR – The Choice Lab PhD Workshop
2017” at the Lofoten, Norway (August 2017).
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Therefore, we used Bartling et al.’s (2014) framework which allows us to separate
the intrinsic from the instrumental value of a decision right. To address our research
question, we replicated the individual decision-making treatment from the original
paper and extended the design with a team decision-making treatment where two
individuals have to reach a common decision by using a free-text chat messenger to
communicate with each other.
The results of our experiment are threefold. First, we could replicate the original
findings by showing that individual decision makers do value decision rights intrin-
sically. Second, we find that the intrinsic value of individuals and teams in general are
comparable. Third, our results suggest that the individual acceptence and satisfaction
of teammemberswith their teamdecisions have a huge impact on the intrinsic valuation
of a decision right. If both team members report no issues with respect to giving up
in the decision process or feeling excluded, the intrinsic value is half of the value of
individual decisionmakers and partly consistent with the hypothesis of a fully rational
decision maker.
Chapter 5 with the title “Social Reference Points and (Dis)Honest Behavior” is a
single-authored paper.4 This paper examines whether and how relative income concerns
affect decision makers’ honesty. Relative income concerns entail the idea that workers
do not only care about their absolute income, but also how this income compares to
the income of relevant peers. Hence, peer income constitutes a social reference point
which is important for the evaluation of the individual position. To test the impact
of peer income information on honesty we let decision makers play a cheating game
where they first learn their intermediate income by rolling a dice and could compare
this income with the income of a relevant peer. Then, decision makers could engage
in dishonest behavior to manipulate, i.e., increase or decrease, their final income by
misreporting the outcome of the dice throw.
We implemented two treatments where we manipulated the income level of the
peer. The variation of the peer income affects the likelihood that the individual com-
parison of the intermediate income with the peer income is advantageous (decision
makers earn more than the peer) or disadvantageous (decision makers earn less than
the peer). Since the underlying decision in both treatments is identical, differences in
reporting behavior can only arise if relative income concerns matter.
Our results show that decision makers act dishonestly in both high and low peer
income situations. But, dishonest behavior is significanlty more frequent in the high
4Financial support from the University of Cologne and the Max-Planck-Institute for Research on
Collective Goods is gratefully acknowledged. I presented this paper at the “Inaugural Conference of
the Experimental Economics Group” in Bonn (May 2018) and at the ESAWorld Meeting in Berlin (June
2018).
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income peer situation than in the low income peer situation. Consequently, relative
income concerns affect the honesty of decision makers, and thus are correlated with
ethical and moral perceptions as well.
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chapter 2
COOPERATION AND THIRD-PARTY PUNISHMENTWITHIN AND
ACROSS GENERATIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDYWITH
JUNIORS AND SENIORS
joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Matthias Sutter
Abstract
High levels of cooperation among genetically unrelated strangers is a key char-
acteristic in humans and a fundamental pillar for the well-functioning of societies.
Evolutionary theories suggest that the inter-generational transmission of coopera-
tion norms is crucial for large-scale cooperation in societies. Hence, understanding
the transmission of cooperation norms among generations is at the heart of under-
standing cooperation in human societies. Here we report a study on cooperation
in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with altruistic third-party punishment as
a means of norm transmission. In our laboratory experiment two generations co-
exist: Juniors (university students in their twenties) and seniors (50 years or older).
We show that seniors have significantly higher cooperation rates than juniors, and
demonstrate more rigid third-party punishment activities than Juniors. However,
the generation of the observer has no impact on the aggregated cooperation levels
of both generations. Our results suggest that third-party punishment might not be
the most efficient channel to transmit cooperation norms among generations.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is a key achievement of humans, and yet it fosters the development and
cohesion of societies. To date, research has shown that humans are able to achieve high
levels of cooperation (e.g., Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a). A
strand of the evolutionary literature suggests that this is closely related to the human
ability of cultural and social learning. These theories state that inter-generational trans-
mission of social values like cooperative norms is a fundamental pillar of establishing
andmaintaining large-scale cooperation in societies (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Henrich
et al. 2015). Hence, understanding age-related norm compliance and interpretation is
at the heart of understanding the evolution of large-scale cooperation.
7
In addition to cultural and social learning, research mentions institutional designs
as a tool to establish and maintain cooperation. Thus, it might be important to under-
stand if inter-generational norm transmission could also work via institutional designs
like punishment in the form of second-party (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and
Gächter, 2002; Gürerk et al., 2006; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008) or third-party pun-
ishment (e.g., Fehr et al., 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004b; Lergetporer et al., 2014). In the former, norm violators may be
punished by direct interaction partners that potentially suffer from norm violations,
whereas, in the latter, the punisher of the norm violator is an unrelated observer. Con-
sequently, third-party designs exclude monetary motivations to engage in punishment
to benefit from behavioral reactions in the course of the game. Hence, this institu-
tion seems to be the most powerful tool to study the individual importance of norm
compliance.
Despite the large literature on cooperation, an important part of our societies is
underrepresented so far, namely senior citizens (Lim and Yu, 2015). This constitutes
a substantial lack in the literature because of the ongoing demographic change (e.g.,
Lutz et al., 2008), and even more striking, the higher social IQ of older people in
solving social dilemmas (Baltes and Staudinger, 1993; Grossmann et al., 2010). Hence,
it might be important to learn more about older people’s norm compliance and norm
interpretation.
A relatively new literature on social dilemmas compares the behavior of student
and non-student samples like representative samples of the population, politicians or
clerical workers in social dilemmas without (Gächter et al., 2004; Burks et al., 2009;
Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Butler and Kousser, 2015; Dragone et al., 2015) and with
second-party punishment tools (Bigoni et al., 2013; Bortolotti et al., 2015). The find-
ings suggest that student samples are less cooperative than non-student samples. In
addition, findings including a punishment option are ambiguous, but it seems that in
non-student samples antisocial punishment is more frequent than in student samples
which affects cooperation results negatively. Moreover, Gächter and Hermann (2011)
compare the behavior of Russian citizens younger and older than 30 years in a Public
Goods game. All participants participated in two one-shot games, one time with and
one time without a punishment option. They show that cooperation is positively cor-
related with age and that students and non-students with the same age do not differ in
terms of cooperation.With regard to punishment, they find, similar to the other studies,
a non-neglectable share of misdirected punishment (punish cooperators) which could
neutralize the positive impact of a punishment option. Empirical findings suggest, ac-
cording to a study by Bicchiere et al. (2017), that punishment alone is not sufficient to
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establish a behavior, but a common understanding of the shared norm is crucial for
the efficacy of punishment.
More closely related to our study, we are aware of two studies where age is an
important feature of the design (Charness and Villeval, 2009; Gutiérrez-Roig et al.,
2015). In the first study, the authors recruited juniors (below the age of 30) and seniors
(50 years or older) and introduced a repeated Public Goods game. In their within-
subjects design, participants played the game with and without being aware of the
generation of the other players. In the latter study, the authors recruited participants
from 10 to 87 years for a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. They designed two
treatments, one where people from the same age cohort were placed in a group and
one with a random composition. The general finding of both papers is that age is
positively correlated with cooperative behavior.
Our paper is also related to studies which investigate inter-generational behavior in
common pool resource experiments with student samples (Chermak andKrause, 2002;
Sadrieh, 2004; Fischer et al., 2004). In these experiments, students either operate in over-
lapping generations environments (Chermak andKrause, 2002) or in inter-generational
environments (e.g., Sadrieh, 2004; Fischer et al., 2004) where their decisions affect the
outcome of succeeding generations. The studies show that decisionmakers do not take
into account the dynamic externalities caused by their actions and thus show relatively
low levels of inter-generational concerns.
2.1.1 THE CURRENT RESEARCH
This study investigates a potential channel of inter-generational norm transmission,
namely inter-generational punishment. We study if and how inter-generational pun-
ishment as means of norm transmission in a social dilemma setting affects coopera-
tion using two age cohorts of the adult population. In particular, the study focuses
on the inter-generational transmission of innergenerational norms from the older to
the younger age cohort. On the one hand, inter-generational norm transmission could
strengthen existing cooperation or could enforce non-existing cooperation in the young
cohort. On the other hand, non-executed inter-generational norm transmission could
weaken existing cooperation or could destroy already weak cooperation.
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Table 2.1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma-game (in points)
Player 2 Send Keep
Player 1
Send 200, 200 50, 275
Keep 275, 50 125, 125
We study how the coexistence of different generations, i.e. of younger (students in
their twenties) and older subjects (> 50 years), in social groups affects cooperation rates,
in particular when costly third-party punishment is possible. Therefore, we introduce
a repeated (20 periods) Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Table 2.1) with altruistic third-
party punishment. The game was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and
recruitment of junior participantswas organizedwith the online recruitement software
“hroot” (Bock et al., 2014). In our experiment, subjects are either players or observers
and stay in their assigned role throughout the whole experiment. Subjects in the role
of a player interact with each other, while those in the role of an observer can punish
the players at a cost after they learned the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
An observer receives 200 points in each round and punishment is a binary decision to
deduct 50 points of a player at a cost of 20 points. The dominant strategies for players
and observers are “Keep” and “no punishment”, respectively.
Importantly, players are always interacting with players of the same generation,
while observers belong either to the same or to the other generation. We designed
our treatments in this way to have a clean measure of the efficiency of third-party
punishment as a tool to transmit cooperation norms and exclude other forms of norm
transmission, i.e., norm transmission at a player level if young players interact with
older players. It is worth mentioning that subjects had full information about the
composition of the groups, i.e., the generation(s) involved in the game. Hence, we are
in the position to distinguish subjects’ behavior in homogeneous and heterogeneous
settings.
In total, we recruited 180 subjects, 94 younger and 86 older subjects (see, e.g., Tables
2.7 and 2.8 in the Appendix). We add to the literature how cooperation and norm
interpretation differs across two age cohorts in the adult population, and thus show
relevant findings for potential inter-generational learning aspects. Our results could
help us to understand age-related differences in norm interpretation and contribute
to the discussion on the evolution of large-scale cooperation in humans. In addition,
our findings provide insights for future research on institutional designs involving
different generations.
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2.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the following section, we present the results of the experiment. First, we present the
findings for the players. Second, we analyze the behavior of the observers. Finally, we
look at the behavior over time.
2.2.1 COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR
Our first result, the average cooperation rates, reveals that seniors cooperate twice as
much as juniors do, irrespective of the generation of the observer.
Figure 2.1: Average Cooperation rates
(a) At the Generational level (b) At the Treatment level
Notes: Bars show the average aggregated cooperation rates at the generational (Figure
2.1a) and at the treatment (Figure 2.1b) level. The black markers indicate the aver-
age aggregated expectations about the partner’s behavior. Error bars of expectations
represent standard error at means (average ± SEM). SEM’s are based on the average
expectations at the matching group level.
Figure 2.1a shows the cooperation rates at the generation level of the players and
Figure 2.1b at the treatment level (the first letter indicates the generation of the play-
ers and the second the generation of the third-party observer). On average, juniors
cooperate in 3 out of 10 cases, whereas seniors do choose cooperation in 6 out of 10
cases. The cooperation rates between both player generations are significantly different
at the generation level (p = 0.002, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test) and at the treat-
ment level (J/J vs. S/J: p = 0.049; J/J vs. S/S: p = 0.037; J/S vs. S/J: p = 0.028; J/S vs.
S/S: p = 0.011, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests). We find no significant differences
in cooperation rates between players of the same generation at the treatment level
(J/J vs. J/S: p = 0.635; S/J vs. S/S: p = 0.848, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests). This
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finding still holds if we just account for cooperative choices in the first period where
players are not biased by previous actions and experiences (J/J vs. J/S: p = 0.305, S/J
vs. S/S: p = 1.000, two-tailed Fisher’s exact tests). Furthermore, a similar pattern can be
observed for the average expectations about the partner’s behavior. A comparison of
behavior and beliefs within both generations yields marginally significant differences
for juniors and seniors (p = 0.070 and p = 0.054, respectively, bothWilcoxon signed-rank
matched-pairs tests).5 While behavior and expectations are not significantly different
fromeach other in homogeneous groups at all conventional levels, they are significantly
different in heterogeneous groups (J/S: p = 0.049, S/J: p = 0.022, Wilcoxon signed-rank
matched-pairs tests).
2.2.2 PUNISHMENT BEHAVIOR
Figure 2.2: Average Punishment rates
(a) Overall (b) Social punishment
Notes: Bars show the average aggregated punishment rates at the treatment level.
Figure 2.2a shows the overall punishment rates, and Figure 2.2b punishment of defec-
tion (social punishment). Error bars of punishment represent standard error at means
(average ± SEM).
Wenowanalyze the behavior of the third-party observers andpresent differences in the
normenforcement of both generations.Again, third-party observers could punish none
of the players, one of them or both players, hence we result in 40 observations for one
observer (2 choices – 1 for each player – in each round). Figure 2.2a shows the average
punishment rates over treatments for all periods, irrespective of the corresponding
behavior of players. To begin with, we start with the observation that, overall, seniors
5We compare behavior and beliefs at the matching group level (see, e.g., Methodology).
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tend to punish in both cases, i.e., observing juniors or seniors, to a higher extent than
juniors (J/J vs. J/S: p = 0.002 and S/J vs. S/S: p = 0.025, two-tailed Mann-Whitney
U-tests). While punishment rates for senior observers are not significantly different
between both treatments (p = 0.323, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test), the punishment
rates in J/J and S/J are marginally significantly different (p = 0.073, two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U-test), with juniors punishing seniors more often than their peers.
In terms of norm transmission, social punishment, i.e., punishment of players who
chose to defect in the first stage of the game, might yield more insightful results.
Figure 2.2b compares average social punishment rates at the treatment level and thus
allows us to say more about the norm enforcement of both generations. In general,
independent of the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, we observe a significant
difference between both homogeneous treatments (players and observer belong to the
samegeneration)with seniors punishingdefection in 1 out of 2 cases and juniors in 1 out
of 10 cases (p = 0.026, two-tailedMann-WhitneyU-test). However, a comparison of both
heterogeneous treatments yields an informative result: Junior and senior observers
have nearly identical punishment rates, between 34 and 35 percent, if a player defects
in the first stage of the game (p = 0.644; two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test). Hence, both
generations adapt their punishment behavior against defectors in treatments where
the players belong to the other generation. While the behavioral change is insignificant
for seniors (p = 0.248, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test), it is significant for juniors
(p = 0.013, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
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Figure 2.3: Social punishment by the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(a) Asymmetric outcome (b) Mutual defection
Notes: Bars show the average aggregated punishment rates at the generation level of
the observer. Figure 2.3a shows punishment of defection in an asymmetric outcome
of the game, and Figure 2.3b shows punishment of defection in a mutual defection
outcome. Error bars of punishment represent standard error at means (average ±
SEM).
Our design allows us to examine generational differences in norm enforcement
when dealing with norm violators in a more sophisticated way. Therefore, we distin-
guish between two cases of norm violations, namely (i) asymmetric norm violation
(one player defects while the other one cooperates, Figure 2.3a) and (ii) mutual norm
violation (both players defect, Figure 2.3b). The most obvious norm violation, i.e.,
asymmetric norm violation, is perceived rather similar by juniors and seniors with
punishment rates of 46 percent and 60 percent, respectively (p = 0.131, two-tailed
Mann-Whitney U-test). On the contrary, mutual norm violation is perceived differ-
ently by both generations. Here, seniors punish in 31 percent and juniors only in 7
percent of all cases (p = 0.008, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
2.2.3 COOPERATION OVER TIME
We observe a strong negative impact of time on cooperation for junior players, while
the trend is less strong for senior players. In addition, in the second half of the ex-
periment the negative time trend for senior players is obsolete (see, e.g., Table 2.2 in
the Appendix). Figure 2.4 shows the average cooperation rates over time for all treat-
ments. The darker grey lines indicate treatments with senior players and the solid
lines point out treatments with senior observers. The findings for junior players can
be confirmed, but the negative trend for senior players is only driven by the hetero-
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geneous treatment S/J. The homogeneous senior treatment (S/S) has no significant
time trend at all (see, e.g., Table 2.3 in the Appendix). Figure 2.4 contains a further
finding regarding the junior player treatments. In particular, treatments J/J and J/S are
the relevant treatments with respect to the transmission of cooperation norms from
the older to the younger generation via third-party punishment. Figure 2.4 shows that
cooperation rates are higher in J/S than in J/J in the first half of the experiment, but
cooperation rates decrease faster in treatment J/S. It is worth mentioning that we do
not observe an increase in punishment behavior neither in treatment J/J nor J/S over
time. In contrast, we do observe negative time trends of punishment behavior in both
treatments (J/J: βPeriod = −0.006, p = 0.038; J/S: βPeriod = −0.008, p = 0.034). Coefficients
obtained from panel random-effects probit regressions. The next subsection focuses on
this observation and shows why we observe this pattern.
Figure 2.4: Average Cooperation rates over time
Notes: The dark (light) grey lines indicate senior (junior)
players and a solid (dashed) line represents senior (junior)
third-party observers.
2.2.4 NORM TRANSMISSION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF PUNISHMENT
The aggregated behavioral reactions (see Table 2.4 in the Appendix), i.e., the impact
of the chosen action and (received) punishment in the previous period on the action
in the actual period, yield insightful results. A short outline of our findings leads to
the following explanation. Our data reveal that punishment has a positive impact on
cooperation in both junior treatments, and senior observers punish norm violation
more frequently than junior observers. However, the more frequent punishment by
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senior observers relative to junior observers may create short-term benefits, but it
affects the stability of cooperation in the long run.
At first glance, punishment seems to work in both junior player treatments. Juniors
switch from defection to cooperation in 21 (J/S) to 25 (J/J) percent of the cases if they
received punishment in the previous period, but only in 6.6 (J/J) to 11.7 (J/S) percent
of the cases if they received no punishment. In addition, senior and junior third-parties
observe a similar number of non-cooperative choices, but senior observers punish
norm violations three times more often than junior observers (44 our of 425 cases in J/J
and 145 out of 410 cases in J/S). Both findings suggest that cooperation rates should
be higher in treatment J/S than in treatment J/J.
But, a less stable cooperation outweighs the positive impact of punishment in treat-
ment J/S. Consider the combination where players chose cooperation in the previous
period and received no punishment. Overall, around 70 percent of the participants
choose cooperation in the acutal period in treatments J/J, S/J, and S/S, but just 57
percent in J/S. This difference arises in the second half of the experiment. The rates are
similar for all treatments in the first half, but in J/S it drops to 25 percent in the second
half of the experiment.
Hence, the more strict enforcement of the cooperative norm by senior observers
has an impact on the long-run stability of cooperation for players which do not share
the same strict norm interpretation than their observers. For instance, junior observers
tend to wait approximately twice as long as seniors until they use the punishment tool
when they observe defection. That is true for J/J vs. J/S as well as S/J vs. S/S (both
p = 0.090, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests).6 Thus, cooperative behavior of subjects
with a more generous norm interpretation might be more sensitive to interventions.
Especially, the more frequent punishment by seniors affects the stability of cooperation
negatively. In this case, a careful and more deliberate punishment from peers seems to
be the more efficient way.7
These findings have an impact on the overall welfare, i.e., the aggregated earn-
ings, as well. Welfare comparisons between treatments do not yield any significant
differences for both junior treatments (J/J vs. J/S: p = 0.529, two-tailed Mann-Whitney
U-test) and both senior treatments (S/J vs. S/S: p = 0.655; two-tailed Mann-Whitney
U-test) as well as for the homogeneous treatment comparison (J/J vs. S/S: p = 0.148,
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test). But, we find a significant difference if we look at the
6We do not find significant differences when we compare juniors or seniors observing the own or
the other generation (both p > 0.100, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests).
7The questionnaire reveals that seniors also have a more positive image of mankind and life than
juniors (see Table 2.5). This might also have an impact on the generational differences in punishment
behavior.
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welfare at the generational level of the players (J/J and J/S vs. S/J and S/S). Here,
we find that individual earnings are higher when seniors are in the role of the player
(p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
2.2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND OUTCOME COORDINATION OVER TIME
In Table 2.6 we show the results of panel random-effects probit regressions which con-
firm the findings of our non-parametric analysis that cooperation is significantly higher
in both senior player treatments. Model 1 confirms the main treatment effect without
any control variables. Model 2 is the same as Model 1 but with controls for time trend
and other individual control variables. In Model 3, we examine the predictive power
of expected cooperation of the matched partner on cooperative choices and include
individual controls. Model 4 includes variables which control for the own action and
received punishment in the previous period with individual control variables. Model
5 confirms the robustness of the treatment effect controlling for the impact of the action
of the partner in the previous period with individual control variables.
Moreover, we observe different patterns with respect to the outcomes of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. Figures 2.5a and 2.5b (see Appendix) show the average symmet-
ric behavior over time at the generation level of the players. Junior players coordinate
towards the Nash equilibrium, while this is not true for senior players. On average,
junior players reach in 58.59 percent the equilibrium outcome, but senior players only
in 17.14 percent of the cases (p < 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test). In contrast,
seniors reach in 38.93 percent of the cases the socially preferred outcome, i.e. mutual
cooperation, but juniors only in 18.91 percent (p = 0.009, two-tailed Mann-Whitney
U-test).
2.3 DISCUSSION
In this paperwe show inter-generational differences in the interpretation of cooperation
norms in both players and unrelated third-party observers. We find higher coopera-
tion rates in seniors than in juniors, independent of the generation of the third-party
observer. In addition, our data reveal that there exists a generational difference how
unrelated third-parties punish norm violation. While both generations react similarly
to asymmetric norm violations, seniors punish mutual norm violations more often
than juniors. This might be due to the fact that asymmetric norm violation is the more
obvious one (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a), while it needs more social skills to
identify the severity of a norm violation in a mutual case. This supports previous
findings that life experience could play an important role in solving social dilemmas
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(Baltes and Staudinger, 1993; Grossmann et al., 2010) and that generational differences
might be a key aspect in inter-generational learning. Moreover, we show that (age-
related) differences in norm interpretation is a fundamental point for the design and
the effectiveness of institutions. We find that third-party interventions do not consti-
tute an efficient channel for the transmission of innergenerational norms from older
to younger generations. Finally and based on our findings on age-related differences
in the interpretation of the norm, we suggest to conduct further experiments to learn
more about the mechanisms of inter-generational transmission of cooperative norms.
2.4 METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
RECRUITMENT STRATEGY. Two generations were participating in this experiment:
Students (in their twenties) and senior citizens (50 years or older). The recruitment
process of junior participants followed the commonly applied procedure. We used the
existing subject pool of the Innsbruck Laboratory for Economic Research. In addition,
we had to set-up a new subject pool for senior participants because the existing one
did not include participants of this generation. Our recruitment strategy was three-
pronged. First, we visited the largest fair for elderly people in North Tyrol, SenAktiv, in
November 2015 which is void of any religious or political views. Second, we used the
contacts of the university sports center which offers courses for active senior citizens.
Third, we contacted non-profit adult education organizations which offer courses for
senior citizens. We conducted the experiment between March and July 2015.
SUBJECTS. In total, we recruited 180 subjects, 94 juniors and 86 seniors (Table 2.7
and Table 2.8 for further details about the subject pool). The median year of birth in
juniors and seniors is 1993 (22 years) and 1948 (67 years), respectively and is similar to
the mean year of birth in both subsamples (1992 for juniors and 1949 for seniors).
COMPARABILITY OF BOTH SUBJECT POOLS. An issue when working with a non-
standard subject pool, e.g., seniors, could be concerns regarding self-selection and
its influence on the outcome. We can not rule out self-selection at a full glance, but
we think that most of the concerns can be ruled out by our recruitment process.
Senior participants required a lot of information regarding the project and did not
spontaneously agreed to participate in the experiment. Another important point for
experiments with both a standard and a non-standard subject pool is to assure the
comparability of the results. Therefore, we applied two rules during the recruitment
process of junior participants. First, we restricted the junior subject pool to subjects
who participated at most three times in economic experiments. Second, we made sure
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junior participants had no previous experienceswith similar types of experiments (e.g.,
Public Goods games, Prisoner’s Dilemma games, and games including third-party
punishment). The applied restrictions should minimize potential experience effects.
THE EXPERIMENTAL GAME. We introduced a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game
with third-party punishment over 20 periods. Hence, we had two roles in the experi-
ment, i.e., players and observers. We organized the interactions between both genera-
tions in a systematic way with four treatments. We have two homogeneous treatments
where players and observers belong to the same generation and two heterogeneous
treatments where players belong to the same generation but the observer belongs to
the other generation. The participants stayed in their respective roles throughout the
entire experiment. We used a stranger-matching protocol to rule out the possibility
to built-up reputation during the experiment. Therefore, participants got assigned to
matching groups of six participants including four players and two observers.
First stage (Prisoner’s Dilemma game): In the first stage, players played the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Each player received a fixed payment of 50 points. Further, the play-
ers received an additional amount of 75 points each. Players could use the additional
amount in two ways and had to decide independently and simultaneously about their
individual action. One option was to send the 75 points to the partner which would
double the amount and the partner received 150 points. The second optionwas straight
forward namely to keep the additional amount of 75 points. In other words, players
had to choose between cooperation and defection where defection was the strictly
dominant strategy.
Second stage (Punishment and Beliefs): In the second stage, observers learned the out-
come of the previous stage. Specifically, observers received information about the
decisions of both players and the corresponding interim payoffs of both players. Then,
they were asked to decide whether they want to deduct points from the interim payoff
of player 1, player 2, both players or none of them. In our design, punishment implied
a binary decision to subtract 50 points of the interim payoff of a player at a cost of
20 points per punishment, or not. Therefore, each observer received an endowment
of 200 points. Hence, punishment within this framework could be interpreted as “al-
truistic” punishment. In the meanwhile, players had to answer two questions about
their expectations (beliefs). They answered two questions: (i) Which action did your
partner choose in this round? Transfer or Keep, and (ii) Do you think that the observer
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subtracts points from your account in this period? Yes or No?
Third stage (Summary): At the end of each period, players and observers received a
summary of the current period, including all actions taken in this stage (own and
partner’s action), the punishment decision(s), the interim payoffs and the net payoffs
(= interim payoffs - punishment). Then, the next period started. The exchange rate was
100 points = 80 Euro cents.
MATCHINGPROTOCOL. Players and observerswere randomly assigned to amatch-
ing group of six participants which included four players and two observers. The as-
signment to one specific matching group for a player was fixed for the entire 20-period
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. At the beginning of a period, participants of a matching
group were randomly assigned into subgroups. A subgroup consisted of two players
and one observer. Hence, a matching group had two subgroups in each period with
three players each. In both homogeneous treatments participants were randomly as-
signed to the role of a player or observer at the beginning of the experiment, while the
roles were fixed in both heterogeneous treatments. In total, we have 8matching groups
in both treatments with junior players and 7 matching groups in both treatments with
senior players.
PROCEDURES. At the beginning of each session, the experimenter in charge read
the instructions aloud in front of the participants. It is worth noticing that we did not
use the usual form of payoff matrices to explain the game. Instead, we described the
payoff structure verbally. We chose this method because we could not take familiarity
with payoff matrices for granted (see Section 2.5.3 for the instructions and sample
screens). Before the start of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, each participant had to
answer six control questions correctly. Subjects were not allowed to proceed until they
had answered all questions correctly. The control questionswere shownon two screens,
with three questions each. The participants had to select the correct option for all three
questions of the first screen to proceed to the second screen. The median number of
trials for each part was one trial for both generations. We can observe a difference
between both groups when we perform χ2-tests over the whole distributions with
(some) senior participants needing more trials than junior participants (p = 0.028 and
p = 0.023 for the first and second screen, respectively). A potential explanation could
be a design choice in our zTree-program. If participants selected an answer of a control
question – irrespective of the correctness of the chosen option – it was highlighted in
green. This created some confusion among participants and we observed this pattern
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particularly in seniors.However, in the results sectionwe show that the number of trials
needed to answer the control questions have no systematic influence on the decisions
of an individual (see, e.g., Table 2.6 in the Appendix). A session lasted on average 75
minutes, but sessions including senior participants lasted longer than homogeneous
junior sessions. Participants received on average 26.3 Euros (exclusive 5 Euros show-up
fee).
POST-EXPERIMENTALQUESTIONNAIRE. After thePrisoner’sDilemmagame, par-
ticipants had to answer a questionnaire. We asked questions regarding individual
characteristics (e.g., age, education), questions regarding individual experiences with
the other generation, and questions from the world value survey targeting trust at-
titudes, attitudes towards income differences, and fairness (see, e.g., Table 2.5 in the
Appendix). In addition, we measured the social value orientation (SVO) using the
Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997). This mea-
sure allows us to classify individuals as individualistic, prosocial or competitive (see,
e.g., Table 2.9 in the Appendix). These classifications are a measure for the individual
attitudes towards social norms.
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2.5 APPENDIX
2.5.1 TABLES
Table 2.2: Time trend at the generational level
All periods Last 10 periods
Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects
Period x Junior -0.136*** -0.030*** -0.167*** -0.028***
(0.020) (0.004) (0.024) (0.004)
Period x Senior -0.035*** -0.008*** -0.035 -0.006
(0.012) (0.003) (0.025) (0.004)
Constant 0.667*** 0.791**
(0.206) (0.327)
N.cluster 30 30
N.obs. 2400 2400 1200 1200
Log-PseudoLL -1089.861 -485.669
Notes: Panel random-effects probit regressions with the dependent variable Cooperation
(1=cooperation, 0=defection). Period x Junior is the interaction between the variable
“Period” and the dummy for junior player. Period x Senior is the interaction between the
variable “Period” and the dummy for senior player. Robust standard erros in parentheses
are clustered on the matching group level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 2.3: Time trend at the treatment level
All periods Last 10 periods
Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects
J/J x Period -0.106*** -0.023*** -0.144*** -0.025***
(0.033) (0.007) (0.043) (0.008)
J/S x Period -0.160*** -0.035*** -0.188*** -0.032***
(0.019) (0.004) (0.029) (0.005)
S/J x Period -0.047*** -0.010*** -0.038 -0.007
(0.014) (0.003) (0.036) (0.006)
S/S x Period -0.025 -0.005 -0.031 -0.005
(0.018) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004)
Constant 0.658*** 0.784**
(0.198) (0.325)
N.cluster 30 30
N.obs. 2400 2400 1200 1200
Log-PseudoLL -1084.166 -484.455
Notes: Panel random-effects probit regressions with the dependent variable Cooperation
(1=cooperation, 0=defection). J/J (J/S, S/J, S/S) x Period are interactions between the
four treatment dummies and the variable “Period”. Robust standard erros in parentheses
are clustered on the matching group level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
23
Table 2.4: Behavioral reactions of players
Period t-1
Cooperate Defect
No punishment Punishment No punishment Punishment
Period t
Cooperate
J/J
74.0 %
(134)
50.0 %
(1)
6.6 %
(25)
25.0 %
(11)
J/S
57.4 %
(89)
58.1 %
(25)
11.7 %
(31)
21.4 %
(31)
S/J
71.7 %
(228)
80.0 %
(4)
40.5 %
(60)
37.7 %
(23)
S/S
72.6 %
(220)
61.5 %
(16)
41.7 %
(43)
43.0 %
(43)
Defect
J/J
26.0 %
(47)
50.0 %
(1)
93.4 %
(356)
75.0 %
(33)
J/S
42.6 %
(66)
41.9 %
(18)
88.3 %
(234)
78.6 %
(114)
S/J
28.3 %
(90)
20.0 %
(1)
59.5 %
(88)
62.3 %
(38)
S/S
27.4 %
(83)
38.5 %
(10)
58.3 %
(60)
57.0 %
(57)
Notes: Behavioral reactions of players from period t-1 to period t per action and received punishment.
Total number of the event in parantheses.
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Table 2.5: Questionnaire overview
Question 1: Would you say most people can be trusted?
Answer 1: Yes or No
Statistics:
Fraction of yes: Seniors = 80.23 % and juniors 58.51 %,
p = 0.002 (two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test)
Question 2:
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of
you if they got a chance (Statement 1) or would they try to be fair (Statement 2)?
Answer 2:
Scale from 1 to 10 (1 = strong agreement with statement 1;
10 = strong agreement with statement 2
Statistics: Mean: Seniors = 7.49 and juniors = 6.29, p <0.002 (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test)
Question 3:
Do you think most people can only get rich at the expense of others (Statement 1) or
wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone (Statement 2)?
Answer 3:
Scale from 1 to 10 (1 = strong agreement with statement 1;
10 = strong agreement with statement 2
Statistics: Mean: seniors = 7.53 and juniors = 6.77, p <0.064 (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test)
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Table 2.6: Probit regressions – Robustness checks
Cooperation of a player
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
J/S 0.014 0.013 -0.005 -0.003 0.007
(0.141) (0.135) (0.089) (0.129) (0.120)
S/J 0.293** 0.285* 0.225** 0.270* 0.254*
(0.139) (0.147) (0.104) (0.138) (0.132)
S/S 0.293** 0.267* 0.182* 0.254* 0.244*
(0.133) (0.146) (0.102) (0.139) (0.128)
Period -0.017***
(0.003)
Expect Cooperation 0.410***
(0.042)
Cooperate t-1 0.128***
(0.047)
Antisocial punishment t-1 0.022
(0.053)
Social punishment t-1 0.068**
(0.030)
CooperateP2 t-1 0.183***
(0.033)
Female 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.022
(0.059) (0.046) (0.056) (0.058)
SVO Prosocial 0.019 -0.004 0.004 -0.003
(0.082) (0.060) (0.074) (0.072)
SVO Individualist -0.116* -0.118** -0.110* -0.120*
(0.071) (0.059) (0.064) (0.063)
Trials questions 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
N.obs. 2400 2400 2400 2280 2280
Notes: Marginal effects of panel random-effects probit regressions. De-
pendent variable is Cooperation (1=cooperation, 0=defection). Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the matching group level.
Independent variables: J/S, S/J, and S/S are treatment dummies (base-
line is treatment J/J), Period is a variable from 1-20, Expect Cooperation
takes the value 1 if an individual expects cooperation and 0 otherwise,
Cooperate t-1 takes the value 1 if an indiviudal cooperated in the previous
period and 0 otherwise. Antisocial punishment t-1 and Social punishment
t-1 take the value 1 if an individual received an antisocial or social pun-
ishment in the previous period and 0 otherwise, CooperateP2 t-1 takes the
value 1 if the matched partner cooperated in the previous period and
0 otherwise. Female takes the value 1 if the individual is female and 0
otherwise, SVO Individualist and SVO Prosocial are dummies for the SVO
classification, and Trials questions indicates the number of trials needed
to answer all control questions. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.7: The Subject Pool
Generation
Gender
Total
Female Male
Junior 45 (47.87 %) 49 (52.13 %) 94
Senior 48 (55.81 %) 38 (44.29 %) 86
Total 93 (51.67 %) 87 (48.33 %) 180
Table 2.8: Educational background of Senior participants
Education Observations Cumulative frequency
No answer 6 07.50 %
Mandatory school 7 16.25 %
Vocational training 17 37.50 %
High school 29 73.75 %
University degree 27 100.00 %
Total 86
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Table 2.9: SVO Triple-Dominance Measure
Situation Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
1
You get: 480
Other gets: 80
You get: 540
Other gets: 280
You get: 480
Other gets: 480
2
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
3
You get: 520
Other gets: 520
You get: 520
Other gets: 120
You get: 580
Other gets: 320
4
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 490
Other gets: 490
5
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
You get: 490
Other gets: 90
6
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
You get: 570
Other gets: 300
7
You get: 510
Other gets: 510
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 510
Other gets: 110
8
You get: 550
Other gets: 300
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
9
You get: 480
Other gets: 100
You get: 490
Other gets: 490
You get: 540
Other gets: 300
Notes: An individual is classified when she/he makes six or more type-
consistent choices. Prosocial choices are: 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c,
and 9b. Individualistic choices are: 1b, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, and 9c.
Competitive choices are: 1a, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, and 9a
Explanation:
We could classify 129 individuals as prosocial, 35 as individualistic, 1 individual as
competitive, and 15 individuals made no type-consistent choices.
Differences between generations:
We find differences between both generations and being classified as prosocial or type-
inconsistent.While seniors aremore often classified as prosocial than juniorswith 80.23
percent and 63.83 percent, respectively (p = 0.017, two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test), ju-
niors are more often type-inconsistent than seniors (juniors = 12.77 percent and seniors
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= 3.49 percent, p = 0.038, two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test). We do not find any signifi-
cant differences between both generations and the classification as an individualist or
competitor at all conventional levels (two-tailed Fisher’s Exact tests).
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2.5.2 ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure 2.5: Symmetric outcomes over time
(a) Junior players
(b) Senior players
Notes: Average rates of symmetric outcomes of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game over time. Figure 2.5a summarizes
treatments J/J and J/S (junior players) and Figure 2.5b sum-
marizes treatments S/J and S/S (senior players). The solid
line indicates mutual cooperation (socially preferred out-
come) and the dashed line mutual defection (corresponds
to the Nash equilibrium of the game).
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2.5.3 EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions 8
Welcome to today’s experiment. You receive e5 as a show-up fee. During the exper-
iment you will be asked to make decisions and so will the other participants. Your
decisions, as well as the decisions of other participants, will determine your monetary
payoff. Therefore, it is important that you carefully read the instructions. If you have
any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the experi-
menters will come to assist you.
Please do not communicate with other participants before the end of the experiment.
Please switch off your mobile phone. At the end of the experiment we will pay you in
cash e5 as a show-up fee and the money you’ve earned during the experiment. Your
income in the experiment will be in points. At the end of the experiment, points will
be converted into Euro at an exchange rate of
100 points = 80 Euro cents
The Game
Generations, Roles, Periods, and Groups
• In principle, two generations are participating in this study: “senior citizens”
and “students”. In this session, only senior citizens (students) are participating.
• We assign each participant to a specific role at the beginning of the experiment.
There are two roles: “players” and “observers”. Eachparticipant belonging to the
senior citizens/students is a player and each participant of the students/senior
citizens is an observer. You stay in your role throughout the whole experiment.
You will be randomly assigned to one of the two roles and you will stay in your role
throughout the whole experiment. You learn your role at the beginning of the experiment
on the screen.
• The gamewill be repeated for 20 periods and each period has the same structure.
8Additional comments for homogeneous treatments shown in the instructions in italics.
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• Before each period you will be matched into a group of three participants. One
group consists of two players and one observer. This means that you interact in
each round within a new group where group members could differ from round
to round. But, you stay in your assigned role throughout the whole experiment.
You will never learn the identity of another matched participant in a round. This
means that all decisions are anonymous.
Structure of the game
Each period consists of two stages.
Stage 1: The decision of the players
• In stage 1, only players make decisions. The decisions of both players will deter-
mine the interim payoff of a player.
• At the beginning of each round, a player receives an endowment of 50 points.
• In addition, a player receives 75 additional points. A player can decide individ-
ually how she wants to use these additional points.
• A player could either keep the 75 additional points or send them to the other
player in the group. Hence, a player has to decide about keeping or transferring
the additional points.
• “Transfer” means that a player loses her 75 additional points, but the other
player in the group receives 150 points. This means that transferred additional
points get doubled.
• “Keeping” means that a player keeps her 75 additional points. The additional
points do not get doubled in this case. The other player in the group receives
nothing.
• Both players decide simultaneously about keeping or transferring the additional
points. Hence, we ed up with four potential outcomes:
1. You choose “Transfer” and the other player chooses “Transfer” aswell. Thismeans
that you and the other player receive an interim payoff of 200 points each. Each of
you receives an endowment of 50 points and 150 transferred points of the other
player.
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2. You choose “Transfer” and the other player chosses “Keep”. This means that you
receive 50 points and the other player 275 points as interimpayoff. You transferred
your 75 additional points and end upwith the endowment of 50 points. The other
player receives an endowment of 50 points, keeps her 75 additional points, and
receives your 150 transferred points.
3. You choose “Keep” and the other player chooses “Transfer”. This means that you
receive 275 points and the other player 50 points as an interim payoff. You receive
an endowment of 50 points, you keep your 75 additional points and recieve
150 transferred points from the other player. The other player ends up with her
endowment of 50 points.
4. You choose “Keep” and the other player chooses “Keep” as well. This means that
you and the other player receive an interim payoff of 125 points each. Each of
you receives an endowment of 50 points and keeps her 75 additional points. Both
players do not receive any additional transferred points.
In each of the 20 periods, both players see the following screen and have to decide
individually if they choose “Transfer” or “Keep”. Your decision as well as the decision
of the other player determine your interim payoff.
This is the decision screen for players where they have to decide between “Transfer”
and “Keep”. Please click on the button of you preferred action. You can confirm your
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decision if you click on the “Next” button. If you want to change your decision you can
simply click on the other button.
Stage 2: The decision of the observer
• In this stage, the observer has to make his decision.
• After both players chose between “Transfer” and “Keep”, the observer learns the
decisions of both players.
• The observer receives an endowment of 200 points. He can use part of his en-
dowment to deduct points from the players’ interim payoffs.
• To bemore precise, an observer could decide if he wants to deduct 50 points from
the interim payoff of a player or not. A deduction of 50 points costs 20 points
which are deducted from his own endowment.
• If an observer wants to deduct 50 points from the interim payoff of both players,
he has to pay 40 points in total and ends up with a payoff of 160 points in this
round.
• A random example:
• Consider the case, in which player 1 chooses “Transfer” and player 2 chooses
“Keep”. This means that player 1 recieves an interim payoff of 50 points and
player 2 receives an interim payoff of 275 points. The observer wants to deduct 50
points from each player’s interim payoff. This leads to the following final payoff
in this period:
– Player 1: 50 - 50 = 0 points
– Player 2: 275 - 50 = 225 points
– Observer: 200 - 2x20 = 160 points
• In each of the 20 periods, an observer sees the following screen. The observer
receives information about the decisions and interim payoffs of both players in
the upper part of the screen. On the lower left part of the screen he has to decide
if he wants to deduct points from player 1. On the lower right part of the screen
he has to decide if he wants deduct points from player 2.
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This is the decision screen of the observers. The text is conditional on the decision of
both players and could vary from period to period.
The observer has to make the decisions for player 1 on the lower left part of the screen
by clicking on one of the two options for player 1. The observer makes the decisions
for player 2 on the lower right part of the screen by clicking on one of the two options
for player 2. If you want to change you decision(s) for a player just click on the other
option.
Summary screen
• At the end of a period (after both stages), each player and the observer receive a
summary of the period. This means that they receive the following information:
– The decisions of both players
– The interim payoffs of both players
– Potential deduction points for both players
– The final payoff of the period for both players and the observer
• You total earnings are the sum of all your final period payoffs of all 20 periods.
You will learn your total earnings after period 20 and you receive your total
earnings in cash at the end of the experiment.
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Questionnaire
Weaskyou tofill out apost-experimental questionnaire before you receive thepayment.
The answers do not influence your income and are anonymous. We use the answers
for the analysis of this experiment only.
Payment
At the end of the experiment we convert your total earnings in Euro and you receive
the payment in cash with the 5 Euro show-up fee.
Questions
If you have questions regarding the experiment please raise your hand. If you need
help during the experiment please raise your hand. We are happy to help you in any
case.
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chapter 3
THE SECRET OF SUCCESS: OLDER GENERATIONS TEACH
COOPERATION TO YOUNGER GENERATIONS
joint work with Stefania Bortolotti, Wilhelm Hofmann,
Angelo Romano, and Matthias Sutter
Abstract
Humans exhibit a remarkable ability to cooperate in large-scale groups.Accord-
ing to a gene-culture coevolution perspective, social learning provides a foundation
for the evolution of cooperation in humans. One powerful channel of social learn-
ingworks via experienced communitymembers being responsible for teaching and
enforcing norms of cooperation in their community. Yet empirical support for the
effect of social learning and experience on cooperation is scarce at best. We present
the first experimental test on the role of older and more experienced people in
fostering cooperation. Here we show that older generations exhibit higher levels of
generosity than younger generations and display more unconditional cooperation
when paired with younger members of the community. Importantly, these results
cannot be explained by ingroup favoritism or cognitive decline. Our study sets the
ground for a better understanding of the role of experience and social learning in
sustaining human cooperation over time and generations.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Decades of economic, social, and biological research have studied the mechanisms
explaining how cooperation is promoted and maintained among past, present and
future generations (Richerson et al., 2016). However, this is an extremely challenging
endeavor, as sacrifices made by the older generations pay out in the future and it is ex-
tremely difficult for future generations to reciprocate costly behaviors made in the past
(Hauser et al., 2014). To date, the empirical evidence on inter-generational cooperation
among non-kins is scarce and the mechanisms at the root of this phenomena are still
unclear.
A gene-culture coevolution perspective proposes a conceptual framework to solve
this conundrum (Richerson et al., 2016). Cultural transmission and the ability to learn
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from other members of the community can enforce extraordinarily high levels of coop-
eration among humans (Richerson and Boyd, 2001). While imitation can be important
per se, for promoting cooperation it must be guided by social cues. This perspective, in
fact, posits that individuals tend to copy members who gained prestige or experience
and that natural selection favored learners who can evaluate and follow these most
successful models (Atkisson et al., 2012; Cartwright et al., 2013; Chudek and Henrich,
2011; Chudek et al., 2012; Rakoczy et al., 2010). Therefore, individualsmayhave evolved
a psychology to condition their cooperation according to specific cues of their social
environment related to the perception of experience of their group members. These
important members can hence have a key role in promoting and maintaining norms of
cooperation through the inter-generational transmission of cooperative norms to their
younger and less experienced followers (Henrich et al., 2015; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).
Importantly, experienced members can shape the cooperative norms of their com-
munity without the use of coercive force or formal institutions (Henrich, 2004). Hence,
this mechanism is fundamentally different from the ones based on peer punishment
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006), or on social contracts aimed
at imposing cooperation with future generations (Hauser et al., 2014). Social learn-
ing is also different from direct and indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005),
and it does not require in-group favoritism to explain cooperation among different
generations.
Empirical evidence on the relation between inter-generational cooperation and so-
cial learning is scattered. Here we present the first experimental test of the so called
“big man mechanism” (Henrich et al., 2015) with actual and not just simulated partic-
ipants. The basic principles of the big man mechanism are derived from mathematical
and agent-based models. They suggest that cooperation can evolve when: (i) agents
selectively cooperate with role models that can have gained experience in their life
time; and (ii) these high-status/experienced group members display high levels of
generosity (Henrich et al., 2015). Conditions (i) and (ii) are sufficient to guarantee co-
operation across generations even when reciprocity, reputation, punishment, voting,
and signaling cannot play a role. Evidence in favor of social learning and the big man
mechanism would support the cultural evolution idea that humans enforce norms of
cooperation within the group, even when these norms are costly for the self.
In this study, we test the predictive power of the bigmanmechanism in interactions
among different generations by focusing on one of the possible cues of experience,
namely age. Previous research suggests that old people tend to be perceived as more
prestigious and experienced than young individuals, since they have likely gained
more knowledge in the past (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Living longer in itself is
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a sign of having complex survival skills (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Hence, old
members of a group may be important models to learn from. Moreover, to learn from
specific members of the group is fundamental to show deference and respect (Henrich
and Gil-White, 2001). Empirical research testing this hypothesis found that across 34
small-scale societies, only 2 societies did not showexplicit evidence of deference toward
the seniors (Silverman andMaxwell, 1978). Importantly, forms of respect and deference
have been found to be crucial in promoting cooperation in groups and organizations
(De Cremer, 2003; Tyler and Blader, 2000; Halevy et al., 2011). Therefore, there seems
to exist a universal tendency to invest in relations with older members of a group, and
this tendency may translate in higher levels of cooperation toward them.
To our knowledge, there is no experimental work showing that people condition
their cooperation with strangers on the age of their interaction partners. Hence, we
devised a new paradigm that aims at shedding light on the relation among past,
present and future generations. Past research on inter-generational cooperation does
not allow disentangling between social learning and other mechanisms, such as kin
selection and ingroup favoritism (Gutiérrez-Roig et al., 2014). Moreover, research on
the relation between generosity and cooperation across age is sparse and inconclusive
(Van Lange et al., 1997; Bellemare et al., 2008; Raihani and Bshary, 2012; Matsumoto
et al., 2016; Charness and Villeval, 2009; Gutiérrez-Roig et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2004;
Molina et al., 2018).
3.1.1 THE CURRENT RESEARCH
We ran a lab-in-the-field experiment with adult subjects (N = 359) drawn from the
Austrian general population (see Table 3.1 in the Appendix and Methodology). We de-
vised a new experimental paradigm where participants could make decisions in two
incentivized games – Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) and
Dictator Game (DG) (Forsythe et al., 1994) – and where decisions could be conditioned
on the age cohort of the matched partner. We distinguished between three cohorts:
Junior (18-39 years), Middle (40-59 years), and Senior (60 years or more, see Figure 3.1a
to 3.1c). The PD serves as ameasure of cooperation, whereas the DG as a proxy for gen-
erosity. Participants were recruited over three consecutive weekends in shoppingmalls
and at a senior fair. Participation to the paper and pencil experiment was voluntary
and subjects were paid anonymously and in cash right at the end of the experiment.
All participants played both games, and the order was reversed in the last sessions (see
Appendix) to control for any possible order effects.
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Figure 3.1: Conditional decisions and experimental games
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Notes: Panels a to c give an overview of the decision environment for both games and panels 1d and
1e summarize both experimental games. For all panels it holds that the square indicates the decision
makers (DM) and the triangle the partners. The letters J, M, and S specify the age cohort and stand
for Junior (18-39 years), Middle (40-59 years), and Senior (60 years and older), respectively. In the
Instructions (see Appendix), we always used the age brackets and did not use loaded terms (Junior,
Middle, and Senior). Panels a to c indicate that decisionmakers from each age cohortmade three choices
– for each game – conditional on the potential age cohort of the matched partner. Panel d shows the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. A decision maker could either choose to cooperate or to defect dependent
on the age cohort of the partner. The first number in each of the four possible outcomes indicates the
decision maker’s payoff, the second number the payoff for the matched partner. Panel e summarizes
the Dictator game. A decision maker received 10 Euros and could choose how many Euros he/she
wants to transfer to a partner dependent on the age cohort of the partner.
Participants played a simultaneous one-shot PD (Figure 3.1d) where mutual co-
operation yields the largest overall outcome [e4 each], but each individual has an
incentive to deviate from cooperation. The Nash Equilibrium of the game predicts that
both players defect, hence ending up with less [e2 each] than what they would have
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obtained if they both had cooperated. Participants made three decisions, one for each
possible age cohort (Junior, Middle, Senior) of the partner. Participants were also asked
– in a series of non-incentivized questions –what they expected from each of their three
potential matched partners. At the end of the experiment, participants were matched
with a partner from one of the three cohorts and paid accordingly.
In the DG (Figure 3.1e) all participants had to make a decision in the role of a
dictator. As dictators, they were asked howmuch of a e10 endowment they wanted to
keep for themselves and how much they wanted to give to a recipient that belonged
to the Junior, Middle, and Senior cohort. As recipients, participants also had to state
how much they expected to receive from a dictator from the Junior, Middle, or Senior
cohort. At the end of the experiment, participants were assigned to the role of either
dictator or recipient and the relevant choices were implemented and paid in cash
(expectations were not incentivized). After stating their expectations about dictators’
behavior, participants chose the age cohort of the dictator they wished to be matched
with in case they were assigned to the role of recipient. This feature of the game is
designed to control for possible misunderstanding of the rules of the game (see Table
3.7 in the Appendix).
To summarize, predictions from the bigmanmechanism are twofold. First, individ-
uals will be more cooperative toward senior people compared to younger generations
(Hypothesis 1). We will use the likelihood of cooperation as a measure for testing
this hypothesis. Second, senior people will show relatively higher levels of generosity
compared to younger generations. To test this second hypothesis, we will investigate
whether seniors are more generous than younger generations in the DG (Hypothesis
2a) and whether they show higher levels of unconditional cooperation in the PD when
matchedwith younger as compared to older generations (Hypothesis 2b). In addition,we
test for alternative explanations based on indirect reciprocity, by investigating whether
our findings are driven by ingroup favoritism (Hypothesis 3). Finally, our design allows
us to test for an additional alternative explanations, namely cognitive decline.
41
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
3.2.1 AGE AND COOPERATION
Figure 3.2: Cooperation behavior of Junior decision makers
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Notes: The figure presents the cooperation behavior
of the Junior cohort. The first bar reports the per-
centage of cooperation for the case in which a Junior
had to make a decision for a partner from the Ju-
nior cohort. The middle bar reports the percentage
of cooperation for the case in which the partner was
from the Middle cohort. Finally, the last bar reports
the case in which the partner was from the Senior
cohort. Standard errors are reported for each bar.
Participants cooperated more when their partner was from the Senior cohort (68.4%)
compared to when it was from the Middle (63.1%) or the Junior cohort (62.5%).
Random-effects panel logit regressions (see Table 3.3 in the Appendix) test for differ-
ences in cooperation based on the age cohort of the partner. We coded two dummies:
one for a partner from the Middle cohort (1 = Partner from the Middle cohort, 0 =
otherwise) and one for a partner from the Senior cohort (1= Partner from the Senior
cohort, 0 = otherwise). A partner from the Junior cohort is the baseline in our regres-
sion. We show that there is significantly more cooperation when the matched partner
belongs to the Senior cohort, compared to the base case of a Junior cohort (β = 0.433
and p = 0.029, Model 2 with controls). Participants are also more cooperative when the
partner belongs to the Senior cohort compared to the case that the partner is from the
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Middle cohort (F-test between the two dummies, partner Middle and partner Senior,
p = 0.049). To further test the idea that younger community members are more coop-
erative toward seniors (Hypothesis 1), we focus our attention on the behavior of the
Junior cohort (Figure 3.2). Decision makers from the Junior cohort cooperated signifi-
cantly more when matched with a participant from the Senior rather than the Junior
cohort (70.0% vs. 55.4%, p = 0.002, Mc Nemar test). These results support the idea that
individuals use cues of experience to condition their cooperation toward strangers. In
particular, young individuals cooperate more with older generations, a finding in line
with the first hypothesis of the big man mechanism.
3.2.2 AGE, GENEROSITY, AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION
We now test whether seniors are more generous than younger generations. A promi-
nent hypothesis from a gene-cultural evolution perspective is that experienced mem-
bers enforce the norms of cooperation in their group by showing higher degrees of
generosity (Hypothesis 2a), even if they incur a personal cost (Henrich et al., 2015). In
the DG, dictators from the Senior cohort give away a slightly larger share of their e10
endowment (M = 4.65, SD = 2.50) than dictators from the Middle (M = 4.24, SD = 2.25)
or the Junior cohort (M = 4.09, SD = 2.30). We run GLS regressions with random-effects
and two dummies: Dictator from Middle cohort (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and Dictator from
Senior cohort (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Although the difference between the base category
Junior and the dummy for Senior is not significant when we add the controls in the
regression (Model 2 with controls β = −0.039 and p = 0.928, see Table 3.4 in the Ap-
pendix), we find that age (in years) is positively correlated with generosity (Model 4
with controls β = 0.019, p = 0.050, see Table 3.4 in the Appendix). People also expected
more generosity from the Senior (M = 3.89, SD = 3.16), compared to the Middle (M
= 3.57, SD = 2.63), or the Junior cohort (M = 2.81, SD = 2.78). Non-parametric anal-
ysis confirms this trend (both p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank extension for trend).
Interestingly, senior participants are more likely to be extremely generous and give to
their matched partner even more than what they keep for themselves (Figure 3.3). This
finding provides at least partial support to the idea that more prominent members of
a community are more generous (Hypothesis 2a).
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Figure 3.3: High levels of generosity in the DG
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Notes: The figure shows the frequency of very gen-
erous actions in the DG, by age cohort of the dic-
tator. We classify as very generous those dictators
who gave to the recipient more than they kept for
themselves.
We also tested whether participants from older cohorts showed unconditional co-
operation toward the Junior cohort (Hypothesis 2b). While it might be relatively easy
to cooperate if you expect your matched partner to cooperate as well, it is extremely
challenging to cooperate if one thinks the partner will defect. However, teaching and
sustaining cooperation across generations might crucially hinge on the ability of older
generations to bear a personal cost and show the virtue of cooperative behavior even
in the face of adversities (i.e., meeting a defector). In fact, teaching is most needed and
powerful when one is matched to a defector.
To test Hypothesis 2b, we considered a regression model where we regress coopera-
tion on expectation about cooperation, a dummy for the cohort of the decision maker
(Middle cohort, and Senior cohort: Junior cohort is the baseline), and an interaction
between expectations and cohort of the decision maker. The regression includes a
number of controls for socio-demographic characteristics (same as Table 3.3 in the Ap-
pendix). We run separate regressions for each age cohort of the matched partner, and
Figure 3.4 reports the coefficients of the three regressions (Table 3.5 in the Appendix).
Expected cooperation positively predicted the level of cooperation independently from
the cohort of the partner (Junior: β = 2.930, p < 0.001, Middle: β = 2.149, p < 0.001, and
Senior: β = 2.047, p < 0.001). However, when we consider the interaction between the
age cohort of the decision maker and his/her expectations, we uncover an interesting
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pattern. When a decisionmaker from the Senior cohort is matched with a partner from
the Junior cohort, expectations become much less important (DM Senior x Expect Co-
operation: β = −1.761, p = 0.013 for the case in which the partner is Junior). Seniors are
more likely to cooperate with a defector from a Junior cohort, than Juniors themselves
are. This suggests that seniors tend to be lenient when they have to deal with younger
partners and this behavior can be a way to teach cooperation to younger members of
the society.
Figure 3.4: Expectations and unconditional cooperation in the PD
Notes: The figure reports the results of three logit regressions, one for
each age cohort of the matched partner (Table 3.5 in the Appendix). The
dependent variable takes value 1 for cooperation and 0 for defection in
the PD. Themarkers plot the estimated β coefficients and the bars the 95%
Confidence Interval. In line with previous studies, expectations are key
determinants of cooperation (see Expect Cooperation, all three markers;
e.g., Brañas-Garza et at., 2017; Lergetporer et al., 2014). There is however
a notable exception: Seniorsmatchedwith Junior partners (see triangular
marker for the regressor Senior x Expect Coop). Seniors matched with
Juniors show a higher propensity to cooperate unconditionally (i.e., even
if they expect the Junior partner to defect).
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It is important to notice that we do not observe the same when seniors are matched
with someone from the Middle or the Senior cohort (Middle: β = 0.254, p = 0.700, and
Senior: β = −0.080, p = 0.904). TheMiddle cohort shows a similar – even though less ro-
bust – pattern whenmatched with younger people (DMMiddle x Expect Cooperation:
β = −1.232, p = 0.094). A noteworthy addition to this finding is that this result was in
part driven by a set of people who are often in the position to educate younger mem-
bers of the society, such as females (coefficient for being male: β = −0.499, p = 0.057),
and people with more children in general (β = 0.224, p = 0.071). Taken all together, our
results support the hypothesis that experienced people are willing to incur a cost to
enforce and teach cooperative norms to the younger generations.
3.2.3 INGROUP FAVORITISM AND COGNITIVE DECLINE
We also tested alternative predictions from different theories that explain how people
would cooperate in inter-generational situations. First, we investigated whether our
findings could be driven by ingroup favoritism, i.e., the tendency to cooperate with
people of the same group – same age-cohort in our case. In fact, previous research
found that individuals tend to cooperate with people belonging to the same group,
even in minimal contexts where groups are established through an arbitrary category
(Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000). To do so, we tested whether people were more gen-
erous and more cooperative when they knew that their partner was from the same
age cohort. Results from panel random-effects regression analysis with a dummy for
ingroup (1 = partner from the own cohort, 0 = partner belongs to a different cohort)
show that people did not discriminate in favor of their age cohort, neither in the DG
(Model 2 with controls β = 0.117, p = 0.415) nor in the PD (Model 2 with controls
β = −0.247, p = 0.141, Table 3.6 in the Appendix). Therefore, we did not find support
for our results being predicted by ingroup favoritism.
Then, we checked whether our findings can be explained by another different
mechanism related to older people, i.e., the cognitive understanding of the situation.
To rule out this possibility we checked for proxies of low understanding of the earning
opportunities in the game. In particular, we examined whether participants preferred
partners fromwhom they expected the highest level of generosity if they were selected
as recipients. After that, we classified participants in three different types, maximizers,
indifferent and non-maximizers. Participants were coded as maximizers when their
choice was to pick the partner from whom they expected the highest generosity, we
coded them as indifferent when they expected the same level of generosity across
different age cohorts and therefore did not have a preference in the partner to pick.
Finally, we classified as non-maximizers the ones that picked a different partner than
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the one from whom they expected the highest generosity. Making a non-maximizing
choice can be understood as a sign of poor understanding of the rules of the game.
Looking at the fraction of non-maximizers by age cohorts, there was no difference
between the Junior, the Middle, and the Senior cohort (p = 0.388, χ2-test, see Table
3.7 in the Appendix). This evidence suggests that older participants could understand
the mechanism of the games as well as their younger counterparts. Moreover, all the
results we have presented survive if we control for participants that behaved as non-
maximizers (Table 3.8 to 3.11 in the Appendix).
3.3 DISCUSSION
Modern societies are characterized by surprisingly high levels of cooperation among
strangers. Yet pressing human challenges such as global warming require to maintain
and even strengthen the norms of cooperation. Furthering our understanding of the
mechanisms that promote andmaintain cooperation is hence of paramount importance
for the betterment of society. In particular, it is fundamental to gain a better understand-
ing of how norms can be taught and maintained across generations. A gene-culture
coevolution perspective proposes that humans evolved a psychology to learn coopera-
tive norms in groups from individuals who have proved to possess crucial experience
(Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). This theory predicts that humans condition their co-
operation toward members with experience, and that this cooperation is enforced by
extreme levels of generosity toward their followers (Henrich et al., 2015). We tested
these hypotheses using age as a proxy of experience, and by letting participants make
choices in a novel experimental paradigm where they could decide conditional on the
age of their partners.
We found that people cooperated more when they knew that their partner was
older, and that senior participants were more generous. In particular, senior partici-
pants were more likely to cooperate unconditionally when matched with the young
generation. Such findings have profound theoretical implications. In fact, our results
inform the current intense debate about how humans evolved to cooperate (Delton et
al., 2011). Past research found that most of the evidence supporting the role of culture
and transmission of norms in promoting cooperation, including altruistic punishment,
can be explained by other mechanisms such as indirect reciprocity (Krasnow et al.,
2016). Our study provides clean experimental evidence on the predictive role of social
learning in promoting cooperation between generations (Richerson et al., 2016). Our
results can also inform previous research findings that 18 years old are more coop-
erative than younger children (Gutiérrez-Roig et al., 2014). Importantly, we ruled out
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the possibility that our findings can be explained by ingroup favoritism and cognitive
decline, a pattern of results that would have supported the role of alternative mech-
anisms (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Therefore, our study provides a first empirical effort
that illuminates the power of teaching cooperative norms in societies.
Our results have relevant practical implications as well. Nowadays humans have
to face important and pressing challenges that involve coordination and cooperation
among different generations, such as global warming (Milinski et al., 2008; MacKay et
al., 2015). Those problems urge us to find solutions to combat selfish behaviors and
promote more cooperation in modern societies. This research stresses the crucial role
of learning norms from specific people, such as the ones recognized for having gained
experience in their group (Henrich et al., 2015). In particular, our findings show the
importance of generosity by old people as a tool to transmit cooperative norms in
humans. We used age as a proxy of experience and found that elderly people may be
a crucial channel for teaching cooperation to young generations. Yet experience and
prestige in groups are not exclusively limited to age (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008). These
resultsmay extend to the understanding of political leadership, teachers in schools and
institutions who may gain status in specific groups, religions, or nations. This means
that future interventions should have a strong focus on empowering categories of
people or institutions that may function as role models to solve cooperation problems
within and between societies.
Despite the relevance of our findings, future research is necessary to even better
understand the development and function of social learning in promoting cooperation.
A first limitation of this study is that our findings are related to a very specific proxy
of experience/prestige: age. In fact, it is possible that part of our findings can be
influenced by confounds related to the use of this specific proxy, such as differences
in risk-aversion (Dohmen et al., 2017). We tried to minimize this aspect by ruling out
possible alternative explanations, such as ingroup favoritism and cognitive decline.
Another possible alternative explanation for our findings could be related todifferences
in wealth across the different age-cohorts. Although this argument could explain part
of our data, it is reasonable to expect that experienced models in the group are the
ones who also have more access to resources in their group. Moreover, differences in
wealth can only explain parts of our results, since it is not clear why young generations
should cooperate more with the rich seniors. Then, an alternative explanation could
be that elderly people give more to young generations because they perceive them
as needier. Yet, if this stereotype was true, we should also have observed the middle
cohort givingmore to young people, a pattern that is not supported by our data. Finally,
it could be argued that our results are driven by the fact that while part of the data
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were collected in the capital of the region, some other were collected in relatively small
communities. That said, we had a quite heterogeneous sample of people from more
than 90 different towns and the results hold when controlling for people from small
and big cities (see Tables in the Appendix). Nonetheless, future research will also need
to investigate the dynamics of status and prestige across different groups and nations to
understand alternative teaching models that next generations may use to learn norms
of cooperation. In fact, we live in societies that are getting older and it is possible that
in societies with a higher percentage of elderly people, age will become a less reliable
proxy for individuals who want to teach norms in their group.
To conclude, our study has crucial implications for the evolutionary understanding
of human cooperation. Indeed our results suggest that old generations may drive
cooperation with younger generations through high levels of generosity. This result
enlightens us on the power of a psychology evolved to learn and transmit cultural
norms ingroups. Future research should start investigatingmechanisms that gobeyond
reciprocity, signaling and punishment and incorporate culture, teaching, and status in
the study of cooperation toward unrelated strangers.
3.4 METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
ETHICSSTATEMENT. The studywas approvedby theEthical Boardof theUniversity
of Innsbruck (Certificate ofGoodStanding, 35/2016).All locations involved in the study
granted us permission to collect data in their facilities. In addition, all participants
signed an informed consent. All data were treated confidentially. No association was
ever made between real names and answers in the study.
RECRUITMENT STRATEGY. The experimentwas conducted inNorth Tyrol, Austria,
over three consecutiveweekends (12Nov, 2016 – 26Nov 2016).Our recruitment strategy
was two-pronged: (i) we recruited participants either in one of two shopping malls
(first and third weekend) or (ii) at the largest fair for senior citizens in North Tyrol
(second weekend). Both shopping malls were located in small towns (10,000 to 15,000
inhabitants) located 30 and 60 kilometers west of Innsbruck, the capital of North
Tyrol. The senior fair took place in Innsbruck (130,000 inhabitants, Figure 3.5a in the
Appendix). We opted for this strategy to be able to reach the widest possible audience
from different walks of life. In particular, older people are difficult to reach and that
required to consider an event specifically designed for this age group. The senior fair
takes place each year and is void of any political or religious connotation.
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RECRUITMENT PROCESS. We set up two teams, including one experienced experi-
menter and three enumerators each. The enumerators were recruited among students
at the University of Innsbruck. They were trained by the experienced experimenters
and received a script to approach potential participants. The two teams rotated over the
two shoppingmalls, while one larger teamwith 5 enumerators and one experienced ex-
perimenter was in charge of the data collection at the senior fair. All enumerators wore
official badges of theUniversity of Innsbruck andmade it clear to potential participants
that the study had no commercial purpose, but was a research project approved by
the University of Innsbruck. The process followed the same strict rules in all locations.
Once a subject agreed to participate in the paper and pencil experiment, he/she was
accommodated in a quiet place and was given a booklet with detailed instructions of
the games and the decision sheets (see Instructions in the Appendix). The enumerators
gave all the necessary privacy to participants, but remained available in case they had
any question.
EXPERIMENTALGAMES,MATCHING, ANDPAYMENT. Both games – PD andDG
–were presentedwith a neutral framing. The age cohorts of thematched partners were
identified by the corresponding age brackets: 18-39 years; 40-59 years; and 60 years or
older.While this classification is somehow arbitrary, it is the same followed by the local
statistical office. The partner changed fromone game to the other.We reversed the order
of the games for the last visit in the shoppingmalls to control for potential order effects.
Once a subject completed the decision booklet, he/she was escorted to the exper-
imenter desk where role assignment in the DG and matching were performed. First,
the enumerator performed a coin toss to determine the role in the dictator game –
either dictator or recipient. For subjects assigned to the role of dictator, an additional
random draw was performed to determine the age cohort of the recipient. For subjects
assigned to the role of recipient, the age cohort chosen in the DG was relevant. Once
the role in the DG and the age cohort were determined, the participant was matched
with someone from the relevant age cohort and with a different role. For the PD, the
decision maker was matched with someone with his/her same role in the DG. While
the partner changed from one game to the other, the age cohort of the partner was
the same for both games (but the information was not provided in advance to avoid
any strategic decision in the DG). Following common practice in these type of lab-in-
the-field experiments, the matching of the participants was made on a rolling basis. In
order to have matching partners for the first subjects in the first visit to the shopping
malls, we collected data from six volunteers – two per age cohort – that were paid
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on a later date. We applied the same matching procedure as in the field. To ensure
comparability, we did not include these six observations in the dataset. The average
completion time was 10 minutes and the average payment was e8.70. The payment
corresponded to the sum of earnings in the DG and in the PD. For the sake of simplicity
and to avoid any hedging, expectations were not incentivized. Subjects were paid in
cash and in private right at the end of the experiment.
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3.5 APPENDIX
3.5.1 LOCATIONS AND SUBJECT POOL
The lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted in Austria (8.7million inhabitants), and
more precisely in Tyrol (746,000 inhabitants), one of the 9 federal states. The shopping
malls are located in smaller towns (10,000 - 15,000 inhabitants), and the senior fair
took place in Innsbruck (Figure 3.5a). The first shopping mall has more than 70 stores
and 7,000–10,000 customers per day, while the second shopping mall has 40 shops.
Even though the two shopping malls are located in relatively small towns, they attract
customers from several neighboring towns. This granted us the possibility to recruit a
varied sample of people resident in about 90 different towns/villages: hence reducing
the chances that participants knew each other. The senior fair in 2016 was organized
over three days and had 9,000 visitors (Figure 3.6b). In each location, we had banners
to advertise the study (Figure 3.5b) and we set up an experimental desk were the
payments were carried out (Figure 3.6a).
Table 3.1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the subject pool
Our sample Austrian Population
Junior Middle Senior Junior Middle Senior
18-39 years 40-59 years 60+ years 18-39 years 40-59 years 60+ years
Share of the adult population(a) 36.21 % 30.92 % 32.87 % 34.58 % 35.64 % 29.78 %
Females(a) 57.69 % 63.06 % 54.24 % 48.95 % 50.06 % 55.54 %
Average age(a) 28 years 51 years 70 years 29 years 50 years 73 years
Education(b)
High school 33.08 % 27.03 % 25.42 % 34.81 % 29.24 % 22.61 %
Bachelor degree or more 24.43 % 25.23 % 22.88 % 17.82 % 14.97 % 7.75 %
Employment status(c)
Employee 74.05 % 75.68 % 9.32 % 77.22 % 70.95 % 5.43 %
Self-employed 3.82 % 6.31 % 5.93 % 4.96 % 10.71 % 1.76 %
Residents in Innsbruck 12.31 % 10.81 % 29.66 % – – –
Notes:All data for Austrian refer to the adult population. Sources: (a,b) “Statistics Austria” – the federal
statistical office of Austria – and (c) “Eurostat”. Last data check: 23rdMay, 2018. (a) Population statistics
refer to year 2018. (b) Education data refer to year 2014. Due to data availability, the Junior cohort
is defined over the interval 20-39 years. (c) Employment data refer to the 2011 Census. Due to data
availability, the Junior cohort is defined over the interval 20-39 years.
Our enumerators were instructed to approach passersby and invite them to partic-
ipate in a research study organized by the University of Innsbruck. In the recruitment
process, we tried to limit asmuch as possible the participation ofmultiple familymem-
bers by inviting only one of them to the study. We also ensured that nobody took part
in the study more than once. Enumerators were asked to try to approach people from
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different age cohorts. A total of 359 subjects participated in our study (Table 3.1).9 344
participants filled in all the items of the experiment, while 15 failed to complete one
or more items.10 In the analysis, we always use all the available data for the specific
question at hand. As a result, the number of observations might change from one test
to the other.
Table 3.2: Socio-demographic characteristics of the subject pool by location
Shopping malls Senior fair
Junior Middle Senior Junior Middle Senior
18-39 years 40-59 years 60 years 18-39 years 40-59 years 60+ years
Share of the adult population 52.05% 33.34% 14.61% 11.43% 27.14% 61.43%
Females 56.14% 63.01 43.75% 68.75% 63.16% 58.14%
Average age 28 years 50 years 69 years 28 years 53 years 70 years
Education
High school 30.70% 27.40% 31.25% 50.00% 26.32% 23.26%
Bachelor degree or more 22.81% 28.77% 21.88% 37.50% 18.42% 23.26%
Employment status
Employee 78.07% 83.56% 6.25% 50.00% 60.53% 10.47%
Self-employed 3.51% 5.48% 6.25% 6.25% 7.89% 5.81%
Residents in Innsbruck 2.63 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 81.25 % 31.58% 40.70 %
9Table 3.2 provides the breakdown of socio-demographic characteristics by location type.
10The number of participants who failed to complete the experiment in all its pats is similar across
age cohort (6 for Junior, 5 for Middle, and 4 for Senior).
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Figure 3.5: Experimental locations 1
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Figure 3.6: Experimental locations 2
(a) Experimenter desk
(b) Senior fair
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3.5.2 REGRESSION TABLES
Table 3.3: Cooperation by age cohort of the partner
Cooperation in PD
(1=Cooperate, 0=Defect)
Model 1 Model 2
Partner from Middle cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.041 0.044
(0.191) (0.193)
Partner from Senior cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.406** 0.433**
(0.195) (0.198)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.133
(0.412)
Constant 0.785*** 0.165
(0.172) (0.967)
Controls No Yes
N.obs. 1073 1049
Log. Likelihood -643.097 -618.577
Notes: Panel random-effects logit regressions. The dependent variable as-
sumes value 1 for cooperation and 0 for defection in the PD. Age cohort of
the partner was dummy coded with Junior cohort as base. Controls include
the following variables. Male that takes value 1 for male and 0 for females.
Three dummies for different education levels: Bachelor or more, High school,
N.A. in case the information is not available. The baseline category for ed-
ucation is Vocational training or lower. Further, we control for the Number of
children. We included two dummies for the location where the experiment
took place: Shopping mall 1 (d) and Senior fair (baseline category is Shopping
mall 2). Finally, we included a dummy for each enumerator. As a robustness
check, we re-run all the regressions and added a dummy PD-first to control
for any potential order effect. The dummy takes value 1 for the sessions in
which the PDwas presented before the DG. All results are qualitatively and
quantitatively the same. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1.
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Table 3.4: Generosity by the age cohort of the Dictator
Generosity in DG (amount given)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dictator from Middle cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.170 -0.041
(0.304) (0.355)
Dictator from Senior cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.587** -0.039
(0.299) (0.430)
Age of the Dictator (in years) 0.023*** 0.019**
(0.007) (0.010)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.287 0.258
(0.412) (0.412)
Constant 4.074*** 3.685*** 3.210*** 3.126***
(0.206) (0.999) (0.345) (1.035)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N.obs. 1073 1049 1067 1043
R2 (overall) 0.008 0.032 0.022 0.039
Notes: Panel random-effects GLS regressions. The dependent variable is the amount given to the
matched partner in the DG. The baseline in Model 1 and Model 2 is that the dictator (decision
maker) belongs to the Junior cohort. For a detailed list of the Controls, refer to the notes to Table
3.3. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3.5: Cooperation by age cohort of the player
Cooperation in PD
(1=Cooperate, 0=Defect)
The partner belongs to the ... cohort
Junior Middle Senior
Expect Cooperation (1=Yes, 0=No) 2.930*** 2.149*** 2.047***
(0.552) (0.449) (0.469)
Decision Maker from Middle cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.261 -0.266 -0.402
(0.416) (0.509) (0.530)
Decision Maker from Senior cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.140 -0.807 -0.513
(0.497) (0.589) (0.583)
DMMiddle x Expect Cooperation -1.232* 0.278 0.083
(0.734) (0.663) (0.672)
DM Senior x Expect Cooperation -1.761** 0.254 -0.080
(0.709) (0.659) (0.662)
Resident in Innsbruck (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.088 0.053 -0.160
(0.426) (0.452) (0.444)
Constant -3.051*** -0.756 -0.795
(1.146) (1.068) (1.063)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 347 348 348
Log. Likelihood -186.938 -178.125 -173.492
Notes: Logit regressions by age cohort of the matched partner. Expect cooperation takes value one if
the decision maker stated that he/she expect the partner for the relevant cohort to cooperate and 0
otherwise. For a detailed list of the Controls, refer to the notes to Table 3.3. Significance levels: ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: Ingroup favoritism
Generosity in DG Cooperation in PD
(amount given) (1=Cooperate, 0=Defect)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Partner from own cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.119 0.117 -0.259 -0.247
(0.141) (0.144) (0.166) (0.168)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.288 0.134
(0.407) (0.409)
Constant 4.280*** 3.647*** 1.016*** 0.401
(0.132) (0.990) (0.147) (0.955)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N.obs. 1073 1049 1073 1049
R2 (overall)/Log. Likelihood 0.001 0.032 -644.516 -620.415
Notes: Models 1 and 2 report GLS panel regressions with random-effects at the individual
level. The dependent variable is the amount given to the matched partner in the DG.
Models 3 and 4 report Logit panel regressions with random-effects at the individual level.
The dependent variable assumes value 1 for cooperation and 0 for defection in the PD. The
variable Partner from own cohort takes the value 1 if the matched partner is from the same
age cohort as the decision maker and 0 otherwise. For a detailed list of the Controls, refer
to the notes to Table 3.3. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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3.5.3 COGNITIVE DECLINE AND UNDERSTANDING
In the DG, participants had an equal chance to be in the role of the dictator or the
recipient. We used the strategy method and ask participants to make decisions in both
roles. When playing as recipient, they were asked to state their beliefs and they also
had to choose the age cohort of the dictator they wanted to be matched with. The idea
is that one should choose what he/she believes to be the most generous cohort, as
that would maximize his/her payoffs. For instance, if a participant expects the Middle
cohort to be the most generous of all, he/she should choose to be matched with a
dictator from the Middle cohort. We interpret departures from this logic as a possible
sign of poor understanding of the rules.11
To test if cognitive decline among the seniors might have affected the proper un-
derstanding of the games, we classify recipients in the DG according to three types:
• Maximizer: they maximize their material payoff, according to their expectations.
We also include players that stated the same expectations for two cohorts and
chose one of the two;
• Indifferent: contains all recipient that held the same expectations for all cohorts.
This implies that we cannot infer anything about their rationality based on the
choice of the dictator cohort;
• Non-maximizer: means that these decision makers did not choose the age cohort
that would maximize their material payoff, based on their expectations.
Table 3.7: Distribution of non-maximizers
Age cohort Maximizer Indifferent Non-maximizers
Junior 40.63% 42.96% 16.41%
Middle 38.53% 44.04% 17.43%
Senior 38.98% 38.14% 22.88%
11Please notice that this is the case also for an altruistic decisionmaker, as dictators are entirely free to
choose the distribution they prefer. There is also no strategic incentive to choose a cohort only to make
sure they could get the e10 endowment, as every dictator was matched with a partner.
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Table 3.7 reports the distribution of types by age cohort: we fail to find any statisti-
cally significant difference in the distribution of types between age cohorts (p = 0.752,
χ2-test). A χ2-test also reveals that the fraction of Non-maximizer types is not signifi-
cantly different across age cohorts (p = 0.388).12 To further control that our results are
not driven by cognitive decline or poor understanding of the instructions, we re-run
all the analysis excluding or controlling for non-maximizers (Table 3.8 to 3.11). All the
results are qualitatively and quantitatively the same.
Table 3.8: Cooperation by age cohort of the partner – Robustness check
Cooperation in DG
(1=Cooperate, 0=Defect)
Model 1 Model 2
Partner from Middle cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.009 0.044
(0.221) (0.193)
Partner from Senior cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.524** 0.433**
(0.229) (0.198)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.151 0.140
(0.498) (0.412)
Non-maximizer (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.200
(0.313)
Constant -0.544 0.183
(1.118) (0.966)
Controls Yes Yes
N.obs. 848 1049
Log. Likelihood -484.423 -618.374
Notes: Panel random-effects logit regressions. In Model 1, we restrict the
analysis to participants who were classified as maximizers or indifferent.
In Model 2, we consider the full sample but we include a dummy taking
value 1 if a decision maker was classified as non-maximizer. See Table
3.3 for a detailed description of the variables. Significance levels: *** p <
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
12Participants classified as Indifferent tend to choose their own cohort. A potential explanation for this
pattern is that participants have more accurate information about peers from their own cohort and thus
their estimates might be more reliable.
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Table 3.9: Generosity by the age cohort of the Dictator – Robustness check
Generosity in DG (amount given)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dictator from Middle cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.075 -0.048
(0.391) (0.356)
Dictator from Senior cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.017 -0.063
(0.483) (0.433)
Dictator Age (in years) 0.022** 0.019*
(0.011) (0.010)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.208 0.282 0.209 0.254
(0.464) (0.412) (0.465) (0.412)
Non-maximizer (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.182 0.113
(0.324) (0.323)
Constant 3.373*** 3.662*** 2.756** 3.123***
(1.092) (1.001) (1.129) (1.036)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 848 1049 842 1043
R2 (overall) 0.047 0.032 0.057 0.039
Notes: Panel random-effects GLS regressions. In Models 1 and 3, we restrict the analysis to
participants who were classified as maximizers or indifferent. In Models 2 and 4, we consider
the full sample but we include a dummy taking value 1 if a decision maker was classified as
non-maximizer. See Table 3.4 for a detailed description of the variables. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3.10: Cooperation by age cohort of the player – Robustness check
Cooperation in PD (1=Cooperate, 0=Defect)
The partner belongs to the ... cohort
Junior Middle Senior
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Expect Cooperation (1=Yes, 0=No) 2.819*** 2.927*** 2.461*** 2.147*** 2.470*** 2.080***
(0.578) (0.552) (0.518) (0.449) (0.554) (0.472)
DM from Middle cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.394 0.261 -0.033 -0.274 -0.055 -0.382
(0.462) (0.416) (0.560) (0.510) (0.584) (0.531)
DM from Senior cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.597 0.144 -1.263* -0.819 -0.320 -0.430
(0.575) (0.498) (0.694) (0.590) (0.678) (0.591)
DMMiddle x Expect Coop. -0.765 -1.228* -0.214 0.284 -0.250 0.074
(0.811) (0.735) (0.752) (0.663) (0.772) (0.673)
DM Senior x Expect Coop. -1.510* -1.761** 0.109 0.254 -0.361 -0.143
(0.784) (0.709) (0.762) (0.659) (0.777) (0.666)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.109 0.089 0.304 0.051 -0.059 -0.153
(0.497) (0.426) (0.525) (0.453) (0.520) (0.443)
Non-maximizer (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.030 0.097 -0.318
(0.317) (0.336) (0.339)
Constant -3.950*** -3.043*** -1.104 -0.762 -1.883 -0.749
(1.388) (1.149) (1.194) (1.070) (1.205) (1.084)
N.obs. 280 347 281 348 281 348
Log. Likelihood -144.986 -186.933 -137.667 -178.083 -131.547 -173.055
Notes: Panel random-effects GLS regressions. In Models 1, 3, and 5, we restrict the analysis to partic-
ipants who were classified as maximizers or indifferent. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we consider the full
sample but we include a dummy taking value 1 if a decision maker was classified as non-maximizer.
See Table 3.5 for a detailed description of the variables. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 3.11: Ingroup favoritism – Robustness check
Generosity in DG Cooperation in PD
(amount given) (1=Cooperate, 0=Defect)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Partner from own cohort (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.168 0.117 -0.238 -0.247
(0.157) (0.144) (0.192) (0.168)
Resident in Innsbruck (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.213 0.282 0.151 0.141
(0.458) (0.407) (0.491) (0.409)
Non-maximizer (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.178 -0.200
(0.319) (0.310)
Constant 3.315*** 3.626*** -0.286 0.420
(1.080) (0.992) (1.096) (0.954)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 848 1049 848 1049
R2 (overall)/Log. Likelihood 0.048 0.033 -487.145 -620.208
Notes: Models 1 and 2 report GLS panel regressions with random-effects at the individual
level. Models 3 and 4 report Logit panel regressions with random-effects at the individual
level. In Models 1 and 3, we restrict the analysis to participants that were classified as
maximizers or indifferent. In Models 2 and 4, we consider the full sample but we include a
dummy taking value 1 if a decision maker was classified as non-maximizer. See Table 3.6
for a detailed description of the variables. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1.
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3.5.4 ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure 3.7: Cooperation behavior of Middle cohort decision makers
M
D E C I S I O N  
M A K E R
[ 4 0 - 5 9  y ]  
SJ M
Notes: The figure presents the cooperation behavior
of the Middle cohort. The first bar reports the per-
centage of cooperation for the case in which a Mid-
dle had to make a decision for a partner from the
Junior cohort. The middle bar reports the percent-
age of cooperation for the case in which the partner
was from the Middle cohort. Finally, the last bar re-
ports the case in which the partner was from the
Senior cohort. Standard errors are reported for each
bar.
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Figure 3.8: Cooperation behavior of Senior cohort decision makers
S
D E C I S I O N  
M A K E R
[ 6 0 y  o r  + ]  
SJ M
Notes: The figure presents the cooperation behav-
ior of the Senior cohort. The first bar reports the
percentage of cooperation for the case in which a
Senior had to make a decision for a partner from the
Junior cohort. Themiddle bar reports thepercentage
of cooperation for the case in which the partner was
from the Middle cohort. Finally, the last bar reports
the case in which the partner was from the Senior
cohort. Standard errors are reported for each bar.
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3.5.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 3.12: Summary statistics of the Dictator Game
Age cohort of
the DM
Age cohort of the recipient
Junior Middle Senior
Junior
4.16
(2.69)
3.74
(2.46)
4.28
(2.89)
Middle
4.54
(2.92)
3.89
(2.58)
4.30
(2.90)
Senior
5.03
(3.23)
3.84
(3.01)
5.17
(3.43)
Notes: The table shows the mean amount given
(standard deviation in parentheses) for each age
cohort of dictators conditional on the age cohort
of the recipient.
Table 3.13: Summary statistics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Age cohort of
the DM
Age cohort of the partner
Junior Middle Senior
Junior
0.55
(0.50)
0.67
(0.47)
0.70
(0.46)
Middle
0.65
(0.48)
0.63
(0.48)
0.67
(0.47)
Senior
0.68
(0.47)
0.59
(0.49)
0.68
(0.47)
Notes: The table shows the fraction of coopera-
tors (standarddeviation inparentheses) for each
age cohort conditional on the age cohort of the
partner.
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3.5.6 EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Page 113
General information
Thank you very much for participating in this short study. You can earn money during
the study and we will pay in cash and in private at the end of the study. Please, read
the instructions carefully because your decisions can influence your earnings and the
earnings of other people. You will be able to participate in two games.
Instructions Game 1
We will form pairs and one member of the pair will be randomly assigned e10 and
the other e0. At the end, we will determine if you get the e10 or the other member
of the pair by a coin flip.
If you are ready you can turn the page. You have to answer to Part A first and can then
move to Part B.
If you have any question during the experiment, please ask a member of the staff.
Page 2
Decisions Game 1: Part A
Consider the case in which you
win the coin flip and get e10.
You have to decide if and how much you want to give to the other person. You can
condition the amount on the age group of the other person. You will know the actual
age only at the end. If you win the coin flip, your earnings are equal toe10 minus what
you give to the other person.
How much would you like to give to the other person?
You can give any amount between 0 Euro and 10 Euro, in increments of 50 cents.
13The design was presented in a A5 format booklet. The original instructions are in German and are
available upon request from the authors.
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Age range of the
other person
Give to the
other person
18-39 years ........... Euro
40-59 years ........... Euro
60 years + .......... Euro
Page 3
Decisions Game 1: Part B
Consider the case in which you
lose the coin flip and get e0.
You have to state how much you expect to receive from the other member of the pair.
You can condition your answer on the age group of the partner. You also have to choose
the age group of the person you want to be paired with.
How much do you think the other person would give you?
With whom do you want to be paired?
Remember that the sum of the money the other person keeps and gives to you must be 10 Euro. Please
round the amounts to the nearest 50 cents.
Age range of the
other person
Receiving from
another person
Choose with whom (age
range) you want to be
matched with
[ONLY ONE ANSWER]
18-39 years ........... Euro O
40-59 years ........... Euro O
60 years + .......... Euro O
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Page 4
Instructions Game 2
In this part of the experiment, you receive 2 Euro and will be matched with another
participant (different from the one in Game 1).
You have to decide between two actions: Keep or Transfer.
• If you Keep, you keep the 2 Euro and the other participant receives nothing
from you.
• If youTransfer, you send the 2 Euro to the other participant and he/she receives
4 Euro.
The other participant is playing the same game as you, and can either Keep or Transfer.
There are four possible cases:
1. Both you and the match Keep: both earn 2 Euro.
2. You Keep and your match Transfer: you earn 6 Euro and your match earns 0
Euro
3. Both you and your match Transfer: both earn 4 Euro
4. You Transfer and your match Keep: you earn 0 Euro and your match earns 6
Euro
If you have any question during the experiment, please ask a member of the staff.
Page 5
Decisions Game 2
Please make your decision.
Now you have to decide if you choose to Keep or Transfer. You can condition your
answer on the age group of the partner. You also have to state what do you expect from
your match. Do you think the person matched with you will Keep or Transfer? (you
can condition on the age of the other person)
Please mark your choices with an X.
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Age range of the
other person
Your decision
What do you expect
from the person
matched with you?
18-39 years
O Transfer
O Keep
O Transfer
O Keep
40-59 years
O Transfer
O Keep
O Transfer
O Keep
60 years +
O Transfer
O Keep
O Transfer
O Keep
Page 6
Questionnaire
Age (in years): .....................
Gender:
O Male
O Female
Place of residence (Zip code): .....................
Highest education level attained: .....................
Number of children: .....................
Employment: (Please choose one):
O Employee
O Self-employed
O Unemployed
O Student
O Housewife
O Retired
O N/A
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chapter 4
THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF DECISION RIGHTS – TEAM VS.
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING
joint work with Justin Buffat and Matthias Sutter
Abstract
Power and decision rights are valued for their instrumental role – the ability
to affect the consequence of a decision – but are also valued per se. While re-
cent experimental and empirical work has shown that individual decision makers
value decision rights intrinsically, evidence for teams andgroupdecision-making is
scarce. In this paper, we build on Bartling et al.’s (2014) framework to quantify and
determine if groups of decision makers value decision rights intrinsically. Specifi-
cally, we compare team decision-making with individual decision-making. While
our results suggest that teams do value power intrinsically, our data reveal that the
value placed on decision rights depends on the decision-making process prevail-
ing in the team. When none of the teams members reported any issue regarding
the decision process, teams assign lower values than individuals. In line with the
literature on team decision-making, this result suggests that teams displays a be-
havior that is more consistent with the rational decision maker than individuals.
However, for teams reporting an issue, the weight placed on keeping the decision
rights dramatically increases, even above the value of individual decision makers.
The findings suggest that groups of individuals assign lower importance to being
in control than individuals only when no issues arise in the decision process.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Decision makers value power and decision rights. Having the right to decide gives
control over the outcome that is preferred. This value, referred to as the instrumental
value, is determinant in shaping behavior and has long been considered as the only
driver of behavior (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Yet,
decision rights carry an additional value, an intrinsic value, because decision makers
enjoy decisions and power per se. Recent experimental work confirms this idea and
shows that decision makers do value decision rights beyond their instrumental value
(Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 2013; Bartling et al., 2014;
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Owens et al., 2014; Neri and Rommeswinkel, 2017) and that this value is sizable. The
gap between the intrinsic and the instrumental value reflects the psychological value of
being in control. Hence, decision makers do not only value the outcome dimension of
a decision, but also the procedure that generates the outcome (Frey et al., 2004; Chlaß
et al., 2014; Dold and Khadjavi, 2017).14
While many studies support the hypothesis that decision rights are valued intrin-
sically by individual decision makers, decisions in organizations are mostly made by
a group of individuals rather than individually. Examples include boards of CEOs,
hiring committees, central bank committees, and executive boards in political parties.
In these situations, the power is shared by individuals and decisions are taken at the
group level. Since most decisions in organizations are made in teams, it is relevant to
understand whether teams value decision rights intrinsically. While the literature on
team decision-making provides no definite answer how teams behave compared to
individuals, a fair amount of studies show that teams behave in a way which is more
consistent with the hypothesis of a rational decision maker than individuals (see, e.g.,
Charness and Sutter, 2012; Kugler et al., 2012, for an overview). Because a rational
decision maker would only care about the consequences of a decision – and not about
the process leading to the outcome – she would assign zero importance to the decision
right per se. Teams behaving as such should hence value decision rights much less than
individuals.
In this paper we address these questions. Specifically, we test whether teams value
decision rights intrinsically and, if so, how this value compares to that of individuals. To
do so, we build on Bartling, Fehr and Herz’s (2014) framework to quantify the intrinsic
value of decision rights in a team decision-making context. Themain advantage of their
design lies in the ability to discriminate between the instrumental value and the intrinsic
value of a decision rights. The design comprises two parts: The goal of the first part
is to elicit the principal’s preferences over keeping or delegating the decision right to
an agent regarding the implementation of a risky project. The second part present the
principal with two lotteries that capture first part’s preferences but take place outside
of the delegation context: A “control” lottery and a “delegation” lottery. The lotteries
reflect the probabilities and payoff consequences of the first part, but are exogenously
given to the principal. The certainty equivalent of both lotteries is elicited. Since the
intrinsic value component of the decision right is absent in the second part, a principal
14Both the economics and psychology literature provide studies showing the existence of an intrinsic
value of decision rights (see, e.g., Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000; Sen, 1985; McClelland, 1975). For instance,
Neri and Rommeswinkel (2017) study the reasons for individuals valuing decision rights intrinsically
and show that they do so because they want to avoid others to interfere in their outcome, rather than
for the freedom of choice, nor to have control over someone else.
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being indifferent between keeping and delegating the decision right should assign
equal certainty equivalents. Only if the certainty equivalent of the delegation lottery
is larger than the certainty equivalent of the control lottery, does the principal assign
a larger value to being in control of a decision right than delegating it, i.e., a non-zero
intrinsic value. The results of Bartling et al. (2014) clearly show that individuals do
value decision rights per se and that being in control of the decision is valued about
17% more than delegating the decision.
In our study, we design two treatments: an individual decision-making treatment
(SINGLE) – a replication of Bartling, Fehr and Herz’s (2014) original condition – and
a team decision-making treatment (TEAM). In the latter treatment, a team of two
subjects plays the role of the principal, while the agent remains a single subject. Team
members make decisions separately, but can freely exchange messages to coordinate.
Importantly, members of a teammust agree on a common decision. In this framework,
teammembers have an incentive to communicate to efficiently coordinate on a common
decision.
Following the literature on team-decision making, teams are expected to be less
affected by psychological factors than individuals. They are hence expected to be less
willing to keep control over decision rights than individuals. If true, the intrinsic value
of teams should be lower than the intrinsic value of individuals. As for whether teams
value decision rights intrinsically, the literature provides no definite answer. On the
one hand, studies show that under some circumstances groups of individuals behave
more consistent with the hypothesis of a rational decision maker than individuals. For
instance, in standard ultimatum games teams have been shown to send less money
to recipients and display a very low rejection rate when in the shoes of the recipient
(Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998). Also, teams systematically choose lower numbers than
individuals in the Beauty Contest game, learn faster than individuals and outperform
individuals in terms of payoffs (Kocher and Sutter, 2005), and the larger the size of
the team the smaller the chosen numbers (Sutter, 2005). Moreover, teams transfer less
money in a dictator game (Luhan et al., 2009) and are less likely to create price bubbles
in financial markets than individuals (Cheung and Palan, 2012).15 Extending these
findings to our design, teams in our experiment should hence be almost indifferent
between keeping and delegating a decision right, which would imply a zero or fairly
low intrinsic value.
On the other hand, some studies report that teamdecision-makingdoes not lead to a
different behavior than individual decision-making. For instance, Bone et al. (1999) find
15In addition, it has been shown that teams coordinate better than individuals (Feri et al., 2010),
perform better in the so-called Monty-Hall problem (Slembeck and Tyran, 2004; Maciejovsky et al.,
2013) and play more strategically in signaling games (Cooper and Kagel, 2005).
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that groupdiscussiondoesnot lead tomore consistent choices than individual decision-
making in so-called common ratio problems. Rockenbach et al. (2007) compare team
and individual decision-making under risk. In particular, the authors test behavior
against two benchmarks, namely standard expected utility theory (EUT) and portfolio
selection theory (PST). They find no difference between individuals and teams with
respect to the EUT, but teams are more consistent with the PST than individuals.16
Our data yield insightful results. First, our treatment replicating Bartling et al.’s
(2014) individual decision-making condition yields very similar intrinsic values. Re-
markably, the average intrinsic value (in percent) in our SINGLE treatment is 17.0% and
differs very little from the value reported in the original paper (16.7%), and the two
samples are statistically indistinguishable from each other. The data in our sample also
very strongly support the hypothesis of a positive and economically important intrinsic
value. In addition, we replicated all effects observed in their study regarding (i) stake
sizes and (ii) various degrees of conflict between the principal and the agent. Also,
for 9 out of 10 different delegation games (i.e., with different payoff consequences) the
value in our data is statistically indistinguishable from the value in their data.
Second, our data suggest that overall groups assign a positive intrinsic value, as do
individuals, and that the value they assign is not different from the value assigned by
individuals. This is true for all stake sizes and degrees of conflict of interest between the
principal and the agent. While this result is at first surprising, it can be expected due
to the rules governing team decision-making. In our design, requiring team members
to agree on a common decision potentially creates situations in which team members
hardly find an agreement unless one of them gives up. Anticipating this possibility,
we asked each team member about any issues encountered during the experiment. In
particular, we asked team members to report whether they “felt excluded” or “gave
up” in the decisionmaking process. Based on this information, we divide the sample of
teams in two groups: Teams reporting no issues in the decision-making process (smooth
teams) and teams in which at least one team member reported an issue (conflict teams).
When controlling for the issues that arose in the decision process, the data show
that smooth teams assign a very low intrinsic value to decision rights, about 8%. This
value is less than half of the value individuals display (treatment SINGLE), 17%, and
this difference is statistically significant. This finding is in line with studies reporting
that groups of individuals are less affected by psychological factors than individuals.
At contrary, conflict teams assign a greater importance to being in control, with an
intrinsic value of about 40%.While these teams annihilate the overall difference between
16Other studies do not report systematic differences in behavior between teams and individuals (see,
e.g., Davis, 1992; Kerr et al., 1996; Bateman and Munro, 2005; Sutter et al., 2009; Harrison et al., 2012;
Baker et al., 2008).
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teams and individuals, very little can be said on the reasons for such a high value as
too few teams reported an issue.
While the self-reported variables used to split the sample of teams into two allows
to document an heterogeneous effect, a more objective measure is needed to back up
issues in the decision-making process. Hence, we provide further evidence that teams
reporting an issue use communication less efficiently than teams reporting no issues.
Teams without issues were also able to coordinate on a common decision in the very
first proposal more often than teams reporting issues, but also much sooner in the
experiment. Rather than relying on communication to coordinate, the data suggest
that teams with issues use strategies in which one member adjusts his or her decision
to the decision of the other. Moreover, we coded the text messages that were exchanged
between team members into various categories to learn more about the quality of the
decision-making process. Interestingly, the more often teammembers seek the opinion
of each other and the more they express their preferences regarding the decisions, the
lower the value they assign to being in control of the decision. Finally, we compare the
selected effort of both team types and individual decision makers with the theoretical
optimal effort level.
Our results are novel in severalways. Tobeginwith and to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to study whether groups of individuals value decision rights beyond
their instrumental role and how this valuation compares to the valuation of individual
decisionmakers. Crucially, we show that without conditioning on the decision-making
process, teams do not behave differently from individuals. It is only when teams have
no issues in the decision-making process that teams are less reluctant to give up control
over decision rights than individuals. Since many decisions are made at the team level,
this result is relevant from an organizational as well as a managerial point of view and
has never been documented before.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the original design and
our experimental treatments. In Section 4.3, we present our findings and discuss their
implications. In Section 4.4weprovide some insights on heterogeneity in teams. Finally,
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We build on the design developed by Bartling, Fehr and Herz (2014, hereafter BFH)
to elicit and measure the intrinsic value of decision rights of subjects. As noted by BFH
(2014), the main difficulty in obtaining a value is to separate the intrinsic value from the
instrumental value. To achieve this goal, BFH (2014) designed an experiment in two
76
parts – a delegation part and a lottery part – based on subjects’ revealed preferences.
Their design provides a measure that expresses (in percentage) how much subjects
value being in control of a decision rather than delegating the decision. The intuition
for a two-part design is the following. The first part serves to elicit subjects’ preferences
over the delegation of a decision right. The second part uses the data from the first part
to present subjects with lotteries that have identical payoff consequences but are given
outside of the delegation context so that the component responsible for the intrinsic
valuation is absent.
In what follows, we describe the setup used for the elicitationmethod developed by
BFH (2014) and then expose our treatments. We finally describe additional measures
we collected. We start by describing the first part: the delegation part.
4.2.1 THE SETUP
The Delegation part
The first part consists of a principal-agent delegation game in which the principal
initially owns the decision right and can delegate it to the agent. Both the principal and
the agent make two decisions in case they own the decision right: (i) They choose one
of the two project alternatives (P or A) and (ii) they select the probability of success
of the chosen project. Choosing the probability of success is framed as a costly effort
provision, with ei ∈ [0,100] the effort level that determines the probability of success
of the selected project, where i = {P,A} denotes the principal and the agent. The party
which finally holds the decision right has to pay the cost for the chosen effort level,
c(e) = ke2 with k > 0 as a parameter. The payoffs to the principal and to the agent, which
depend on the chosen alternative and on the success of the project, are displayed in
Table 4.1 for the 10 different delegation games.
The principal, who initially holds the decision right, has to make a third decision:
She selects a minimum requirement for the agent’s effort, denoted e. This is the main
innovation of BFH’s (2014) design and this is what determines whether the decision is
delegated or not. Specifically, delegation takes place if and only if the agent’s effort is
at least as high as the minimum required by the principal, i.e., eA ≥ e. This mechanism
ensures that the principal keeps the decision right whenever the agent’s chosen effort
would make her worse off and delegates the right otherwise. In the words of BFH
(2014), it is in the principal’s best interest to set the minimum requirement in a way
that if the chosen effort of the agent is equal to theminimum requirement, the principal
is indifferent between keeping and delegating the decision right.
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Note that by design, holding the decision right induces a trade-off: On the one hand,
the party with the decision right has her decisions implemented, and this is important
because the principal weakly prefers project P over A, and the agent A over P . On
the other hand, the party with the decision right has to bear the cost of the effort. The
delegation game is played for 10 different situations that reflect different stakes and
different payoff allocations between the principal and the agent. The following example
summarizes the decisions and payoff consequences of the delegation part:
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE. Suppose that in Game 3 the principal chooses an effort
eP = 60 (effort cost of 36), a minimum effort requirement e = 40 (cost of 16) and
projective alternative θP = P .
If eA < 40: The decision right remains with the principal and project alternativeP will be implemented. Thus, the principal and the agent receive 180 − 36 = 144 and
140 with probability 0.6 (because eP = 60), respectively, or 100 − 36 = 64 and 100 with
probability 0.4, respectively.
If eA = 60 ≥ 40: The decision right is delegated to the agent. Hence, the principal
and the agent receive 140 and 180 − 36 = 144 with probability 0.6 (because eA = 60),
respectively, or 100 to the principal and 100 − 36 = 64 to the agent with probability 0.4,
respectively.
Table 4.1: Parameters of the delegation games
Project Successful Project Unsuccessful
Alternative P Alternative A Outside option Stake size Conflict of interest Cost parameter (k)
Principal
PP
Agent
AP
Principal
PA
Agent
AA
Principal
P0
Agent
A0
HS - high,
LS - low
HC - high, LC - low,
NC - no
k = 0.01 - low,
k = 0.02 - high
Game 1 220 190 190 220 100 100 LS LC 0.01
Game 2 280 235 235 280 100 100 LS LC 0.01
Game 3 180 140 140 180 100 100 LS HC 0.01
Game 4 220 160 160 220 100 100 LS HC 0.01
Game 5 260 260 260 260 100 100 LS NC 0.01
Game 6 440 380 380 440 200 200 HS LC 0.02
Game 7 560 470 470 560 200 200 HS LC 0.02
Game 8 360 280 280 360 200 200 HS HC 0.02
Game 9 440 320 320 440 200 200 HS HC 0.02
Game 10 520 520 520 520 200 200 HS NC 0.02
Notes: The table shows the payoffs for the principal and the agent in 10 different games depending on
whether the project is successful or unsuccessful. The table also indicates “LS” for low-stake games
(Games 1-5) and “HS” for high-stake games (Games 6-10) and displays a measure of the degree of
conflict between the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs, with “NC” standing for no conflict, “LC”
for low conflict and “HC” for high conflict.
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The Lottery Part
The goal of the lottery part is to present the principals with payoff consequences that
are equivalent to the delegation part but that take place outside of the delegation
context, i.e., the intrinsic component is absent.
Specifically, in this part the principal is presented with two lotteries: a “control”
lottery and a “delegation” lottery. Although these lotteries reflect decisions from the
first part, they are exogenously given to the principal in this part. The task of the decision
maker is to state her certainty equivalents for eachof the lotteries.Aswill be shown later,
the difference in certainty equivalents between the control lottery and the delegation
lottery will be used as a measure of the intrinsic value of a decision right.
Control lotteries represent payoffs and probabilities when the principal keeps the
decision rights. They are hence solely determined by the principal’s choices regarding
the project alternative and the probability of success. Let Lc(eP , θP ) denote the control
lottery, with θP the project alternative chosen by the principal. The delegation lottery
represents payoffs and probabilities when the principal delegates the decision. Let
Ld(eA, θA) denote any delegation lottery when the agent choses effort eA ≥ e and
project alternative θA. The worst delegation lottery to the principal is achieved when
the agent chooses her preferred alternative A and selects the lowest minimum effort
so that delegation takes place, i.e., eA = e. This worst delegation lottery is denoted
Ld(e,A).
A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE. Based on the previous numerical example, the control
lottery yields payoffs 144 to the principal and 140 to the agent with probability 0.6,
and payoffs 64 to the principal and 100 to the agent with probability 0.4. The delegation
lottery yields 140 to the principal and 164 to the agent with probability 0.4, and 100 to
the principal and 84 to the agent with probability 0.6. Subjects report their certainty
equivalent for each lottery, CE(Lc) for the control and CE(Ld) for the delegation
lottery.
MEASURINGTHE INTRINSICVALUE. In this paragraph, we showhow the intrinsic
value of the decision right can be obtained from comparing the utilities of both lotteries.
Let’s start with the case of a principal not valuing decision rights per se. If the principal
plays the lottery, her expected utility is given by the consequences of the lottery she
faces, U(Lc) for the control lottery and U(Ld) for the delegation lottery. If the principal
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does not play the lottery she receives her stated certainty equivalent CE(L) and the
agent receives the outside option A0, so that the principal’s utility is u(CE(L),A0).17
It is optimal for a principal to choose a minimum effort requirement e∗ such that
the utilities are equal, i.e.,
U(Lc) = U(Ld)⇔ u(CE(Lc),A0) = u(CE(Ld),A0). (4.2.1)
For the latter equation to hold, the certainty equivalents must be equal, CE(Lc) =
CE(Ld). Hence, without any intrinsic valuation of the decision right, the gap in certainty
equivalents is zero.
Now suppose that the principal intrinsically values a decision right. This means that
her utility directly depends on the allocation of the decision right. The expected utility
of a lottery is then described as U(Lw,w) with w = {c, d} indicating either keeping
control over the decision (w = c) or delegating it (w = d). Expression 4.2.1 is modified
accordingly:
U(Lc, c) = U(Ld, d)⇔ u(CE(Lc) + Vc,A0) = u(CE(Ld) + Vd,A0), (4.2.2)
where Vc and Vd capture the potential intrinsic values of being in control and of dele-
gating, respectively. For equation (4.2.2) to hold, it must be that
Vc − Vd = CE(Ld) −CE(Lc) ≡ IV, (4.2.3)
where we defined IV , the intrinsic value, as the difference in certainty equivalents. If
Vc > Vd, the value placed on being in control outweighs the value of delegating and
IV = CE(Ld) −CE(Lc) > 0. Hence, a difference in certainty equivalents may indicate
either a positive or negative intrinsic value.
4.2.2 PROCEDURE
In the instructions, principals and agents were neutrally referred to as Role A and
Role B, respectively. In the first part, principals (Role A) and agents (Role B) played
each of the 10 situations of the delegation game (see Table 4.1) in a random order.18
We implemented a perfect-stranger matching such that in each round a principal is
randomly matched with an agent but only once.
In the lottery part, both roles faced a control lottery and a delegation lottery for each
of the 10 situations from the first part. In total, they faced 20 decisions in a random
order. Role A was randomly matched with Role B in any new round. The certainty
17The agent receives the outside option tomatchwhat the agent would receive in the delegation game
when the project is not successful.
18The order was random at the session level but the same for all principals within a given session.
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equivalent for each lottery was elicited using the incentive compatible mechanism pro-
posed by Becker et al. (1964). In particular, the principals had to specify the smallest
certain payoff shewould accept – the certainty equivalent – instead of facing the offered
lottery. Then, the computer randomly drew a number from an uniform distribution
and the lottery was played if the randomly selected number was smaller than the prin-
cipal’s certainty equivalent.19 If the certainty equivalent was smaller or equal than the
randomly drawn number, the principal received the randomly drawn number. In ad-
dition, the principal’s decision affects the payment of a randomly matched participant,
whose payoff is determined by the outcome of the lottery should the lottery be played
or by a fixed payment if the lottery is not played (outside option of either 100 or 200,
see Table 4.1).
In total, each subject played10 roundsof thedelegation stage (10different situations)
and 20 rounds of the lottery stage (10 delegation lotteries and 10 control lotteries).
4.2.3 TREATMENTS
We implemented two treatments, labeled SINGLE and TEAM. Treatment SINGLE is a
replication of the original condition in BFH (2014). The treatment follows closely the
steps described above and the subjects were provided with the original instructions.
The only difference between our SINGLE treatment and the original treatment in BFH
(2014) is the wording we use to describe the task to the participants. While BFH (2014)
refer to the principal and to the agent as Participant A and Participant B, respectively,
we refer to them as Role A and Role B. We used this wording to facilitate the com-
parison between both treatments, since in treatment Team a principal consisted of two
individuals.
TEAMDECISION-MAKING. In treatment TEAM, a team of two persons plays in the
role of a principal (Role A), while the agent is a single subject (Role B). The pair of
principals remains fixed for the entire duration of the experiment. The principals in
TEAM faced the same set of decisions as the single principal in SINGLE, but they must
reach a common decision beforemoving to the next round. At any time during a round,
team members could exchange messages through a free-text chat box. The chat box is
erased and cleared at the end of each round. At the end of each situation/lottery, a
summary screen displays the own as well as the partner’s choices. They are then given
the possibility to adjust their choices. Only when all of their decisions coincide, could
they proceed to the next round.
19Note that the boundaries of the distribution was determined by the low and the high payment of
the given lottery.
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Importantly, we did not impose any limit on the time for the principals to reach
a common decision. We did so to avoid time pressure and let them as much time as
needed to reach a common decision. Finally, both roles were aware of the composition
of the other role as well as the rules governing decisions within each role.
4.2.4 ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
At the end of the experiment, we collected additional measures that potentially affect
the intrinsic value. As BFH (2014), we collected a measure of loss aversion. Both roles
made six lottery decisions that can yield an additional gain ofe3 per person or a loss of
eX , with both outcomes being equally likely. We varied the size of the loss X in steps
of e0.50 from e1 to e3.50 (see, e.g., Abeler et al., 2011, for a similar methodology).
Although BFH (2014) showed that loss aversion did not affect the intrinsic value of
decision rights in an individual decision-making context, we decided to measure it to
account for potential differences between teams and individuals.20 Since we do not ob-
serve any significant differences between the degree of loss aversion of individuals and
teams (p = 0.572, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test), and we do not find any correlation
between loss aversion and the average intrinsic value of decision rights as defined in
equation (4.2.3) (Pearson’s correlation coefficient: ρ = −0.036, p = 0.784 for individuals,
and ρ = 0.237, p = 0.208 for teams), we do not report on this measure in the analysis.
We also obtained a measure of illusion of control. This variable measures the will-
ingness of subjects to give up money in exchange for rolling themselves the dices that
determine whether the project is successful or not.21 Only a few individuals and teams
decided to spendmoney to be able to roll the dices themselves (20 % in each treatment,
p = 1.000 two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test). Moreover, the willingness to pay did not
vary significantly between treatments (p = 0.990, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
Also, as in BFH (2014), this measure is not correlated with the average intrinsic value of
decision rights (Pearson’s correlation coefficient: ρ = −0.168, p = 0.201 for individuals
and ρ = −0.275, p = 0.141 for teams). Hence, we do not report on this measure in what
follows.
Lastly, to account for the fact that agreement within a team may vary between
teams, we also collected information on how team members perceived the overall
decision-making process. In particular, we asked each team member whether (i) she
felt excluded from the decision-making process and (ii) she gave up in the decision-
20Note that team members made again a common decision. They used a free-text chat to coordinate
on the lotteries to accept and reject.
21As in BFH (2014), both roles received a few more tokens and could decide how much to spend to
be able to roll the dices themselves. Team members had to agree on whether to spend any tokens and,
if so, on how much to spend.
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making process at some point. Both questions could be answered by “Yes” or “No”.
These two questions were motivated by previous research pointing out that besides
group consensus, individual acceptance and member satisfaction are important for
effective team decisions (see, e.g., Priem et al., 1995).
4.2.5 PARTICIPANTS AND PAYMENTS
The sessions took place at the laboratory of the University of Cologne (C-LER) in June
and July 2016.A total of 210 participantswere recruitedwithORSEE (Greiner, 2015).We
conducted 7 sessions, with exactly 30 participants in each, accordingly: 4 sessions for
treatment SINGLE (60 Role A, 60 Role B) and 3 sessions for treatment TEAM (60 Role A,
30Role B). The experimentwas computerizedusingZ-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects
were students of the University of Cologne with a self-reported fluency in German. At
the end, one decision out of the ten delegation situations and two decisions out of the
twenty lottery decisions were randomly chosen to be payoff relevant.
The experiment lasted on average 105 minutes for subjects in treatment SINGLE
and 125 minutes for subjects in treatment TEAM.22 The participants earned on average
e25 (including a e4 show-up fee).
At the beginning of each part, new instructions were handed out individually
together with control questions that tested their understanding of the experiment.23
Subjects typed in their answers to the control questions and could start the experiment
when all questions were correctly answered.
4.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We report the results as follows. We first compare our estimates of the intrinsic value
IV from our SINGLE treatment with the estimated values obtained from BFH (2014).
As already stated, our treatment SINGLE followed a strict replication procedure of
the original condition in BFH (2014).24 We then present the main results for the team
decision-making treatmentTEAM and compare itwith the individual decision-making
treatment SINGLE.
22While the duration of this experiment was on average longer than a standard economic experiment
at the University of Cologne, our experiment was shorter than the original experiment by BFH (2014).
Rather than having student assistants verifying control questions of the participants one person at a
time, answers were typed in the computer and automatically verified.
23A translated version of the instructions for SINGLE and TEAM is available in the Appendix.
24The only difference between our treatment SINGLE and BFH’s (2014) original condition lies in the
wording used to describe the principals and agents. While they use “Participant A” and “Participant B”,
we labeled them as “Role A” and “Role B” to account for the fact that a Principal in the TEAM treatment
comprises more than one participant.
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In what follows we focus on the intrinsic value IV, defined in equation (4.2.3), and
expressed in percentage of the certainty equivalent of the control lottery, i.e.,
IV% = CE(Ld) −CE(Lc)
CE(Lc) .
This measure indicates the percentage to which the principal values the delegation
lottery over the control lottery. In addition, this measure ensures that values of games
with different stakes, hence different certainty equivalents, can be compared with each
other.
Figure 4.1a compares the IV% averaged over all delegation games of our treatment
SINGLE with the data of BFH (2014). Both datasets show that individual decision
makers value decision rights beyond the instrumental value of the decision rights such
that the measured IV% is strictly positive. The data clearly suggests that there is no
difference between the two samples. Remarkably, the IV% is 16.7% in BFH (2014) and
17.0% in our sample. Consequently, both samples are statistically indistinguishable
from each other (p = 0.745, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
Figure 4.1b shows the average intrinsic value of treatment SINGLE and BFH(2014)
at the game level. In every delegation game, each measured IV% in our data for
individual decision makers is strictly positive, and is significantly different from zero
for all ten delegation games (Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests, all p < 0.010, except for game
2, p = 0.021). Except for game 9, there is no significant difference between the IV% in
BFH (2014) and our data.25
Overall, the data show that our treatment SINGLE is a strong replication of BFH
(2014) and the slightly different wording and different subject pool that we used had
no effect on decision-making.
25The IV% in game 9 is 6.2% in BFH (2014) and 14.5% in our data, and this difference is statistically
significant (p = 0.030, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of BFH (2014) and treatment SINGLE
(a) Delegation games (b) Aggregated
Notes: Percentage IV difference for the individual condition in BFH (2014) and treatment
SINGLE at the aggregated level (panel a) and at the game level (panel b). Error bars represent
standard errors at means (average ± SEM) clustered at the decision maker-level.
4.3.1 TEAM VS. INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING
Since IVs (in percentage) do not differ between the original treatment and our SINGLE
treatment, we proceed with the analysis of the treatment of interest: team decision-
making. We present the results at the aggregate level, i.e., averaging over the ten
delegationgames (Figure 4.2a), aswell as for eachof the tendelegationgames separately
(Figure 4.2b).
Figure 4.2a shows the IV% at the aggregated level. On average, the IV% measured
for teams accounts for 17.6%, compared to 17.0% for individuals. This difference is
statistically not significant (p = 0.504, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
At the disaggregated level, Figure 4.2b provides additional evidence that teams
did not assign different values to decision rights than individuals. Except for game 7,
individuals and teams did not value decision rights differently.26 Furthermore, the IVs,
standardized by the certainty equivalent of the control lottery, of the team decision-
making treatment are significantly positive at conventional levels for all delegation
games (p < 0.010, except for game 4, p = 0.047, game 5, p = 0.038, and game 7, p = 0.055,
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).
The previous analysis suggests that, overall, teams do value decision rights intrin-
sically, in a way comparable to individual decision makers. We summarize the first
result accordingly.
Result 1. Individuals and teams in general both value decision rights intrinsically and do not
assign different values.
26Table 4.5 in the Appendix shows the OLS regressions of the IV% on the dummy TEAM for each of
the ten games.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of treatment SINGLE and TEAM
(a) Aggregated (b) Delegation games
Notes: Percentage IV difference for treatments SINGLE and TEAM at the treatment level
(panel a) and game level (panel b). Error bars represent standard errors at means (average ±
SEM) clustered at the decision maker-level.
While it first comes as a surprise that teams and individuals in our setup behave
very similarly given the extensive literature showing that behavior differs,many studies
also reported no differences in behavior.27
In our design, team members had to agree on a common decision and could use
a free-text chat to better coordinate. While unanimity is a natural practice, it is likely
to create complicated situations when team members have opposite preferences. For
instance, one member could feel excluded from the decision-making process or even
give up expressing her own preferences. Anticipating this possibility, we included two
questions in a questionnaire at the end of the experiment: (i) Did you feel excluded from
the team decision-making process? and (ii) did you give up in the decision-making
process? Participants could answer “Yes” or “No”.
This measure, while self-reported, provides some insights on the difficulties in the
decision-making process a team might encounter that would otherwise be hard to
observe using a more objective measure. Out of 60 team members, 50 subjects of the
TEAM treatment answered in the negative to both questions. Out of the 10 answering
in the positive to one of the questions, 3 subjects “felt exculded”, 3 subjects “gave up”,
and 4 subjects answered both questions positively. In total, for 21 teams both team
members reported no issues while 9 teams comprised one member or more reporting
at least one issue. Throughout the rest of the section, we distinguish between the two
types of teams: Smooth teams, teams reporting no issues, and conflict teams, teams with
at least one member reporting an issue. We now condition the results on the type of
teams and put more focus on teams reporting no issues (smooth teams).
27See, e.g., Davis (1992), Kerr et al. (1996), Bone et al. (1999), Rockenbach et al. (2007), Baker et al.
(2008), and Harrison et al. (2012).
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Figure 4.3a depicts the IV% for treatment SINGLE, teams reporting no issues (smooth
teams) and teams reporting issues (conflict teams) in the decision-makingprocess.Smooth
teams value decision rights much less than individuals (8.6% vs. 17.0%). This difference
in values represents half of the baseline value in the SINGLE treatment and is highly
significant (p = 0.021, two-tailedMann-WhitneyU-test). This result indicates that teams
reporting no issues are less attached to keeping decision rights than individual decision
makers and speaks in favor of the literature developed above. Interestingly, the graph
shows that the intrinsic value for conflict teams is relatively high, 38.7%, and significantly
larger than in SINGLE (p = 0.015, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test). Although the
difference in values is substantial (about 100% of the baseline in SINGLE), we do not
make strong claims due to the very limited number of conflict teams.
Figure 4.3bplots the IV% for eachof the 10delegationgames for individual decision-
making (SINGLE) and smooth teams. These teams display mostly lower intrinsic values
than individuals and the values are not significantly different from zero in 40% of the
delegation games (Games 2, 4, 5, and 7, p > 0.100, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). For
delegation game 10, the IV% is significantly different from zero (p = 0.073), as well as
for games 1, 6, and 9 (p < 0.050), and games 3 and 8 (p < 0.010, all Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests). Interestingly, the data show significant differences between individuals and
smooth teams in six out of ten delegation games.28
Figure 4.3c plots the IV% for each of the 10 delegation games but compares indi-
viduals in SINGLE with conflict teams. The graph shows that the IV is systematically
larger for these teams than for individuals, but due to limited power (i.e., very few
teams) significant differences are detected in only 30% of the situations (games 2, 5 and
6, see Table 4.7 in the Appendix). We again do not make any statement regarding the
behavior of conflict teams. These findings lead us to our second result.
Result 2. Smooth teams have a significantly lower intrinsic value (8.6%) than individuals
(17.0%). Moreover, the intrinsic value in 4 out of 10 delegation situations is not statistically
different from zero.
28For games 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 (see Table 4.6 in the Appendix).
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of treatment SINGLE and both team types
(a) Aggregated (b) Delegation games smooth teams
(c) Delegation games conflict teams
Notes: Percentage IV difference for treatment SINGLE, smooth teams and conflict teams
at the aggregated level (panel a), at the game level for individuals and smooth teams
(panel b) and individuals and conflict teams (panel c). Error bars represent standard
errors at means (average ± SEM) clustered at the decision maker-level.
In the analysis we used the measure IV% to compare behavior of teams in treat-
ment TEAM with individual decision makers in SINGLE. While the method to obtain
the measure allows to separate the intrinsic from the instrumental value, BFH (2014) ac-
knowledge that it is time-consuming and that a good proxy is available (pp. 2025-2026).
They suggest to use the difference in expected values of the delegation and control lot-
teries generated in the delegation stage and they show that it is indeed a good proxy (it
is highly correlatedwith themeasured intrinsic value). In Section 4.6.2 in the Appendix,
we also perform this analysis and show that the decisions in the delegation stage are
indeed a good proxy, but especially for individual decision makers in SINGLE and for
smooths teams, but are less reliable for conflict teams. We consider this as more evidence
that a seperation in smooth teams and conflict teams is necessary to understand how
teams value decision rights.
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4.3.2 STAKES AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The experimental design allows us to control for the effect of the stake size and for the
conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. The stakes in games 6 to 10 are
twofold the stakes in games 1 to 5. As for the conflict of interest, the situations generate
different tensions between the principal and the agent regarding their relative outcome
in the projects. BFH (2014) measured the degree of conflict between the principal and
the agent as the principal’s relative payoff difference between project alternativesA andP , denoted as α = (PA − P0)/(PP − P0). The less attractive the outcome of the agent’s
favorite alternative A, compared to the principal’s preferred alternative P , the higher
the conflict of interest, hence the lower α. For instance, in games 5 and 10 the difference
in outcomes between the project alternative and the outside option is the same so that
there is no conflict (α = 1). For games 1, 2, 6 and 7, the conflict is “low” (α = 0.75) and
in games 3, 4, 8 and 9 the conflict is “high” (α = 0.5).
Figure 4.4: The role of stake size and conflict of interest
(a) Stakes (b) Conflict of interest
Notes: Percentage IV difference for treatment SINGLE, smooth teams, and conflict teams for
different stake sizes (panel a) and various degrees of conflict of interest (panel b). Error bars
represent standard errors at means (average ± SEM) clustered at the decision maker-level.
Figure 4.4a displays the intrinsic value for SINGLE, smooth teams, and conflict teams
over low and high stakes. As in BFH (2014), the larger the stakes the higher the intrinsic
value of individual decision makers (from 14.1% to 19.9%, paired t-test, p = 0.064). For
smooth teams, however, stakes do not significantly affect their intrinsic value (7.9% for
low stakes, 9.4% for high stakes, paired t-test, p = 0.642). The difference in the intrinsic
value between treatment SINGLE and smooth teams is not significant for low stakes
(p = 0.111, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test), but significant for high stakes (p = 0.044,
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test). Further, we can observe that conflict teams report
a higher intrinsic value than individuals. This difference is significant for low stakes
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situations (p = 0.002), but fails to be significant for high stakes situations (p = 0.135,
both two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests).
Figure 4.4b plots the intrinsic value for the three degrees of conflict of interest. As
depicted in BFH (2014), individual decision makers assign higher IVs the lower the
degree of conflict. Although the positive trend depicted in the graph is not significant
for all specifications, the numbers are very similar to BFH (2014). However, smooth
teams are not affected by the degree of conflict and the trend from high to no conflict
is statistically insignificant.29 More interestingly, these teams display lower IVs than
individuals for low conflict games (p = 0.022 ) and no conflict games (p = 0.053), but not
for high conflict games (p = 0.546, all two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests). The results
for conflict teams are similar to the previous results on the stake size. These teams
report a higher intrinsic value for all degrees of conflict compared to individuals. The
differences are significant at the 10%-level for no-conflict games, and at the 5%-level
for high-conflict games (all two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests). Our last result can be
summarized accordingly:
Result 3. Smooth teams value decision rights intrinsically less than individuals, regardless of
the stake size and the degree of conflict.
4.4 HETEROGENEOUS TEAM BEHAVIOR
In the previous section, we showed that teams reporting no issues in the decision-
making process value the pure right to decide over outcomes much less than individ-
uals, while teams with at least one member reporting an issue place a higher value on
the decision right per se. While theses results are insightful, they rely on self-reported
values.
In this section, we go one step further and provide evidence that the two types of
teams behave differently with respect to more objective measures. As a first measure,
we use the ability of teammembers to agree on a common decision early in the decision
process. In particular, we compare agreement rates regarding the very first proposal in
the delegation stage. We then have a look at the sequence of events during the decision
process and investigate how teams use the communication tool to better coordinate
on a common decision. The second measure is based on the plain messages that are
exchanged between team partners, grouped into various categories. In particular, we
study how the frequency ofmessages intended to seek the opinion of the teammember
and the expression of a preference differs between the types of teams and how these
29This is true for both the IV% and the absolute IV at all conventional levels (paired t-tests).
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categories affect the average IV%. Finally, we compare effort choices of individuals,
smooth teams, and conflict teams with respect to the theoretical optimal effort choice.
4.4.1 COORDINATION ON DECISIONS
We first study how teams differ in their ability to coordinate on decisions in the del-
egation stage.30 In particular, we focus on the agreement rate between team members
on their very first proposal. Figure 4.5 shows the fraction of initial agreement between
team members regarding (a) the chosen minimum effort requirement and (b) the cho-
sen effort. Both graphs suggest that smooth teams agreed in the first proposal more
often than conflict teams. As for the minimum effort requirement, smooth teams display
an overall agreement rate of 89%, while the rate of conflict teams is 72% (p = 0.059,
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
The same pattern emerges for the chosen effort. The overall agreement rate is lower
for conflict teams, 68%, and drops to less than 40% in the second round. The agreement
rate in these teams is significantly different from the agreement rate in smooth teams
with 86.6% (p = 0.085, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
Figure 4.5: Agreement rate in both effort choices
(a) Minimum effort requirement (b) Effort
Notes: The graphs display the agreement rates between team members for the first proposal
regarding (a) the minimum effort requirement and (b) the chosen effort for both types of teams
for the 10 rounds in the delegation stage.
To better understand why the agreement rate is lower for conflict teams, we have a
closer look at the sequence of events taking place in the delegation game. In particular,
30In any round, team members entered their decisions (minimum effort requirement and effort
level) before seeing the summary screen displaying both team members’ choices. Team members could
communicate through free-text chat at any time during a round.
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we investigate whether teammembers use the free-text chat tool to agree on a common
decision before making it. We investigate this pattern, because not using the free-text
chat from the beginning could create a conflict when teammembers have to adjust their
individual decisions to come up with common decisions in the end. Recall that in the
delegation stage, team members make three sequential decisions: the minimum effort
requirement, the project alternatives and the effort level in case they retain the decision
right. At any time in a given round, they can freely exchange chat messages. Once each
member has individually selected her choices, a summary displays the decisions of
both members with the possibility to revise their decisions and to agree on common
decisions.
Figure 4.6 displays the fraction of teammembers making an entry on the minimum
effort requirement before chatting with the other teammember over rounds. We use the
data for the mimimum effort requirement as the first event within each round. This
allows us to have a clean order of events because for both other decisions we are not in
the position to clearly seperate the order of events (communication anddecisions). Over
all rounds, members of conflict teams are more likely to make a decision individually
before chatting with the other team member than members of smooth teams (33.3% vs.
9.52%, p = 0.027, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test).
We interpret this result as evidence that members of conflict teams are less coopera-
tive thanmembers of smooth teams in finding an agreement. They tend to agree ex-post,
while members of smooth teams are more likely to agree on a common decision ex-ante.
Figure 4.6: Fraction of no communication before a decision
Notes: Fraction of team members not chatting with
the other member before making the first decision
on the minimum effort requirement in the delega-
tion stage.
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4.4.2 CHAT ANALYSIS
In total, 4,701 text messages were coded into 11 categories. Table 4.2 provides a descrip-
tion of each category, the agreement rate between the coders for each category, Cohen’s
Kappa statistics and the frequency of messages in each category.31 Coding was per-
formed by two student helpers independently. The agreement rate varies from 67.37%
for the category “Preference statement” to 99.81% for the category “Time stress”. The
level of agreement within each category can be tested against chance agreement and
tests show that agreement was substantial in each category (Landis and Koch, 1977;
all κ’s statistics p < 0.010). Finally, one researcher of our team read through all coding
inconsistencies and solved the disagreements.
Table 4.2: Description of coding categories
# Category Definition
Agreement
rate
Cohen’s
Kappa
Total
frequency
1
Preference
statement
Statements which contain a preference statement 67.37 % 0.39 44.46 %
2
No
preference
Statements that a participant has no preference at all or just
follows the team member
98.14 % 0.45 0.70 %
3
Asking
partner
Statements/Questions which indicate that a team member
wants to get some knowledge about the other team member’s
preferences/opinions
95.38 % 0.88 27.46 %
4
Compare outside
option
Statements where participants refer to the payment if the project
is not successful (delegation part) or make statements w.r.t. the
certainty equivalent (lottery stage)
96.87 % 0.17 0.91 %
5
Comparison with
role B
Statements where participants compare the team members’
payoff with the payoff of Role B
98.32 % 0.43 0.77 %
6
Time
stress
Communication where one team member wants to put some
time pressure on the team partner
99.81 % 0.47 0.15 %
7
Mentioning
risk
Communication where team members explicitly talk about risk 99.49 % 0.77 1.06 %
8
Group
thinking
Messages which explicitly refer to team decision (compromise,
we as a team, ...)
99.60 % 0.34 0.30 %
9
Problem
with rules
Messages which indicate that rules were not 100 % clear or
people ask the partner for clarification of a point
98.49 % 0.20 0.49 %
10
Communication
not optimal
Messages which directly indicate that the communication
between both team members is not optimal
99.79 % 0.44 0.11 %
11
Residual
category
Statements which does not relate to any of the other ten
categories
- - 47.10 %
Notes:Message frequencies and Cohen’s Kappa (separately evaluated for each category) as ameasure
of reliability.
31Cohen’s κ is a statistical test that measures agreement between two independent raters for categor-
ical items.
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In what follows, we focus on the dummy categories “Asking partner”(category 3)
and “Preference statement” (category 1). The former takes the value one whenever
one member seeks the opinion of the partner regarding the decision at hand and zero
otherwise, while the latter takes the value one whenever one of the members expresses
her preferences regarding the decision and zero otherwise.
We focus on these two variables because they respectively account for 27.5% and
44.5% of all exchangedmessages. These categories are also good proxies for the quality
of the decision-making process within a team as they measure how often team mem-
bers seek the opinion of the teammate and how often a team member expresses her
preferences.
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4.3 provide insights on the frequency to which members
seek the opinion of the other teammember. While members in smooth teams seem to be
more likely to seek the opinion of their teammate, none of the differences is significant.
Columns (4)-(6) in Table 4.3 provideOLS regressions of the average IV% on the variable
“Asking partner”. The table provides some evidence that seeking the opinion of the
other team member is associated with lower IVs in the delegation stage (column 5,
p = 0.027), but not in the lottery stage (column 6), nor overall (column 4).
The category “Preference statement” is also associated with lower IVs but only in
the delegation stage (Table 4.4, column 5, p = 0.032), not in the lottery stage (column 6)
nor overall (column 4).
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Table 4.3: OLS regressions for the category “Asking Partner”
Asking partner Average IV%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smooth team 0.092 0.467 -0.014
(0.278) (0.548) (0.177)
Asking partner -0.009 -0.014∗∗ -0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
Constant 1.540∗∗∗ 2.275∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.468) (0.146) (0.039) (0.049) (0.039)
Stage Pooled Delegation Lottery Pooled Delegation Lottery
R2 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.017 0.004
Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30
Observations 798 289 509 798 289 509
Notes: The table reports OLS regressions for the category “Asking partner”. The dependent variable
in columns (1)-(3) and independent variable in columns (4)-(6), “Asking partner”, indicates how
often team members made a statement in line with the category “Asking partner”. Smooth team
is a dummy variable and takes the value one if no member within a team reports any issues and
zero otherwise. Average IV% is the average IV% per group. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p <
0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 4.4: OLS regressions for the category “Preference statement”
Preference statement Average IV%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smooth team 0.129 0.625 0.008
(0.358) (0.737) (0.166)
Preference statement -0.005 -0.011∗∗ -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
Constant 2.475∗∗∗ 3.600∗∗∗ 1.725∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.629) (0.129) (0.036) (0.054) (0.030)
Stage Pooled Delegation Lottery Pooled Delegation Lottery
R2 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.000
Clusters 30 30 30 30 30 30
Observations 798 289 509 798 289 509
Notes: The table reports OLS regressions for the category “Preference statement”. The dependent
variable in columns (1)-(3) and independent variable in columns (4)-(6), “Preference statement”,
indicates how often team members made a statement in line with the category “Preference state-
ment”. Smooth team is a dummyvariable and takes the value one if nomemberwithin a team reports
any issues and zero otherwise. Average IV% is the average IV% per group. Levels of significance:
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
4.4.3 OPTIMAL EFFORT CHOICES
In this section, we investigate effort choices of teams and individuals and compare them
with optimal levels. Assuming risk-neutral principals over the payments described in
Table 4.1 and quadratic effort costs ke2, there exists an unique level of effort, e∗, that
maximizes the principal’s expected utility in each situation.
Figure 4.7 displays the average differences between the principals’ chosen effort and
the optimal effort for individual decision makers in SINGLE and both team types. A
positive (negative) difference hence means exerting too much (little) effort. The graph
shows that conflict teams over-provide effort (+7.22, p = 0.110, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test), smooth teams are close to efficiency (−0.35, p = 0.945; Wilcoxon signed-rank test),
and single individuals under-provide effort (−5.07, p = 0.051, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test).32
32Single decision makers in BFH (2014) also under-provide effort and to a similar extent (−5.98,
p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
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Figure 4.7: Optimal versus actual effort choice by decision makers
Notes: Average differences between the principals chosen effort
(eP ) and optimal effort (e∗) for conflict teams, smooth teams and
individual decision makers.
Themismatch between the chosen effort and optimal effort of conflict teams is signifi-
cantlydifferent from themismatchof individuals inSINGLE (p = 0.014) and smooth teams
(p = 0.046). Interestingly, smooth teams and single individuals do not differ (p = 0.303, all
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests).
4.5 CONCLUSION
Based on previous research showing that individuals do value decision rights per se
and not solely according to the fundamental value of the underlying decision (see,
e.g., Fehr et al., 2013; Bartling et al., 2014; Neri and Rommeswinkel, 2017), this paper
addresses the questions whether teams value decision rights intrinsically and how their
valuation compares to the valuation of individuals. Extending BFH’s (2014) design, we
replicate their individual decision-making treatment (SINGLE) and introduce a team
decision-making treatment (TEAM) in which teams of two subjects take decisions
unanimously.
Our experiment yields insightful results. To begin with, our individual decision-
making treatment SINGLE is a fairly accurate replication of BFH’s (2014) individual
decision-making condition. In particular, we also find that principals display a strictly
positive intrinsic value, regardless of the stake size and the degree of conflict between
the principal and the agent. Remarkably, the average intrinsic value of decision rights
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is 17.0% in our SINGLE treatment and thus very similar to the value reported in BFH
(2014), namely 16.7%. In addition, our data provide two new results.
First, an overall comparison of team and indvidual decision-making yields no
difference in the intrinsic valuation of decision rights. In both treatments, principals
value being in control about 17% more than delegating the decision right to an agent.
This holds regardless of the size of the payoffs at stake or the degree of conflict between
the principal and the agent.
Second, our data reveal that the decision-making process within a team matters.
Remember that teammates have to coordinate on a common decision which might
lead to some issues. For instance, teammates could either use the free-text chat to
coordinate on a common decision before they individually enter their decisions or
they could first enter their decisions individually and then adjust their choices to
come up with a common decision. To account for potential issues within teams, we
asked team members at the end of the experiment whether they had issues with the
decision-making process or not. This self-reported impressions give us the opportunity
to account for heterogeneity in treatment TEAM, and thus we divide teams into teams
where none of the team members reported an issue (smooth teams) and conflict teams
where at least one member reported an issue. In addition, we provide more objective
measures, e.g., how they use communication, to show differences between both team
types. This categorization leads to insightful results. Smooth teams value decision rights
much less intrinsically than individuals with 8.6% and 17.0%, respectively. Further,
smooth teams do not display a significant positive intrinsic value in 4 out of 10 situations,
and thus behave partly in line with the benchmark of a fully rational decision maker.
Moreover, in 6 out of 10 games smooth teams have a significantly lower IV% than
individuals, and are less affected by stake sizes and conflicts of interest. In contrast,
conflict teams seem to have a very high intrinsic valuation of decision rights.
Our results are novel in several ways. To begin with, we are the first to study
how groups of individuals value decision rights and power per se, and how this value
compares to thevalueof individuals. This is rather surprisinggiven thatmanydecisions
in organizations are made at the group level. Also, to the best of knowledge, we are
the first to compare teams and individuals in the context of delegation. This is relevant
since most applications of theoretical considerations (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart,
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) focus on the instrumental value of decision rights, not
on the intrinsic value. To conclude, our findings partly provide another rationale for
team decision-making in organizations, since well-functioning teams are less affected
by psychic benefits of decision rights than individuals. In general, our results provide
some insights for further research on team and individual decision-making.
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4.6 APPENDIX
4.6.1 ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table 4.5: IV%: TEAM vs. SINGLE for each of the 10 games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TEAM -0.031 0.085 0.130 -0.031 0.098 0.011 -0.133∗ -0.024 -0.034 -0.009
(0.057) (0.069) (0.091) (0.060) (0.133) (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.049) (0.093)
Constant 0.198∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.038) (0.055) (0.070) (0.032) (0.057)
R2 0.003 0.019 0.029 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.028 0.001 0.005 0.000
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Notes: OLS regressions. The columns (1)-(10) represent the games (1-10) shown in Table 4.1. The
dependent variable is IV%. TEAM is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the principal is from
the team treatment and 0 otherwise. The reference group is SINGLE. Levels of significance: *p <
0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 4.6: IV%: Smooth teams vs. SINGLE for each of the 10 games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Smooth team -0.099∗ -0.007 0.032 -0.110∗∗ -0.129∗ -0.099∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.073∗ -0.123
(0.054) (0.063) (0.059) (0.052) (0.074) (0.054) (0.068) (0.079) (0.043) (0.082)
Constant 0.198∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.038) (0.055) (0.070) (0.032) (0.057)
R2 0.027 0.000 0.003 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.045 0.002 0.021 0.018
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: OLS regressions. The columns (1)-(10) represent the games (1-10) shown in Table 4.1. The
dependent variable is IV%. Smooth team is a dummy for teams without issues. The reference group
is SINGLE. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 4.7: IV%: Conflict teams vs. SINGLE for each of the 10 games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Conflict team 0.126 0.300∗∗ 0.358 0.151 0.629∗ 0.267∗ -0.009 0.031 0.059 0.256
(0.096) (0.131) (0.241) (0.112) (0.336) (0.157) (0.124) (0.079) (0.105) (0.182)
Constant 0.198∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046) (0.039) (0.055) (0.071) (0.032) (0.057)
R2 0.022 0.111 0.093 0.028 0.161 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.036
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Notes: OLS regressions. The columns (1)-(10) represent the games (1-10) shown in Table 4.1. The
dependent variable is IV%. Conflict team is a dummy for teams with issues. The reference group is
SINGLE. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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4.6.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECK: PROXY FOR THE IV
Throughout the paper, the intrinsic value of a decision right is defined by equation
(4.2.3). Although this is a neat measure, it is obtained in the second part (lottery part)
and might reflect potential issues in teams that arose in the first part (delegation part).
To check for potential issues between the first and the second part of the experiment,
we can use a proxy for the IV, as suggested by BFH (2014), which is generated in the
delegationpart. Theauthors showthat the expectedmonetarypayoffsof the control and
delegation lotteries from thefirst part could beused to obtain a good andvalid proxy for
the IV. Therefore it is important that the expectedmonetary payoffs of the lotteries from
the delegation part are highly correlatedwith the certainty equivalents from the lottery
part. In the orginal paper, Bartling and co-authors show that the expected monetary
payoffs of the lotteries are indeed highly correlated with the certainty equivalents
(Pearson’s coefficient of correlation ρ = 0.887, p < 0.001).
Our data reveal that the expected monetary payoffs of the lotteries are also highly
correlated with the certainty equivalents (SINGLE: ρ = 0.878, p < 0.001 and TEAM:
ρ = 0.930, p < 0.001). This result still holds whenwe account for frictions in the decision-
making prosess (ρ = 0.965 in smooth teams and ρ = 0.865 in conflict teams; both p <
0.001). In a second step, we investigate if the difference in expected monetary values
(delegation minus control) is positively correlated with the IV of a principal (in BFH
(2014): ρ = 0.58, p < 0.001). In our sample, the correlation coefficients for SINGLE,
smooth teams and conflict teams are ρ = 0.578, ρ = 0.779, and ρ = 0.351, respectively
(all correlations: p < 0.001), with the coefficient of correlation for conflict teams being
of lower magnitude. Finally, we can measure the correlation between the IV% and
the difference in expected payoffs normalized by the expected payoff of the control
lottery (i.e., the percentage difference). The data show that the correlation coefficients
for SINGLE and smooth teams are ρ = 0.410 and ρ = 0.729 (both p < 0.001). However, the
coefficient of correlation for conflict teams is ρ = −0.132 and is not significant (p = 0.216).
This analysis suggests that the difference in expected payoffs in the first part is a good
proxy for the IV in treatment SINGLE and for teams without issues (smooth teams), but
is not a good proxy for teams reporting an issue (conflict teams).
This is additional evidence that teams reporting an issue behave differently from
teams reporting no issues.
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4.6.3 EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions - Part 1
Instructions for role A 33
Welcome to today’s experiment. You receive 4 Euros as a show-up fee. During the
experiment you will be asked to make decisions and so will the other participants.
Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your
monetary payoff. Therefore, it is important that you carefully read the instructions. If
you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the
experimenters will come to assist you.
Please do not communicate with other participants before the end of the experiment.
Please switch off yourmobile phone. In addition, wewant to point out that you are only
allowed to use the computer functions that are intended for the course of the study. If
you violate these rules, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment and
all payments. At the end of the experiment wewill pay you in cashe4 as a show-up fee
and the money you’ve earned during the experiment. Your income in the experiment
will be in “points”. At the end of the experiment, points will be converted into euro at
an exchange rate of
100 Points = 2 Euros
This study consists of three parts:
1. The first part of the study lasts 10 rounds. (In each of the 10 rounds you are paired
with another participant (always the same person). Together you represent role
A. You will be called team members A1 and A2. You learn at the beginning of
the experiment if you are A1 or A2.) You will be paired with a different role B
in each of the 10 rounds of the study. You can complete a project with the role B
who is paired with you in each round. You will find detailed explanations about
this first part of the study on the following pages.
2. You will receive exact instructions about the second part as soon as the first part
is completed.
3. The third part of the study is very short, and you will receive instructions on
screen as soon as the second part is completed.
33Modification for treatment TEAM in red and in parenthesis.
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General information about the first part of the study
There are two types of roles in the first part of the study: role A and role B. You are
(part of) role A. (Role A consists of two fixed matched participants. Role B consists of
a single person. Role B knows that your role consists of two team members.)
There are ten rounds. You (Role A (you and your team partner)) will be paired with a
different role B in each round. A project can be completed in each round. A successful
completion of the project will lead to a positive payment for roles A and B.
The decision right
In each period, either you (and your team partner) (role A) or role B has the decision
right. The role with the decision right can make two decisions:
1. Which alternative of the project - A or B - will be completed?
Role A receives the larger share of the project income in alternative A, and role B
receives the larger share of the project income in alternative B. (It is possible that
roles A and B will receive the same amounts in some rounds.)
2. What is the probability that the project will be successful?
The determination of the probability of success is associated with costs for the
role with the decision right. The higher the probability of success, the higher the
costs.
Payment of the project
The payments that result from completion of the project vary from round to round.
You will be informed of the payments at the beginning of each round.
Example: The payments from the project in a round: In case of success, you (role A
(your team)) will receive 200 points (per person) in alternative A and role B will receive
150 points. Role B will reiceve 200 points in case of success in alternative B and you
(role A (your team)) will recieve 150 points (per person). If the project is unsuccessful,
role A (your team) receives 100 points (per person) and role B receives 100 points.
Payment to
role A (per person)
Payment to role B
Successful completion
Alternative A 200 150
Alternative B 150 200
If unsuccessful 100 100
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The probability of success
If you, role A, have the decision right, then you can determine the probability with
which the chosen project alternative – A or B – will be successful.
How is the probability of success determined?
The prbability of success is a number between 0 and 100 that can be chosen freely.
0 ≤ probability of success ≤ 100
A probability of success of 0 means that the project will never be successful. A proba-
bility of success of 100 means that the project will always be successful. For all values
in between, a project might be successful or it might not be so. A value of 50 means
that a project has a 50% chance of being successful.
If the project is successful, roles A and B will be paid out in accordance to the chosen
alternative (in the example above, 150 or 200 points). If the project is not successful,
both participants will receive a lower payment independent of the chosen alternative
(in the example above, 100 points each).
The costs of the choice of the probability of success
The higher the probability of success you choose, the higher are your costs. Two infor-
mation sheets (yellow and pink) are at your desk; they show you both in a table and
in a graph how high the costs are for the various possible probabilities of success. You
will be informed in each round whether the costs on the yellow or on the pink sheet
apply. You can also always have the computer show you the costs on the monitor while
choosing the probability of success.
A roll of the dice determines whether the project is successful
The role with the decision right can roll two dice at his or her desk – they are red and
white (and show the numbers from 0 to 9). The red die determines the first digit and
the white the second digit. This results in a number between 1 and 100 (two zeros are
valued as 100). If the number rolled is smaller than or equal to the chosen probability
of success, the project is successful. If the number rolled is larger, the project is not
successful. The greater the probability of success that you choose, the greater the
possibility that the number rolled is smaller than the chosen number, i.e., that the
project is successful.
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Examples:
1. Example: You choose a probability of success of 15, i.e., 15%
This means the following:
• If – through rolling the red and the white dice – a smaller or equal number
results, i.e. a number between 1 and 15 (= 15 of 100 possibilities), the project
is successful.
• If the number is greater than 15 (= 16 to 100, or 85 possibilities) results, then
the project is not successful.
2. Example: You choose 80 as the probability of success, i.e., a probability of
success of 80%.
This means the following:
• If – through rolling the red and the white dice – a number between 1 and 80
(= 80 of 100 possibilities), the project is successful.
• If the number is greater than 80 (= 81 to 100, or 20 possibilities) results, then
the project is not successful.
• Assume that you roll the number 9 with the red die and a 3 with the white one.
This results in the number 93.
In this case, neither example would have been successful (the number rolled is,
in both cases, larger than the chosen probability of success).
• Assume that you roll the number 5 with the red die and a 4 with the white one.
This results in the number 54.
In this case, the project in the first example would not have been successful (the
number rolled is larger than 15), but the project in the second example would
have been successful (the number rolled is less than 80).
• Assume that you roll the number 0 with the red die and a 3 with the white one.
This results in the number 03.
In this case, the project would have been successful in both examples (the number
rolled is less than the probability of success chosen in each example).
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The income
The incomes of roles A and B consist of the following two parts:
• Payment from the chosen project alternative if the project is successful. If the
project is not successful, both roles receive a lower payment that is independent
of the project alternative.
• The costs for the probability of success will be deducted from the corresponding
payment for the role with the decision right.
The following four possibilites thus result for you (as a part of role A):
1. You (Your team) have (has) the decision right and the project is successful:
Income = payment from the project alternative you (your team) chose (per person) -
costs for the choice of the probability of success (costs are per person)
2. You (Your team) have (has) the decision right and the project is not successful:
Income = payment in case of lack of success (per person) - costs for the choice of the
probability of success (costs are per person)
3. You (Your team) do (does) not have the decision right and the project is success-
ful:
Income = payment from the project alternative (per person) role B chose
4. You (Your team) do (does) not have the decision right and the project is not
successful:
Income = payment in case of lack of success (per person)
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Detailed procedure for a round on the computer
1st stage: role B’s decision
In each round, you as role A first have the decision right. You can also delegate the
decision right to role B. Before you decide whether you would like to delegate the
decision right to role B, role B determines in a binding manner – for the case that the
decision right is delegated to her – which project alternative and which probability of
success that she would like to select. If you actually delegate the decision right to role
B, then the decisions role B makes in the first stage will be realized.
You (and your team partner (role A)) will not yet learn which decisions participant
B makes in the first stage.
The team decision (just for TEAM treatment)
In each of the 10 round you and your team partner (together you represent role A)
could communicate with each other. That means that teammembers A1 and A2 could
talk within the rounds about their decisions and could exchange preferences. At the
end of each round, role A needs to take decisions. A decision is valid, if and only if
the decisions of A1 and A2 coincide. So you have to agree on a common decision.
Therefore, you can use the chat which is only visible to role A (A1 and A2). The chat is
visible and available in all subsections of a round in the lower part of the screen. You
can send amessage if youwrite a text in the blue line and press the “Enter” button. You
and your partner can see the message immediately afterwards. Both team members
A1 and A2 see the same screen but have to enter the decisions individually. At the
end of each round both team members see a summary screen with all their decisions.
You can still adapt/change your decisions at this stage. It is important that both team
members entered the same decisions.
2nd stage: Who has the decision right?
You (and your team partner) can decide in each round – after role B has made her
decisions – whether you would like to delegate the decision right to role B or if you
would like to retain this for yourself. In this case, you (and your team partner) do not
make the decision directly, but by determining a minimum requirement:
In each round, you (and your team partner) can determine theminimum probability
of success that role Bmust have chosen for you to be willing to delegate the decision
right to her. You can choose any minimum requirement between 1 and 100.
Role B has already chosen her probability of success at the time you (and your team
partner) determine a minimum requirement. You thus have no opportunity at all to
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influence the decision that participant B has already made.
Please take note that you (and your team partner) do not know the probability of
success that role B chose when you determine your minimum requirement.
If the probability of success that role B chooses is greater than theminimum require-
ment that you (your team) determine (determines), you will delegate the decision
right. If the probability of success that role B determines is less than yourminimum
requirement, you (and your team partner) will retain the decision right.
The graph below clarifies the connection between the minimum requirement you (and
your team partner) determine, the probability of success that role B chooses, and the
question of who has the decision right?
If, for example, you (and your team partner) decide on a minimum requirement of 45,
this means that youwould then like to delegate the decision right to role B if she selects
a probability of success of 45 or greater.
When you (and your team partner) are considering yourminimum requirement, you
should ask the following:
• Would I (we) want to delegate the decision right if role B selected a probability
of success of 1? If not, you should then ask:
• Would I (we) want to delegate the decision right if role B selected a probability
of success of 2? If not, you should then ask:
• Would I (we) want to delegate the decision right if participant B selected a prob-
ability of success of 3? And so on.
Do this until you (your team) reach (reaches) role B’s probability of success level,
above which you would delegate the decision right. You should determine this
as your minimum requirement.
– In the example above, this is the value of 45. This means that you would
just be willing to delegate the decision right if role B selects a probability of
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success of 45, but that you would prefer retaining this right at all values of
44 or less.
Further examples:
1. You (Your team) select (selects) aminimum requirement of 78.
This means the following:
• If role B selects a probability of success in stage 1 between 0 and 77, you will
not delegate the decision right.
• If role B selects a probability of success in stage 1 between 78 and 100, you
will delegate the decision right to her.
2. You (Your team) select (selects) aminimum requirement of 4.
This means the following:
• If role B selects a probability of success in stage 1 between 0 and 3, you will
not delegate the decision right.
• If role B selects a probability of success in stage 1 between 4 and 100, you
will delegate the decision right to her.
You (and your team partner) make your decision on theminimum requirement for role
B on the screen shown below.
The upper part of the screen always informs you of the payments in the two project
alternatives as well as the payment in case of lack of success in the round in question.
Furthermore, you will be informed whether the cost schedule on the yellow or the
pink information sheet applies. In the middle part of the screen you can enter your
minimum requirement. The lower part of the screen contains the chat. Here you can
chat with your team partner about your decisions. Here is an example (screenshots for
TEAM treatment without chat part):
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After you have entered your minimum requirement, please click on the OK button to
move to the next stage.
3rd stage: Determination of the project alternative
At the time of the selection of the project alternatives, you (and your team partner) do
not yet know whether the probability of success that role B selects is at least as high as
yourminimum requirement or not. You (and your teampartner) therefore do not know
whether you delegate the decision right or not. For this reason, you (and your team
partner) must select the project alternative that you (and your team partner) would
like to realize in case you (your team) retain (retains) the decision right. The selection
of the project alternative is made on the following screen:
Again, you can use the chat in the lower part of the screen to make common decisions.
After you have chosen the project alternative, please click on the OK button.
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4th stage: Selection of the probability of success
Furthermore, you (and your team partner) do not know at the time of your selection
of the probability of success whether the decision right will be delegated or if you will
retain it. You (and your team partner) must therefore select the probability of success
in case you (your team) retain (retains) the decision right. The costs of the probability
of success will only be incurred, however, if you (your team) ultimately retain (retains)
the decision right. You make your choice of the probability of success on the screen
shown on the next page:
After you have chosen the probability of success, click on the “display costs” button.
This will then show the exact costs of the probability of success that you chose. You
can then change your probability of success if you wish. You make your final decision
with “confirm”.
5th stage: Round summary
At the end of each round you receive a summary screen of your decision.
110
On the left side, you can see your and your team partner’s decisions in case you keep
the decision right. On the right side, you can see the values if you delegate the decision
right to role B. At this stage, you can make changes in your project alternatives, the
probability of success and the minimum requirement.
As soon as one of the members of role A (you or your team partner) clicks on “confirm
decisions” then it is the final decision and you are not allowed to change anything. If
your decisions don’t match the decisions of your team partner it is not possible to
confirm your decisions. This means that you and your team partner have to enter the
same decisions everywhere to be able to start with the next round.
In case you confirmed your decisions, you get to the next round.
6th stage: Determination of the project success At the end of the study, the computer
will randomly determine one of the ten rounds, and the payment that determines your
income from this part of the study will be decided for this round based on your (and
your partner’s) decision and that of the role B assigned to you in this period. As you
do not knowwhich round the computer will randomly determine, you (and your team
partner) should consider your decisions in each round very carefully.
a) The computer will first randomly determine which round will be selected for pay-
ment.
b) It will then examine whether the role B randomly assigned to you in this round
chose a probability of success that is at least as large as your minimum requirement.
• If the minimum requirement is fulfilled, you (your team) will delegate the deci-
sion right.
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• If the minimum requirement is not fulfilled, you (your team) will retain the
decision right.
If you retain (your team retains) the decision right, you (or your team partner) can
determine the project success yourself by rolling the dice. Youwill do this at your desk,
under supervision of the head of the study. You can decide within your team who
should roll the dice. The result is entered on the following screen:
You can roll the dice yourself, but the entry of the result and the code (necessary in
order to press the “continue” button) must be done by the head of the study.
Do you have questions about the first part of the study? Please raise your hand. We
will come to your desk. If you do not have any questions, please answer the control
questions on the next pages. You have to enter the correct answers on the screen
later.
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Test questions
Role A and Part 1
Please answer the following test questions. Please contact the head of the study if
you have any questions.
1. Assume you (your team) determined a minimum requirement of 85.
(a) If role B selects a probability of success of 80, who has the decision right in
this round? Role ........
(b) If role B selects a probability of success of 90, who has the decision right in
this round? Role ........
2. Assume you (your team) determined a minimum requirement of 55.
(a) If role B selects a probability of success of 50, who has the decision right in
this round? Role ........
(b) If role B selects a probability of success of 60, who has the decision right in
this round? Role ........
3. Assume role B chose a probability of success of 3.
(a) If you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum requirement of 1, who has
the decision right in this round? Role ........
(b) What is the probability that the project will then be successful? ........
(c) If, however, you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum requirement of
4, who has the decision right in this round? Role ........
4. Assume role B chose a probability of success of 90.
(a) If you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum requirement of 85, who
has the decision right in this round? Role ........
(b) What is the probability that the project will then be successful? ........
(c) If, however, you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum requirement of
95, who has the decision right in this round? Role ........
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5. Assume that you (your team) retained the decision right and chose a probability
of success of 54. The cost schedule on yellow information sheet applies in this
round. Assume further that you roll an 8 with the red die and a 2 with the white
one.
(a) How high are your costs (per person)? ........
(b) Would the project have been successful? ........
The following payments apply for the project:
Your payment (per person) Payment to role B
Successful completion
Alternative A 200 150
Alternative B 150 200
If unsuccessful 100 100
Assume you (your team) chose (chose) project alternative A.
(a) How high would your income (per person) be? ........
(b) How high would role B’s income be? ........
Now assume that you (your team) chose (chose) a probability of success of 24.
Assume further that you roll a 1 with the red die and a 5 with the white one. The
cost schedule on yellow information sheet applies in this round. You (your team)
again chose (chose) project alternative A.
(a) How high are your costs (per person)? ........
(b) Would the project have been successful? ........
(c) How high would your income (per person) be? ........
(d) How high would role B’s income be? ........
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6. Assume that you (your team) delegated the decision right. Role B selected project
alternative B and chose a probability of success of 48. The cost schedule on pink
information sheet applies in this round.
The following payments apply for the project:
Your payment
(per person)
Payment to role B
Successful completion
Alternative A 200 150
Alternative B 150 200
If unsuccessful 100 100
Assume further that role B rolls a 5 with the red die and a 7 with the white one.
(a) Would the project have been successful? ........
(b) How high would your income (per person) be? ........
(c) How high would role B’s income be? ........
Now assume role B rolls a 3 with the red die and a 9 with the white one.
(a) Would the project have been successful? ........
(b) How high would your income (per person) be? ........
(c) How high would role B’s income be? ........
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Instructions for role B
Welcome to today’s experiment. You receive e4 as a show-up fee. During the exper-
iment you will be asked to make decisions and so will the other participants. Your
decisions, as well as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your mon-
etary payoff. Therefore, it is important that you carefully read the instructions. If you
have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the ex-
perimenters will come to assist you.
Please do not communicate with other participants before the end of the experiment.
Please switch off yourmobile phone. In addition, wewant to point out that you are only
allowed to use the computer functions that are intended for the course of the study. If
you violate these rules, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment and
all payments. At the end of the experiment wewill pay you in cashe4 as a show-up fee
and the money you’ve earned during the experiment. Your income in the experiment
will be in “points”. At the end of the experiment, tokens will be converted into euro at
an exchange rate of
100 Points = 2 Euros
This study consists of three parts:
1. The first part of the study lasts 10 rounds. You will be paired with a different
role A in each of the 10 rounds of the study. You can complete a project with the
role A who is paired with you in each round. You will find detailed explanations
about this first part of the study on the following pages.
2. You will receive exact instructions about the second part as soon as the first part
is completed.
3. The third part of the study is very short, and you will receive instructions on
screen as soon as the second part is completed.
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General information about the first part of the study
There are two types of roles in the first part of the study: role A (two persons) and role
B. You are role B.
There are ten rounds. Youwill be paird with a different role A in each round. A project
can be completed in each round. A successful competion of the project will lead to a
positive payment for roles A and B.
The decision right
In each period, either you or role A has the decision right. The role with the decision
right can make two decisions:
1. Which alternative of the project – A or B – will be completed?
Role A receives the larger share of the project income in alternative A, and role B
receives the larger share of the project income in alternative B. (It is possible that
roles A and B will receive the same amounts in some rounds.)
2. What is the probability that the project will be successful?
The determination of the probability of success is associated with costs for the
role with the decision right. The higher the probability of success, the higher the
costs.
Payment of the project
The payments that result from completion of the project vary from round to round.
You will be infromed of the payments at the beginning of each round.
Example: The payments from the project in a round: In case of success, youwill receive
200 points in alternative B and role A will receive 150 points. Role A will reiceve 200
points in case of success in alternative A and you will recieve 150 points. If the project
is unsuccessful, both role A and role B receive 100 points.
Payment to
role A (per person)
Your payment
Successful completion
Alternative A 200 150
Alternative B 150 200
If unsuccessful 100 100
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The probability of success
If you have the decision right, then you can determine the probability with which the
chosen project alternative – A or B – will be successful.
How is the probability of success determined?
The prbability of success is a number between 0 and 100 that can be chosen freely.
0 ≤ probability of success ≤ 100
A probability of success of 0 means that the project will never be successful. A proba-
bility of success of 100 means that the project will always be successful. For all values
in between, a project might be successful or it might not be so. A value of 50 means
that a project has a 50% chance of being successful.
If the project is successful, roles A and B will be paid out in accordance to the chosen
alternative (in the example above, 150 or 200 points). If the project is not successful,
both participants will receive a lower payment independent of the chosen alternative
(in the example above, 100 points each).
The costs of the choice of the probability of success
The higher the probability of success you choose, the higher are your costs. Two infor-
mation sheets (yellow and pink) are at your desk; they show you both in a table and
in a graph how high the costs are for the various possible probabilities of success. You
will be informed in each round whether the costs on the yellow or on the pink sheet
apply. You can also always have the computer show you the costs on the monitor while
choosing the probability of success.
A roll of the dice determines whether the project is successful
The role with the decision right can roll two dice at his or her desk – they are red and
white (and show the numbers from 0 to 9). The red die determines the first digit and
the white the second digit. This results in a number between 1 and 100 (two zeros are
valued as 100). If the number rolled is smaller than or equal to the chosen probability
of success, the project is successful. If the number rolled is larger, the project is not
successful. The greater the probability of success that you choose, the greater the
possibility that the number rolled is smaller than the chosen number, i.e., that the
project is successful.
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Examples:
1. Example: You choose a probability of success of 15, i.e., 15%
This means the following:
• If – through rolling the red and the white dice – a smaller or equal number
results, i.e. a number between 1 and 15 (= 15 of 100 possibilities), the project
is successful.
• If the number is greater than 15 (= 16 to 100, or 85 possibilities) results, then
the project is not successful.
2. Example: You choose 80 as the probability of success, i.e., a probability of
success of 80%.
This means the following:
• If – through rolling the red and the white dice – a number between 1 and 80
(= 80 of 100 possibilities), the project is successful.
• If the number is greater than 80 (= 81 to 100, or 20 possibilities) results, then
the project is not successful.
• Assume that you roll the number 9 with the red die and a 3 with the white one.
This results in the number 93.
In this case, neither example would have been successful (the number rolled is,
in both cases, larger than the chosen probability of success).
• Assume that you roll the number 5 with the red die and a 4 with the white one.
This results in the number 54.
In this case, the project in the first example would not have been successful (the
number rolled is larger than 15), but the project in the second example would
have been successful (the number rolled is less than 80).
• Assume that you roll the number 0 with the red die and a 3 with the white one.
This results in the number 03.
In this case, the project would have been successful in both examples (the number
rolled is less than the probability of success chosen in each example).
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The income
The incomes of roles A and B consist of the following two parts:
• Payment from the chosen project alternative if the project is successful. If the
project is not successful, both roles receive a lower payment that is independent
of the project alternative.
• The costs for the probability of success will be deducted from the corresponding
payment for the role with the decision right.
The following four possibilites thus result for you:
1. You have the decision right and the project is successful:
Income = payment from the project alternative you chose - costs for the choice of the
probability of success
2. You have the decision right and the project is not successful:
Income = payment in case of lack of success - costs for the choice of the probability
of success
3. You do not have the decision right and the project is successful:
Income = payment from the project alternative role A chose
4. You do not have the decision right and the project is not successful:
Income = payment in case of lack of success
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Detailed procedure for a round on the computer
1st stage: Your decision as role B
In each round, role A first has the decision right. Role A can also delegate the decision
right to you as role B. Before role A decides whether he would like to delegate the
decision right to you, you determine in a binding manner – for the case that the
decision right is delegated to you – which project alternative and which probability of
success that you would like to select.
If role A actually delegates the decision right to you, then the decisions you make in
the first stage will be realized.
You should therefore carefully considerwhich probability of success andwhich project
alternative you would like to choose, even though you do not yet know whether your
will have the decision right.
Role A will not yet learn which decisions you as role B make in the first stage.
You will make your choices of project alternative on the following screen:
Theupperpart of the screen informsyouof thepayments for the twoproject alternatives
as well as the payment in case of lack of success in the round in question. You will also
be informed whether the cost schedule on the yellow or the pink information sheet
applies. You can choose the project alternative in the lower part of the screen.
Here is an example:
After you have chosen the project alternative, please click on the OK button.
121
You make your selection of the probability of success on the screen shown below:
Here is an example:
After you have chosen the probability of success, click on the “display costs” button.
This will then show the exact costs of the probability of success that you chose. You
can then change your probability of success if you wish. You make your final decision
with “confirm”.
Please take note that the costs for the choice of probability of success only apply if
the decision right is actually delegated to you.
2nd stage: Who has the decision right?
Role A can decide in each round – after you as role B have made your decisions –
whether she would like to delegate the decision right to you or if she would like to
retain this for herself.
In this case, role Adoes notmake the decision directly, butby determining aminimum
requirement:
In each round, role A can determine the minimum probability of success that role B
must have chosen for her to be willing to delegate the decision right to role B.
Please take note that role A does not know the probability of success that you chose
when she determines her minimum requirement.
If the probability of success that you choose is greater than the minimum require-
ment that roleAdetermines, roleAwill delegate thedecision right. If theprobability
of success that you determine is less than the minimum requirement, role A will
retain the decision right.
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3rd stage: Selection of project and determination of the probability of success by
role A
If role A retains the decision right, she selects a project and determines a probability
of success.
4th stage: Determination of the project success
At the end of the study, the computer will randomly determine one of the ten rounds,
and the payment that determines your income from this part of the study will be de-
cided for this round based on your decision and that of the role A assigned to you in
this period. As you do not know which round the computer will randomly determine,
you should consider your decisions in each round very carefully.
a) The computer will first randomly determine which round will be selected for pay-
ment.
b) It will then examine whether you chose a probability of success that is at least as
large as the minimum requirement of the role A who was randomly assigned to you
in this round.
• If the minimum requirement is fulfilled, role A will delegate the decision right to
you.
• If the minimum requirement is not fulfilled, role A will retain the decision right.
If youwere delegated the decision right, you can determine the project success yourself
by rolling the dice. You will do this at your desk, under supervision of the head of the
study. The result is entered on the following screen:
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You can roll the dice yourself, but the entry of the result and the code (necessary in
order to press the “continue” button) must be done by the head of the study.
Do you have questions about the first part of the study? Please raise your hand. We
will come to your desk. If you do not have any questions, please answer the control
questions on the next pages. You have to enter the correct answers on the screen
later.
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Test questions
Role B and Part 1
Please answer the following test questions. Please contact the head of the study if
you have any questions.
1. Assume you chose a probability of success of 3.
(a) If role A specifies a minimum requirement of 1, who has the decision right
in this round? Role ........
(b) What is the probability that the project will then be successful? ........
(c) If, however, role A specifies a minimum requirement of 4, who has the
decision right in this round? ........
2. Assume you chose a probability of success of 90.
(a) If role A specifies a minimum requirement of 85, who has the decision right
in this round? Role ........
(b) What is the probability that the project will then be successful? ........
(c) If, however, role A specifies a minimum requirement of 95, who has the
decision right in this round? ........
3. Assume that you received the decision right and chose a probability of success of
54. The cost schedule on yellow information sheet applies in this round. Assume
further that you roll an 8 with the red die and a 2 with the white one.
(a) How high are your costs? ........
(b) Would the project have been successful? ........
The following payments apply for the project:
Payment to
role A (per person)
Your payment
Successful completion
Alternative A 200 150
Alternative B 150 200
If unsuccessful 100 100
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Assume you chose project alternative B.
(a) How high would your income be? ........
(b) How high would role A’s income (per person) be? ........
Now assume that you received the decision right and chose a probability of
success of 24. Assume further that you roll a 1 with the red die and a 5 with the
white one. The cost schedule on yellow information sheet applies in this round.
You again chose project alternative B.
(a) How high are your costs? ........
(b) Would the project have been successful? ........
(c) How high would your income be? ........
(d) How high would role A’s income (per person) be? ........
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Instructions - Part 2
Second part of the experiment – Instructions 34
There are 20 rounds in this part of the study. You are randomly paired with another
participant in the study in each round. (You and your permanent partner from the
previous part (role A) are randomly paired with another participant in the study in
each round.) The exchange rate of 100 points = 2 Euro still applies.
In each round, you (your team) must decide between a guaranteed payment and a
variable payment. Your decision also determines the payment of the other participant
randomly assigned to you.
An example:
If, in the example above, you decide for the guaranteed payment, you will receive
120 points (per person) and the other, randomly assigned participant will receive 100
points.
If you (your team) opt for the variable payment, there is a 60% probability that youwill
receive a payment of 180 points (per person) and the other participant will receive 150
points. There is a 40% probability that you will receive 80 points (per person) and the
other participant will receive 100 points.
You (and your team partner) make a decision in each of the 20 rounds between a
guaranteed payment and a variable payment. The payments and the probabilities
in case of the variable payment differ in each round.
34Same instructions for role A and role B, but again modifications for teams in red.
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How can you (and your team partner) make your decision between the guaranteed
and the variable payment in each round?
When you (and your team partner) make your decision in a round between the guar-
anteed and the variable payment, you (and your team partner) do not yet know the
amount of your guaranteed payment (per person). You (and your team partner) cannot
therefore make a direct decision between the guaranteed and the variable payment,
rather, you (and your team partner) must indicate how high your guaranteed payment
(per person) must be for you to opt for the guaranteed payment instead of the variable
payment.
You will be informed of the guaranteed payment for the other participant, the variable
payments for you (your team (per person)) and the other participant, and the proba-
bilities in case of the variable payments in each round.
After you (and your team partner) have indicated the minimum payment that would
make you (your team) decide for the guaranteed payment in a round, your actual
guaranteed payment in this round will be notified to you. The decision between the
guaranteed payment and the variable payment is then realized as follows:
• If the actual guaranteed payment is less than the minimum payment you (your
team) indicate (indicates), the variable payment determines your income (your
team income) and that of the other participant.
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• If the actual guaranteed payment is greater than or equal to the minimum pay-
ment you (your team) indicate (indicates), you (and your team partner) will
receive the actual guaranteed payment and the other participant will also receive
the secure payment shown on the screen (100 points in the example above).
The possible values of your guaranteed (team) payment lie between both of your
variable (team) payments (per person) (in the example above, between 80 and 180
points). Any integer value in this interval (80, 81, 82, 83, ..., 180) is equally probable.
The minimum payment you (your team) indicate (indicates) can also be any integer
value between both of your variable payments.
The graph below again clarifies the connection between the minimum payment you
(your team) determine (determines), the amount of the actual guaranteed payment,
and your (team) decision between the guaranteed and the variable payment:
If, for example, you (and your team partner) indicate a minimum payment of 127,
this means that you prefer any guaranteed payment between 127 and 180 points to the
variable payment.
You will be informed of the exact amount of your actual guaranteed payment (per
person) after you determine your minimum payment.
When you (and your team partner) consider your minimum (team) payment (per
person), then you should (assuming the numbers from the example above) ask the
following questions:
• Would I (we) prefer a guaranteed payment amounting to 180 (per person) points
to the variable payment? If yes, then you should ask:
• Would I (we) prefer a guaranteed payment amounting to 179 (per person) points
to the variable payment? If yes, then you should ask:
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• Would I (we) prefer a guaranteed payment amounting to 178 (per person) points
to the variable payment? If yes, then you should ask:
Continue this way until you (your team) reach (reaches) a point amount for the guar-
anteed payment where you (and your team partner) would just prefer the guaranteed
payment. You (Your team) should then enter this point amount as the minimum pay-
ment.
The value is 127 in the example above. This means that you (your team) just prefer
(prefers) the guaranteed payment instead of the variable payment in case of a guaran-
teed payment of 127 (per person), but at a lower point amount of 126 (per person) (and
at all values below this), you would prefer the variable payment. The income:
If the actual guaranteed payment is at least as high as
the minimum payment you (your team) indicate (indicates):
You (and your team partner) will receive the actual guaranteed payment.
The other participant will receive the guaranteed payment indicated for him.
If the actual guaranteed payment is less than the minimum payment you (your
team) indicate (indicates):
The choice between the indicated variable payments for you (your team (per person))
and the other
participant
will be made randomly with the probabilities that are given.
The computer will randomly determine 2 of the 20 rounds at the end of the study.
In each of the randomly chosen rounds, the minimum payment (per person) you indi-
cate will be compared with the actual guaranteed payment (per person). If the actual
guaranteed payment is greater than or equal to the minimum payment you indicate,
you will receive the guaranteed payment. If the actual guaranteed payment is less than
the minimum payment you (your team) indicate (indicates), a cast of the dice will
determine which of the variable payments you and the other participant each receive.
As you (your team) do (does) not know which 2 of the 20 rounds the computer will
randomly determine, you should consider your (team) decisions in each round very
carefully.
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Procedure on the computer
The team decision follows the same rules as in part 1 of this experiment. Both team
members A1 and A2 have to make the same decisions. You can communicate via the
free text chat again.
1. You enter your decision about the guaranteed payment that you must receive
as a minimum in order to make you prefer the guaranteed payment over the
variable payment in each round on the computer screen below.
Here is an example:
You see the variable payments for you (your team) and for the other randomly
chosen participant on the right side of the screen. Youwill also see the probability
with which the payments will occur. This information varies in each of the 20
rounds. You enter your minimum payment (per person) on the left side of the
screen. The minimum payment indicates which guaranteed payment you (your
team (per person)) must receive in minimum to make it so that you prefer the
guaranteed payment to the variable payment. When you have made your entry,
please click on the OK button. You can change your entry until you click on the
OK button.
A confirmation of your entry is only possible, if the entries of A1 and A2 are
identical.
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2. If theminimumpayment you (your team) indicate (indicates) lies under the actual
guaranteed payment in one of the chosen rounds, a cast of the dicewill determine
which of the variable payments you (your team) and the other participant will
receive. Casting the dice works in exactly the same way as in the first part of the
study. The head of the study will enter the numbers that are cast in the screen
below.
Do you have questions about the second part of the study? Please raise your hand. We
will come to your desk. If you do not have any questions, please answer the control
questions on the next pages. You have to enter the correct answers on the screen
later.
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Test questions
Part 2
Assume that the following payments and probabilities apply for the case of the
variable payment.
1. Assume you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum payment of 120.
(a) Assume the actual guaranteed payment is 128.
How high is your payment in this round (per person)? ....
How high is the other participant’s payment in this round? ....
(b) Assume the actual guaranteed payment is 117.
How high is your payment in this round (per person)? ....
How high is the other participant’s payment in this round? ....
2. Assume you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum payment of 135.
(a) Assume the actual guaranteed payment is 128.
How high is your payment in this round (per person)? ....
How high is the other participant’s payment in this round? ....
(b) Assume the actual guaranteed payment is 113.
How high is your payment in this round (per person)? ....
How high is the other participant’s payment in this round? ....
3. Assume you (your team) specify (specifies) a minimum payment of 115.
(a) Assume the actual guaranteed payment is 128.
How high is your payment in this round (per person)? ....
How high is the other participant’s payment in this round? ....
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(b) Assume the actual guaranteed payment is 135.
How high is your payment in this round (per person)? ....
How high is the other participant’s payment in this round? ....
Please raise your hand when you have answered the questions. We will come to you
at your desk.
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Instructions - Part 3
Additional information 35
The computer will now randomly determine the round that is relevant for your (team)
payments from the first part of the study. If you (and your team partner) have the
decision right in the chosen round, you can determine the project success by rolling
the dice.
We would like to know from you (as a team) whether it is worth points to roll the
dice yourself and not to let another person roll the dice. (This only involves rolling
the dice and not the selection of the probability of success or the project alternative.)
You (Your team) will now receive another 30 points. You can use some or all of these
30 points to purchase the right “to roll the dice yourself”. If you do not purchase this
right, the head of the study will roll the dice for you (your team). The head of the study
will roll the dice fairly using a cup for dice, i.e., exactly as you would have done it. If
you purchase the right to roll the dice, then you do so yourself.
We will pose the following question on the screen:
Are you willing to pay to be able to roll the dice yourself? Yes or No?
Team decision:
You are again matched with your fixed partner. The team decision works as in the
previous rounds. You can communicate via the free text chat and have to reach a
common decision.
If you (your team) click (clicks) on“yes”on the computer,wewill thenask themaximum
number of points you are willing to pay to be able to roll the dice yourself (for the case
that you retained the decision right).
When answering this question, please take the following procedure into account: you
(your team) can purchase the “right to roll the dice yourself” by stating yourmaximum
willingness to pay for this right – this must lie between 1 and 30. A random decision
will then determine a price between 1 and 30 for this right. If the price is less than or
equal to your willingness to pay, you will pay the price and roll the dice yourself. If the
price is higher, you retain the entire 30 points (per person) and the head of the study
will roll the dice for you. This procedure insures that it is best for you to state how
many points the value of rolling the dice yourself if worth.
35The same instruction for both roles with team treatment modifications
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Example 1: You (Your team) are (is) willing to pay a maximum of 5 points (per person)
in order to be able to roll the dice yourself (your willingness to pay is 5 points). The
random device determines that the price for rolling the dice yourself is 18 points. As
your willingness to pay (per person) is less than the price, you do not pay the price.
You retain all 30 points and the head of studies rolls the dice.
Example 2: You (Your team) are (is) willing to pay amaximumof 25 points (per person)
in order to be able to roll the dice yourself (your willingness to pay is 25 points). The
random device determines that the price for rolling the dice yourself is 7 points. As
your willingness to pay (per person) is greater than the price, you pay the price of 7
points. You retain 23 of the 30 points and roll the dice yourself.
If you are willing to pay something to be able to roll the dice yourself, we ask you to
enter your exact willingness to pay. If you (your team) delegated or did not receive the
decision right in the first part of the study, you will receive the additional 30 points
automatically.
If you have questions about these instructions, please raise your hand. We will then
come to your desk. Otherwise click on the “continue” button.
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Instructions - Additional
Loss aversion lotteries 36
You now have the possibility to participate in a series of lotteries. Potential earnings
will be added to your overall income, potential losses will be subtracted from your
overall income.
You will soon see a series of lottery decisions. The team decision works as in the pre-
vious rounds. Please decide for each lottery whether you want to “accept” or “reject”
the lottery. At the end, one lottery will be randomly chosen.
If you accepted that lottery, a random process will determine whether you have won or
lost the lottery. If you rejected the lottery nothing happens and your income remains
unchanged.
Please decide for each of the following lotteries whether you want to accept or reject
the lottery:
1. With 50% probability youwin 3 Euro (per person), with 50% probability you lose
1 Euro (per person).
2. With 50% probability youwin 3 Euro (per person), with 50% probability you lose
1.50 Euro (per person).
3. With 50% probability youwin 3 Euro (per person), with 50% probability you lose
2 Euro (per person).
4. With 50% probability youwin 3 Euro (per person), with 50% probability you lose
2.50 Euro (per person).
5. With 50% probability youwin 3 Euro (per person), with 50% probability you lose
3 Euro (per person).
6. With 50% probability youwin 3 Euro (per person), with 50% probability you lose
3.50 Euro (per person).
36The same instruction for both roles with team treatment modifications
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Handout – Supplementary Information for the participants
Cost sheet (here: high costs)
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chapter 5
SOCIAL REFERENCE POINTS AND (DIS)HONEST BEHAVIOR
Abstract
This paper experimentally examines how social reference points in the form of
peer income affect honesty. Decision makers know the income of a relevant peer
and learn their intermediate income for a subsequent real effort task by rolling
a virtual dice. By exogenously varying the level of the peer income across treat-
ments, we affect the likelihood that the social income comparison based on the
intermediate income is advantageous or disadvantageous from a decision maker’s
perspective. Then, decision makers have to determine their final income by re-
porting the outcome of the dice throw. We find that decision makers engage more
frequently in dishonest behavior, i.e., misreport the outcome of the dice throw, to
increase their income in the treatment where the likelihood of a disadvantageous
social comparison is higher. This finding is consistentwith the concept of social loss
averison. We interpret our result as a shift in the moral and ethical perception due
to relative income concerns. Hence, this finding might be relevant for frequently
discussed and partly implemented income transparency policies.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Employee fraud has huge consequences for economies with an estimated annual dam-
age of five percent of the revenues for organizations. More than three quarters of the
cases originate from asset misappropriation such as cash larcency, check tampering or
issuing payments by making false claims for compensation (Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners, 2016). Yet, it is important to know what affects dishonest behavior
in this environment. One potential trigger might be relative income concerns. Rela-
tive income concerns entail the idea that workers do not only care about the absolute
level of their income, but also how their income compares to the income of others
(see, for instance, Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949 for early contributions). More re-
cent studies show that income comparisons are correlated with subjective well-being
(e.g., Luttmer, 2005; Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005; Perez-Truglia, 2019), health (e.g., Marmot,
2004), perceived fairness (Austin et al., 1980), and job and pay satisfaction (e.g., Clark
and Oswald, 1996; Card et al., 2012; Cohn et al., 2014). From an organizational point
of view relative income concerns also affect relevant behavior such as effort provision
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(e.g., Gächter and Thöni, 2010; Cohn et al., 2014), work quality (Cohn et al., 2014) and
risk-taking attitudes (Schwerter, 2016).
An important observation from social psychology highlights that people frequently
exert social comparison, in particular with relevant others (e.g., Festinger, 1954). The
working environment, as Falk and Knell (2004) and Clark and Senik (2010) argue,
serves as a particular channel to make peers and peer income salient (i.e., relevant)
for social comparison. For instance, Austin et al. (1980) show that the comparison
of the own income with a peer income (as a social reference point) has a stronger
impact on pay satisfaction than the comparison with an individual (private) reference
point like previous earnings. These findings raise the question how individuals react
to advantageous or disadvantageous income comparison with relevant peers if they
could change their position within the income distribution by engaging in dishonest
behavior.37 In the shadow of recent wage transparency initiatives, this question is
indisputably relevant as it may point out potential negative externalities of full wage
transparency.
In this paper, we study how social reference points in the form of peer income affect
whether or not subjects act honestly when monetary incentives stay constant. In our
laboratory experiment, we observe worker pairs where onemember (the peer) receives
a fixed income for a subsequent real effort task, and the other member (the decision
maker) is asked to report the outcome of a computerized dice throwwhich determines
her final income. In detail, in a first step decision makers learn their intermediate
income by observing the outcome of a dice throw, and in a second step they determine
their finale income by reporting the outcome of the dice throw. This comes with
the possiblity to increase (or decrease) their final income relative to the intermediate
income.
We implement two treatments in a between-subjects design where we exogenously
manipulate the level of the peer income. In one treatment, decision makers are paired
with a peer who earns a low income, while in the other treatment they are paired with
a peer who earns a high income. Consequently, the variation of the peer income first of
all affects the outcome of a decision maker’s social comparison process after they learn
the intermediate income. If she is paired with a low income-peer, her intermediate
income is most likely greater than the peer income. In constrast, if she is paired with
a high income-peer, her intermediate income is most likely smaller than the peer
income. We examine whether the variation of the peer income affects her decision
which determines her final income.
37Pettit et al. (2016) show that status as means of a social comparison outcome affects dishonesty. The
authors show that people cheat more to avoid falling behind than to go ahead.
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To this end, we compare the fraction of dishonest decision makers between the
high income-peer and the low income-peer treatment. Differences can only arise from
relative income concerns based on the intermediate income. We derive this prediction
by applying the concept of loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991) in the social domain. In detail, we assume that people perceive
a disadvantageous comparison after the first step as a social loss and an advantageous
comparison as a social gain. For instance, the outcome-based social preference model
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes, in line with loss aversion in the social domain,
that people experience more disutility from inequality in the envy domain (disadvan-
tageous outcome comparison) than in the compassion domain (advantageous outcome
comparison). In our context, social loss aversion implies that decision makers are more
sensitive to losses than to gains and thus aremore likely to engage in dishonest behavior
to avoid a social loss.
Our main finding of this paper is that social reference points affect honesty. A sig-
nificant fraction of decision makers misreport the outcome in both high and low social
reference point situations. But, decision makers engage more frequently in dishonest
behavior when they face a high income-peer relative to the situation when decision
makers face a low income-peer. We interpret this finding as a shift in the moral and
ethical perception of individuals, i.e., the moral and ethical perceptions of individuals
are correlated with relative income concerns.
Our result is in line with previous research investigating honesty and reference
dependence in the private domain. For instance, Schweitzer et al. (2004) show that
participants want to avoid perceived losses in form of unmet goals by using dishonest
behavior. Cameron et al. (2010) and Grolleau et al. (2016) report that loss frames lead
to more dishonest behavior than gain frames. Shalvi (2012) shows that people tend
to act dishonestly to convert a loss into a gain, and Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017)
document that people tend to cheat more to avoid a loss than to realize an equal-sized
gain.
Our paper complements and extends the existing experimental research investigat-
ing honesty, fairness and social comparison processes by Houser et al. (2012) and John
et al. (2014).38 Houser et al. (2012) investigate decision makers’ honesty after either
participating in a dictator game or randomly receiving payments which represent the
most frequent dictator transfers. The authors conclude that perceived unfair treatment
(receiving zero in the dictator game) is the main motivation to engage in dishonest
38Outcome-based social preferencemodels (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton andOckenfels, 2000)
also deal with fairness concerns when subjects compare their outcome with the outcome of others in
allocation games. In these games decision makers affect not only the own outcome but also the outcome
of others.
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behavior for monetary gains. John et al. (2014) examine honesty in a real effort game
where participants either receive a low or a high piece rate in a real-effort task. The
authors show that receiving a low piece rate is not enough to act more dishonest per se.
But, aversive social comparison does lead to more dishonest behavior in low earners.
However, they do not find a higher fraction of dishonest participants, but the magni-
tude of dishonest actions increases. The difference between our paper and these two
papers is that we introduce reference dependence in our experiment to investigate
the impact of relative income concerns on honesty and thus exclude other peer effects
which might affect dishonesty as well.
In the vein of the literature on reference dependence, both studies have limitations
as they do not implement a proper social reference point. First, all participants could
engage in dishonest behavior and thus could improve individual earnings. Second, in
John et al. (2014) subjects are aware of the different piece rates (and might infer that
those earning 25 cents perform better) but they do not know, at themoment they report
their score nor afterwards, the absolute income of their peers. The absence of a proper
social reference point might rule out important motivations to engage in dishonest
behavior and could therefore measure also other peer effects than relative income
concerns. For instance, the individual relative position within the income distribution
is not salient and might be strongly correlated with the beliefs about others’ honesty
(including those who should represent the peers). Moreover, the absence of a proper
social reference point makes it impossible to know whether a decision maker could
avoid a comparison in the form of social loss comparison by acting dishonestly. This
might discourage people ex-ante to engage in dishonest behavior and might result
in non-observable differences in dishonesty even in the presence of (huge) income
inequality. To account for these points, we implement a unique social reference point
to fix decision makers’ expectations about the income and behavior of the peer and
thus make the relative position of an individual salient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the
experimental procedures, the experimental design, and our hypothesis. Section 5.3
presents the experimental results and Section 5.4 concludes the paperwith a discussion
of the results.
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this section we first describe the procedure and design of the experiment. Then
we present our hypothesis. The experiment was conducted between June and De-
cember 2017 at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research with a total of 272
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participants (136 decisionmakers). The experiment was fully computerized with zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was organized using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The
subject pool consisted of only male participants because we wanted to keep the subject
pool homogeneous.
We implemented a computerized lab experiment with two between-subjects treat-
ments. For the rest of this paper we will refer to them as treatments High and Low.
In both treatments, there are two roles and two stages, and all experimental sessions
followed the same structure.
Upon arrival participants were seated and thus randomly assigned to one of the
roles. Participants could be assigned to the role of a peer or to the role of a decision
maker. In both treatments, we formed groups of two participants which consisted of
one peer and one decisionmaker.We did notmention the terms peer or decisionmaker
in the instructions, but used neutral expressions for both roles, i.e., Participant A (peer)
and Participant B (descision maker). Before the participants learned their respective
roles, they received the instructions for the whole experiment. After the experimenter
read aloud the instructions in front of the participants, they had time to go through
the instructions once again and to ask questions if necessary. Then, the experimenter
started the experiment and participants learned their role on the computer screen. The
experiment consisted of two stages.
5.2.1 THE FIRST STAGE – TWO STEPS CHEATING GAME
The first stage was the treatment stage and differed across roles. Subjects in the role of
a peer received a predetermined income for the subsequent real effort task. The peers
received either 5 Euros in treatment High or 2 Euros in treatment Low. Subjects in the
role of decisionmakers determined their income in a two steps cheating game.Decision
makers were aware of the peer income and they knew that both groupmembers had to
work on an identical real effort task in the next stage. Each decision maker participated
in a two steps cheating game to determine her income.39 We seperated both steps of
the cheating game by displaying both steps on two consecutive screens. In the first
step, a decision maker selects among six boxes with equal probability. To make sure
that participants understood this mechanism, we mentioned that the outcome is, in
principle, the same as the outcome of a dice roll. In our computerized version, one
box contained exactly one number between 1 and 6 whereas each number occured
only once and was associated with a fixed payoff (see, Section 5.5.3 for a screen shot).
The associated payoffs were calculated as follows. The payoffs in Euros equalled 7
39Our cheating game is comparable to the “observed” game in Gneezy et al. (2018). They used a paper
and pen-based reporting mechanism, while we used a computerized version.
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minus the respective number.40 We constructed the payoffs in this way to avoid any
kind of anchoring (e.g., the number six is associated with a payoff of six Euros) and
that participants had to think about their report. Importantly, decision makers knew
their intermediate income (based on the dice throw outcome) after the selection of
the box. Hence, they were also aware of their relative income position (based on the
intermediate income). In the second step, we asked the decision makers to report the
selected number. We told them that their final income equals the associated payoff of
the reported number. It is worth mentioning that we did not explicitly point out the
possibility to misreport, neither in the instructions nor on the screen.
5.2.2 THE SECOND STAGE - REAL EFFORT TASK
This stage was identical for both roles and should create a situation with a strong
relationship between both roles and thus emphasize the salience of the peer income.
The taskwas counting the number of zeros in a table of zeros and oneswith 70 digits (10
rows and 7 columns) (e.g., similar to Abeler et al., 2011 and Balafoutas et al., 2016). Each
group member had to solve in total eight tables correctly without a time constraint.
In detail, participants had three tries to report the correct amount of zeros per table,
otherwise they received a new table.
After participants completed the real effort task, we asked them to answer a ques-
tionnaire. We asked them regarding socio-economic characteristics, perceived fairness
of the payment mechanism, and their overall perception regarding norm compliance
(see Table 5.4). In addition, we included an unincentivized task to elicit the individual
social value orientation (SVO) developted by Van Lange et al. (1997). Thismeasure clas-
sifies individuals as prosocial, individualistic, competitive, or as a non-consistent type.
SVOs usually indicate social preferences of an individual towards social norms like
cooperation. Grosch and Rau (2017) show that SVOs also correlate with honesty where
a decision does not affect payments of other participants, with prosocial types being
more honest than individualistic types. They argue that prosocials might experience
higher costs from acting dishonestly (e.g., violate a social norm) than individualistic
types.
5.2.3 HYPOTHESIS
Before we turn to the results of the experiment, we present our hypothesis. To do
so, we first summarize the most relevant part of the design. Both treatments were
40We explained the relationship between the numbers and associated payoffs in a table in the instruc-
tions as well as on the decision screen.
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constructed in the following way: In both treatments it holds that the peer income is
strictly greater than the minimal and strictly smaller than the maximal intermediate
income of a decisionmaker after the first step of the cheating game. A decisionmaker’s
intermediate income is either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 Euros with equal probability. Hence,
in treatment Low a decision maker is (theoretically) better off than the peer in 66.67
percent, since the peer earns 2 Euros. In constrast, in treatment High, the probability
that a decision maker is worse off than the peer is 66.67 percent, since the peer earns
5 Euros. These restrictions are very important when studying the impact of relative
income concerns on honesty. Decision makers could always avoid a social loss or turn
a social loss into a social gain by misreporting the selected number in the second step,
and thus increase the final income relative to the intermediate income.
We expect a higher fraction of dishonest participants, i.e., more decision makers
misreport the selected number in the second step, in treatment High. In our setting,
decision makers are worse off than the peer in 66.67 percent of the cases in treatment
High, whereas this is true just in 16.67 percent of the cases in treatment Low after the
first step of the cheating game. This is, to speak in terms of social loss aversion, identical
to the likelihood of a social loss comparsion after the first step of the cheating game.
Hence, our prediction is based on the assumption that people are loss averse in the
social domain and engage in dishonest behavior to avoid a social loss comparison in
the end.
5.3 RESULTS
This section is organized as follows. First, we show descriptive statistics of our sub-
ject pool. Second, we present a non-parametric analysis of the experiment. Third, we
perform a regression analysis.
5.3.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SUBJECT POOL
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of the subjects for each treatment. We compare
both treatments at the overall (decision makers and peers) and at the decision maker
level. We report the values for the following variables: Age indicates the average age
of the subjects in years. Econ students (in %) shows the percentage of subjects studying
economics or business.41 The two variables SVO Indivdualist (in %) and SVO Prosocial
(in %) (see Table 5.3) report the fraction of subjects classified as individualistic and
prosocial. The last variable, Norm compliance, reports the mean value of the individual
41For instance, the survey of Rosenbaum et al. (2014) reports that economics majors do engage in
dishonest behavior for monetary gains more often than non-economists.
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perception of norm compliance within the society in general (see Table 5.4). We infer
from these comparisons that randomization worked.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the subject pool
Treatment Low
n = 126
63 pairs
Treatment High
n = 146
73 pairs
Low vs. High
(p-values)
Age – All subjects 24.67 (5.87) 24.92 (5.89) 0.370
Age – Decision makers 24.90 (6.08) 25.22 (7.09) 0.863
Econ students (in %) – All subjects 0.51 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.543*
Econ students (in %) – Decision makers 0.46 (0.50) 0.37 (0.49) 0.300*
SVO Individualistic (in %) – All subjects 0.43 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 0.389*
SVO Individualistic (in %) – Decision makers 0.41 (0.50) 0.37 (0.49) 0.725*
SVO Prosocial (in %) – All subjects 0.48 (0.50) 0.58 (0.50) 0.145*
SVO Prosocial (in %) – Decision makers 0.51 (0.50) 0.59 (0.50) 0.389*
Norm compliance – All subjects 4.75 (2.37) 4.67 (2.41) 0.801
Norm compliance – Decision makers 4.60 (2.22) 4.75 (2.48) 0.819
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. In the fourth column (Low vs. High) we report p-values
of either two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests for non-binary variables or Fisher’s Exact tests for binary
variables (indicated with *).
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5.3.2 NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS
Figure 5.1: Intermediate vs. final incomes in the cheating game
(a) Treatment Low (b) Treatment High
Notes: Distribution of intermediate and final incomes for both treatments. The black bars repre-
sent the distribution of the intermediate income. The grey bars represent the distribution of the
final income.
In this subsection, we present the main results of our experiment. Therefore, we com-
pare intermediate and final incomes. By intermediate income we mean the associated
payoff if a decision maker would report the selected number truthfully.
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b show the distributions of the intermediate and the final
incomes for treatments Low andHigh, respectively. The black bars refer to the interme-
diate income, i.e., payments if all decisionmakerswould have reported truthfully. To be
able to compare both treatments, we need to show that the distributions are comparable
between both treatments.42 Indeed, we are in the position to argue that the distributions
in both treatments are not significantly different from each other (p > 0.668, χ2-test).43
The grey bars show the income according to the reported number, i.e., the final income,
of the decision makers. Both sides of Figure 5.1 indicate that a substantial fraction of
participants reported a number which is associated with a higher payoff than the se-
lected number. The graphical analysis is supported by non-parametric tests. Therefore,
we compare the intermediate with the final incomes within both treatments. Both tests
reveal a highly significant difference between the intermediate and the final income
(p < 0.001, two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests for both treatments).
Hence, we observe dishonesty in both high and low income-peer settings.
42Both distributions are not significantly different from a uniform distribution (both tests: p > 0.100,
χ2-tests). We compare the observed frequencies of the numbers with expected frequencies following a
uniform distribution.
43We come to the same conclusion if we use a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test (p = 0.404) instead of
a χ2-test.
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Figure 5.2: Fraction of dishonest subjects per treatment
(a) Aggregated level (b) Per intermediate income
Notes: Figure 5.2a shows the aggregated fraction of dishonsts subjects, i.e., liars, per treatment.
Dishonesty is a binary variable which takes the value 1 if the intermediate income is different
from the final income and 0 otherwise. The left bar represents treatment Low and the right bar
refers to treatment High. Error bars represent standard errors at means (average ± SEM) at the
treatment level. Figure 5.2b shows the fraction of dishonest subjects by the intermediate income.
The dashed line represents treatment High and the solid line represents treatment Low.
For our main treatment analysis, we compare the fraction of dishonest decision
makers in each treatment. We measure dishonest behavior by comparing the inter-
mediate and the final income. Hence, dishonest behavior is a binary variable which
takes the value zero if a participant reports the selected number and one otherwise.
Figure 5.2a shows that the fractions of dishonest decision makers are 33.33 percent and
53.42 percent in treatments Low and High, respectively. It follows that the level of the
social reference income has a significant impact on the honesty of decision makers,
with people engaging more often in dishonest behavior if they have relative income
concerns (p = 0.024, Fisher’s Exact test). Furthermore, this pattern holds when we ac-
count for the payments associatedwith a truthful report. Figure 5.2b shows the fraction
of dishonest subjects per intermediate income. We see that in the relevant space, i.e.,
all intermediate payments which are smaller than the maximum payment, dishonest
behavior is more frequent in treatment High. A logistic regression with the dependent
variable “Dishonest behavior”, and a dummy for treatment High and dummies for all
intermediate incomes (baseline: intermediate income = 1) as independent variables
shows that subjects in the high income-peer treatment are more likely to engage in
dishonest behavior (N = 120, βHigh = 0.940 and p = 0.017). These findings confirm our
hypothesis that dishonest behavior is higher in treatment High. Later, we show in a
regression framework that this finding is a robust result by controlling for several vari-
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ables including variations of the intermediate income.
Figure 5.3: Fraction of partial liars
Notes: The graph shows the fraction of partial
liars at the treatment level. Error bars rep-
resent standard errors at means (average ±
SEM ) at the treatment level.
Next, we examine the difference between intermediate and final income in each
treatment and look at income-based motivations to engage in dishonest behavior. We
compare the difference between intermediate and final income between both treat-
ments in two steps. First, we examine the average magnitude of the difference between
both incomes. Therefore, we calculate the difference between the final income and the
intermediate income for each decision maker. This means that the difference could
range from 0 (truthful report) to 5 (intermediate income would be 1 and the final
income is 6). A two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test reveals that the average magnitude
of the differences in both incomes is significantly higher in treatment High than in
treatment Low (1.73 vs. 1.11, p = 0.031). Second, we compare the average magnitude
of misreports of only dishonest participants. This comparison yields no significant
difference between both treatments (p = 0.811).
Moreover, our design allows us to look at income-based motivations of dishonest
behavior. In particular, we are interested in one case of dishonest behavior, namely
partial dishonest behavior. Partial dishonest behavior is defined as all cases of dis-
honest behavior which do not maximize the income. Figure 5.3 shows the fraction of
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partial dishonest decision makers among all dishonest decision makers for both treat-
ments. While we observe a non-neglectable share of partial dishonest decision makers
in treatmentHigh (p = 0.002, two-tailedWilcoxconmatched-pairs signed-rank test), this
motivation is absent in treatment Low since all dishonest decisionmakers went straight
to the maximum income by reporting a “1”.44 In line with the previous test, a com-
parison between both treatments in the domain of partial dishonest behavior shows
that it is significantly higher in treatment High (p = 0.011, Fisher’s Exact test). To be
more precise, all except one partial dishonest participants reported the number 2which
results in an income of 5 Euros, i.e., they used dishonesty up to the level of the social
reference point.45 This result is in line with the findings by Abeler et al. (forthcomming)
and Gneezy et al. (2018) who report that partial dishonesty exists in observed games.46
However, they report that participants’ awareness of the observability of dishonest
behavior at the individual level has an impact on dishonest behavior overall, but espe-
cially on partial dishonest behavior. In particular, partial dishonesty is more frequent
in games where individual behavior is not observable than in games where dishonesty
could be detected at the individual level. This pattern seems to originate from social
identity concerns, i.e., people want to be perceived as honest by others (Gneezy et al.,
2018; Result 4). In contrast, Mazar et al. (2008) argue that partial dishonesty is used to
keep a positive self-image. The interpretation of our result, although being cautious
in the interpretation due to the points mentioned, is the following. For some decision
makers, acting dishonestly to increase the income above the social reference point, i.e.,
implementing an advantageous income inequality, is not beneficial because the addi-
tional intrinsic costs exceed the marginal benefit. The reference income in treatment
Highmight be viewed as a fair income, thus using dishonesty to earn 5 Euros could be
viewed (from an external or internal perspective) as legitimate.
5.3.3 PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS - A PROBIT REGRESSION APPROACH
The result of the non-parametric analysis of the main treatment effect is confirmed by a
probit regression analysis. Table 5.2 encompasses six different specifications of probit
regressions. The dependent variable of all models is the dummy variable “dishonest
behavior” as defined previously. Model 1 reports the main treatment effect of the
high peer-income treatment and confirms the findings from the non-parametic tests.
Model 2 adds demographic variables as controls. In model 3 and 4, we show that
the treatment effect is still significant when we control for the intermediate income
44Figure 5.4 displays the fraction of honest participants, partial liars, and full liars in treatment High.
45In one case, a participant reported a three. This led to a payment of 4 Euros for the decision maker.
46Please note, that the extreme result of no partial dishonesty in treatment Low could be due to the
already low number of dishonest participants in this treatment.
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without and with demographic variables as controls. Model 5 is the same as model
3 and confirms the robustness of the treatment effect when we relax the linearity
assumption for the intermediate income variable (see Figure 5.2b). The demographic
variables are all orthogonal to the treatment effect, so they should not change the main
effect by design. They are not orthogonal against each other, so we conclude that the
best model is the full model (Model 6).
Table 5.2: Probit regressions – Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Treatment High 0.197** 0.203*** 0.169** 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.208***
(0.078) (0.075) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071) (0.068)
Intermediate income -0.108*** -0.098*** 0.210* 0.203*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.119) (0.117)
Intermediate income2 -0.049*** -0.047***
(0.018) (0.018)
Age -0.012 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Study Econ/Business 0.196** 0.186** 0.181**
(0.078) (0.073) (0.072)
SVO Prosocial 0.202 0.086 0.078
(0.182) (0.177) (0.181)
SVO Indiviudalistic 0.156 0.094 0.085
(0.184) (0.176) (0.181)
Norm compliance 0.037** 0.025 0.025
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
N.obs. 136 136 136 136 136 136
Notes:The table reportsmarginal effects of probit regressionswith thedependent variable
“Dishonest behavior”. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we test whether and how social reference points in the form of peer
income affect honesty. Thereby, we contribute to the scarce literature on social reference
points, and complement and extend the literature on social comprison processes and
dishonest behavior (Houser et al., 2012; John et al., 2014). We do so by presenting
results of a laboratory experiment with a homogeneous subject pool of male subjects.
In our experiment, decision makers either face a peer which earns a high income or
a low income. We find that participants engage more often in dishonest behavior in
the treatment where the likelihood of the ex-ante income comparison based on an
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intermediate income is more likely to be in the form of a social loss comparison. We
conclude from this finding that there exists a correlation between moral and ethical
perception of decision makers and relative income concerns. In addition, we find in
the high income-peer treatment that a substantial fraction of decision makers use
dishonesty to increase the own income up to the level of the peer income which
might be viewed as a fair payment, while this motivation is absent in the treatment
with the low income-peer. Hence, decision makers use dishonest behavior to avert
disadvantageous income inequality, but do not cheat to the full extent to maximize
the income and implement an advantageous income inequality. This is in line with the
general conclusion of the outcome-based social preference model by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), where people are inequality averse and suffer from every form of outcome
inequality.
Our results are relevant for income transparency policies which are debated (and
partly implemented) inmany countries. For instance, theGerman income transparency
law came into force at the time we conducted the first sessions. Income transparency
could create positive externalities such as compressing the wage distribution (Mas,
2017), increasing tax reports (e.g., Bø et al., 2015), and closing the gender wage gap.
Yet, our work suggests that it might result in negative externalities in the form of
counterproductive workplace behavior (such as employee fraud) which are currently
ignored. Hence, our findings should be considered by policy makers and practitioners
when they decide about potential transparency policies.
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5.5 APPENDIX
5.5.1 ADDITIONAL TABLE
Table 5.3: SVO Triple-Dominance Measure
Situation Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
1
You get: 480
Other gets: 80
You get: 540
Other gets: 280
You get: 480
Other gets: 480
2
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
3
You get: 520
Other gets: 520
You get: 520
Other gets: 120
You get: 580
Other gets: 320
4
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 490
Other gets: 490
5
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
You get: 490
Other gets: 90
6
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
You get: 570
Other gets: 300
7
You get: 510
Other gets: 510
You get: 560
Other gets: 300
You get: 510
Other gets: 110
8
You get: 550
Other gets: 300
You get: 500
Other gets: 100
You get: 500
Other gets: 500
9
You get: 480
Other gets: 100
You get: 490
Other gets: 490
You get: 540
Other gets: 300
Notes: An individual is classified when she/he makes six or more type-
consistent choices. Prosocial choices are: 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, and
9b. Individualistic choices are: 1b, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, and 9c. Competi-
tive choices are: 1a, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, and 9a.
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5.5.2 ADDITIONAL FIGURE
Figure 5.4: Types of liars in treatment High
Notes: The graph shows the fraction of type of liars in treat-
mentHigh by the intermediate income. Black represent honest
participants, grey refers tomaximum liars, andwhite indicates
partial liars.
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5.5.3 EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions
Welcome to today’s experiment. You receive e4 as a show-up fee. In addition, you can
earn money during the experiment. Therfore, it is important that you carefully read
the instructions. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your
hand and one of the experimenters will come to assist you. Please do not communicate
with other participants before the end of the experiment. Please switch off yourmobile
phone. In addition, wewant to point out that you are only allowed to use the computer
functions that are intended for the course of the study. If you violate these rules, you
will be immediately excluded from the experiment and all payments. At the end of
the experiment we will pay you in cash e4 as a show-up fee and the money you’ve
earned during the experiment.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will form pairs. A pair consists of two
participants: Participant A and Participant B. At the beginning of the study, you will
be informed if your are Participant A or Participant B. Both participants have the same
task. Your task is to count the number of 0s in a table of 1s and 0s and report this
number correctly. A table consists of 10 rows and 7 columngs (i.e., 70 digits). The
number of 1s and 0s in a table are generated randomly.
Both participants have to solvemultiple tables correctly, but the total amount of tables
are the same for each member of a pair. You will learn the total amount of tables to
solve at the beginning of the task.
The difference between both roles of participants is in the payment for the task.
You will start with you task as soon as both incomes are determined.
Income of Participant A:
Participant A receives e5 for the task.
Payment Participant A for this experiment = e4 + e5 (e2 in Low) = e9 (e6 in Low)
Income of Participant B:
The income of Participant B will be determined as follows:
Participant B sees at the beginning a screen as illustrated on the next page.
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• The screen shows the numbers 1 to 6.
• Participant B has to click on “Random draw”. The computer picks one of the
numbers 1 to 6 randomly. Each number has the same likelihood to appear (You
can imagine the outcome of a dice throw). The box of the drawn number will be
highlighted in green and we show the drawn number below the box.
• We ask Participant B to remember the number and report it later on the screen.
• The number you report on screen determines your income. You will be paid
the equivalent in Euros to the number you report. The link between reported
number and income is summarized in the following table.
The conversion table (also shown on screen again):
Reported number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Income in Euros 6 5 4 3 2 1
Payment Participant B for this experiment=e4 + Income according to the conversion
table for the reported number
Participant A does not lear the income of Paricipant B for this task. All decision are
anonymous. Both players start with the respective task as soon as all incomes are
determined.
All decision will be treated confidentially and anonymously.
Thank you very much for your participation!
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5.5.4 POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Table 5.4: Post-experimental questionnaire
Question Answer
Please enter your age! ............
What is your major?
0 Business/Management
0 Economics
0 Psychology
0 Maths
0 Physics
0 Other
This is your ... semester at the university? ............
Do you have a study-accompanying job?
0 Yes, student job
0 Yes, during the holidays
0 Yes, part-time (whole year)
0 Yes, full-time (whole year)
0 No
Please, state your opinion to the following two
statements on a scale from 1 to 10.
Statement A: The mechanism which determined
my income for the job was unfair
given the income of the other participant!
Statement B: The mechanism which determined
my income for the job was fair
given the income of the other participant!
Scale from 1 - 10
with 1 strong agreement with
statement A and 10 strong
agreement with statement B
Please, state your opinion to the following two
statements on a scale from 1 to 10.
Statement A: People comply with legal norms!
Statement B: People do not comply with legal norms!
Scale from 1 - 10
with 1 strong agreement with
statement A and 10 strong
agreement with statement B
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